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Abstract 
 
This research analyses the impact of deliberative governance mechanisms on policy reforms. 
This mode of governance involves the direct participation of state and non-state actors in meetings, 
during which participants are open to the exchange of arguments about a particular policy space and 
to reaching an agreement which can be non-binding. This research develops the theoretical claim 
that deliberative governance has a significant impact on the cognitive aspect of domestic policies and 
in particular individual attitudes. It focuses on the Bologna process that has been at the heart of 
European-wide reforms of higher education and investigates three aspects. First, a survey of 
participants in the Bologna process shows how their attitudes have changed. Secondly, case studies 
of the Sorbonne and Bologna agreements of the 25th of May 1998 and the 19th of June 1999 
investigate how those changes of attitudes and policies fit participants’ interests. Thirdly, a 
comparison between reforms in England and France (mid-1980s-2007) discusses how changes of 
attitudes relate to domestic policy changes.  
The study explores two mechanisms that have been widely held to facilitate reforms, namely 
‘learning’ and ‘strategic use’.  The study finds that participants are open to changing their perceptions 
and receiving information on policy options in deliberations if it fits their interests. Deliberations also 
help diffuse paradigms which facilitate domestic reforms. More importantly, deliberative governance 
obeys a certain hierarchy when influencing individual attitudes. It starts by changing the most 
instrumental attitudes. However, all attitudes are connected, leading to a spiralling effect toward  
attitude change concerning more fundamental domestic reforms. Deliberative governance therefore 
has the potential to create some convergence in certain policy areas. This research contributes to the 
relevant European integration literature on deliberative governance and policy change by drawing on 
theoretical insights from the wide literature on cognitive theories. It also adds to the specialist field of 
studies concerning the European higher education area 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 ‘The free and sovereign thing is the  
whole process of discussion’ Barker (1958:37) 
 
The puzzle of policy change in higher education  
Most if not all countries in Europe have adopted reforms going in a similar direction in 
higher education policies1 since 1998. Those reforms initially concerned the architecture of 
degrees in three graduation levels - undergraduate, master and doctorate (Eurydice, 2007)2. They 
then touched upon others objects, for example increasing the autonomy of universities in the area 
of financial management (Eurydice, 2008: 18)3.   
Why would countries adopt similar-minded reforms, especially since the European Union 
(EU) traditionally had few policy competencies in the realm of education? Education was 
perceived as a stronghold of the nation-state. Articles 149 and 150 TEC4 only gave the EU 
complementary competencies in education, meaning that the European Union could only 
promote cooperation between member states, supporting and supplementing member states’ 
actions5. But the EU could not regulate aspects of higher education related to curricula, financing 
or management.  
                                               
1 Policy is loosely defined as a deliberate course of actions set by the Government.  
2 Many countries already had a degree structure similar to those three levels. Others, such as Italy, France, Germany, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria and Liechtenstein, had to undergo a reform of their degree structure to fit the three 
graduation levels (see Eurydice, 1999; 2007:16). 
3 See appendix for a table comparing the times of reforms on those issues in the member states of the European 
Union since the late 1990s. The table shows that there is admittedly some variation in the content and mode of 
reforms – the area of financial management including various aspects from the introduction of tuition fees to who is 
responsible for financial decisions; and in the table taking legislation, regulations, governmental strategies and 
proposals into account. Knowing this, the average year of reforms regarding the architecture of degrees was 2002 
while reforms regarding financial contribution came later, on average in 2004.  
4 TEC: Treaty establishing the European Community (consolidated version). Equivalent to art. 165 and 166 in the 
2008 Treaty of Lisbon.  
5 The most popular of those cooperation programmes was the students’ mobility programme ERASMUS, created in 
1984 to promote the mobility of students across the EU (Commission, 2006: 116-120). 
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Moreover, the reforms did not arise from competitive pressures on European universities 
to attract students since the movement of European students remained small. Few students 
travelled outside the European Union area to study: students with EU citizenship studying in  the 
main non-EU international destinations represented on average only 0.19% of the number of 
students enrolled in higher education in the EU in 1998 (OECD, 2000:  186)6. And few EU 
students went to another European country: only 1.55% of students who were citizens of one of 
the fifteen EU member states studied in another country of the EU, the European Economic 
Area or in a candidate country for accession to the EU, in 1998 (Eurostat, 2009)7. 
As far as higher education was concerned, European countries shared non-binding 
agreements. The Bologna process constitutes a series of non-binding agreements in the field of 
higher education8. Started on the 25th of May 1998 with the Sorbonne declaration, it aims at 
creating more integration in higher education, under what was called a European higher education 
area, having started with an agenda for reforms on the length of degrees, followed by quality 
assurance, and finally including statements on institutional management and the financing of 
universities. Those non-binding agreements emerged from deliberative governance mechanisms. 
Deliberative governance involves the direct participation of state and possibly non-state actors in 
deliberations, during which those various actors are open to exchanging arguments in a particular 
policy space and to reaching an agreement which can be non-binding9. Since this study is 
concerned with European agreements, the deliberative governance studied in this research occurs 
                                               
6 Using the citizenship of students inflates estimates of mobility, since some students may have a different citizenship 
from the one of the country in which they study while all the same being resident. OECD data took into account 
students who crossed one or more borders with the express intention to study to measure mobility only from 2003. 
Non EU international destinations included the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Statistics were 
available for 14 of the 15 EU member states in 1998 (all except Belgium). The US, Canada, Australia and Japan 
welcomed 45% of foreign students studying in OECD countries in 1998 (OECD, 2000: 179).  
7 This statistic represents the percentage of students of EU/EEA/candidate country citizenship studying in another 
EU/EEA/candidate country. Data was missing for Belgium.  
8 The Bologna process is constituted by a series of agreements signed every two years by ministers of higher 
education.  
9 The rest of this research uses the terms deliberative governance and deliberations interchangeably.  
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mostly on a European platform, although deliberations started at the European level admittedly 
helped shape to further domestic deliberations.  
Intuitively, one would not expect deliberative governance to induce decision-makers to 
voluntarily implement major reforms in their respective states. Because decision-makers are not 
legally bound to reform and many of them are elected and constrained to a short-term mandate, 
they should logically prioritise other policy areas where implementation is legally binding, for 
example implementing EU legislation on competition policy.  
If deliberative governance such as the Bologna process has more effect than this prediction, 
it becomes worth analysing the scope and mechanisms for such impact. Such analysis not only 
increases understanding of how higher education policy changes, but also provides more insight 
in the functioning and capacities of deliberative governance as a policy-making tool. In other 
words, this research assesses whether or not deliberative governance makes a difference to the 
outcome of policy-making, and if it does, why and through which mechanisms deliberative 
governance affects policy-making. Moreover, European higher education, because it underwent 
many policy changes over the past decades despite the relative absence of binding EU 
legislation10, could well be a critical case to study deliberative governance.  
A starting point to understand how deliberative governance influenced, if at all, reforms in 
European higher education, lies within the chronology of reform. Why did some reforms, such as 
the reforms of the length of degrees, precede other reforms, for example in the area of financial 
contribution? Could a theory of deliberative governance explain the chronology of reform? The 
rest of this chapter introduces what deliberative governance encompasses within the framework 
of the European Union, and explains how deliberative governance can be theorised and applied 
to the Bologna process.  
                                               
10 A few directives promoted the recognition of vocational qualifications. See chapter 6.  
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Deliberative governance in the European Union 
The study of deliberative governance has burgeoned so much over the past decade in 
European studies that some have qualified the trend as a ‘deliberative turn’, perceived as an 
alternative to intergovernmentalist and neofunctionalist theories (Neyer, 2006). This ‘deliberative 
turn’ is motivated by empirical developments within and outside the classic community method. 
The classic community method is the traditional way to make EU law. It mainly results in binding 
measures and involves the legislative interplay between the European Commission, the Council, 
the Parliament, and the European Court of Justice as the judicial body.  Deliberation occurs at 
many levels within the classic community method. At the level of the Council, Eriksen and 
Fossum (2000: 7) reported that only fourteen percent of all the decisions adopted were voted 
upon. In other cases, those decisions were adopted unanimously, pre-supposing prior 
deliberation.  Two additional examples consist of the deliberations of national civil servants when 
preparing EU legislation in the Permanent Representatives Committee COREPER (art. 207 
TEC11) and to monitor implementation in comitology meetings established at the end of the 
1980s (Council decisions 1987/373/EEC and Council decision 1999/468/EEC).   
Deliberative governance has also extended outside the classic community method for 
example through the open method of coordination (OMC) (Hartwig and Meyer, 2002; Sabel and 
Zeitlin, 2007). The open method of coordination involves the collective monitoring of the 
domestic policies of the member states. It results in non-coercive measures and involves the 
participation of actors from various professions. The Lisbon strategy (2000) gave official 
recognition to the open method of coordination. But policy coordination was first developed 
before that, to prepare for the monetary union, accompanying the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines and later of the European Employment Strategy in the 1990s. The open method of 
                                               
11 Art. 240 of the consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Communities.  
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coordination extended to many policy areas in the early 2000s including education with the 
Lisbon Council (2000), but also information society, research, company policy, social policy and 
environmental policies. Studying what impact the OMC has on domestic policies is particularly 
interesting, because this involves an analysis of the possibility of policy change without the use of 
coercion.  
A theoretical framework inspired by cognitive theories 
This research tests the constructivist view of the impact of deliberation on domestic 
policies. This constructivist view is the most supportive of deliberative governance. It explains 
how deliberative governance sweeps away narrow self-interests through argumentation and makes 
participants harmonise their plans of action (Eriksen and Neyer, 2003: 11). This harmonisation 
results in European integration (Eriksen, 2003) and implies a convergence between the policies of 
European member states, convergence being defined as an increase in the similarity of policy 
goals (the intent to deal with similar problems) outputs (the content of political measures at the 
national level) and possibly also style (policy style signifying the process by which policy responses 
are formulated) (Bennett, 1991: 218). However, at first sight this constructivist view on 
deliberation does not relate very well to rationalist accounts which are sceptical of the effect of 
deliberation and assume the endurance of self-interest. Nor does it appear to be compatible with 
accounts of domestic implementation, which predicts long-lasting differences between the 
policies of member states (for example, see Knill and Lenschow, 1998).  
This study reconciles those apparently different accounts by getting inspiration from 
cognitive theories drawn from social psychology and political philosophy (for example Quine, 
1951; Festinger, 1953; Ajzein and Fishbein, 1975; Axelrod, 1976; Moscovici, 1980; Eagly and 
Chaiken, 2003; List, 2008 Mackie, 2008).  Using cognitive theories is not as big a leap as it may 
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seem. The deliberative democratic branch of political philosophy (Habermas, 1984; Elster, 1992; 
Cohen and Sabel, 1997; Dryzek, 2000) inspired the constructivist view of researchers studying 
deliberative governance in European integration studies. And the predictions of cognitive 
psychology share similarities with the constructivist view according to which deliberation can 
change individual opinions. Moreover, psychology has been used to explain group behaviour and 
ideology in political science (Converse, 1963; Kinder, 1985; McGuire, 1985). Cognitive theories 
therefore provide the grounds to understand not only the consequences of communication for 
policy change, but also the reasons and mechanisms stimulating this change.  
The key starting point for many cognitive theories is that an individual holds many opinions 
on different objects. Those opinions, in this research called attitudes, are all connected and some 
are more general and central than others. The more central and general attitudes are, the more 
difficult they are to change. Hence deliberation, by providing new information, should have an 
impact on the superficial attitudes before the more central ones.  
Some of the literature on Europeanisation12 also divides policies according to different levels 
(Knill and Lenschow, 1998), providing the grounds to connect individual changes in attitudes to 
domestic policies, and eventually the role of deliberation to domestic policies while 
acknowledging that different dynamics influence both levels.  
Establishing this connection explains why reforms occur in some policy objects before 
others, or why researchers sometimes fail to discover any effect from deliberation if they look at a 
very central object. Such a model complements the European integration literature by adding the 
prediction of a spiralling effect: change at one layer of policy facilitates adjustment in other 
aspects of the policy.  
                                               
12 This research conceives of Europeanisation studies as the analysis of the impact of the European level on domestic 
policies, Europeanisation studies being part of the larger field of European integration studies.  
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
 15 
This research empirically tests such a framework on the Bologna process. Testing the 
impact of deliberative governance on policy-making is rather different from the typical empirical 
tests in political philosophy. Such empirical tests traditionally concentrate on the impact of 
deliberation on public opinion (see for example Boucher et al., 2007; Davidson et al., 2009). 
Studying deliberation in a policy-making environment introduces many constraints which are not 
present when looking at public opinion in general or when theorising about deliberation in a 
normative way. But introducing such constraints is important to understand ‘real life’ European 
policy-making. How do political interests affect the impact of deliberation on individual attitudes? 
How does introducing various roles, countries of origins and hierarchies between representatives 
impact on their reactions to deliberation and affect the group outcome? This research shows that 
deliberation can have a more instrumental role in policy-making, in addition to the cognitive 
effect on attitudes described by deliberative democrats. Within this mechanism, state actors use a 
rhetoric that they have heard at the European level to convince other actors to reform in the 
domestic sphere.  
The Bologna process, a deliberative laboratory  
This research presents an original effort to analyse the significance of deliberative 
governance within the Bologna process. The Bologna process has not yet been studied from the 
angle of deliberative governance. Yet, it represents an ideal laboratory to study deliberation in a 
‘real’ policy environment and to analyse the relevance of deliberation for the EU. Research on the 
Bologna process presents it as a unique phenomenon, since it has stimulated an integrationist 
institutional dynamic in a policy area traditionally devoted to maintaining national power without 
the use of coercion (Racké, 2005; Ravinet, 2005a/2005b/2007/2008). Existing research also 
suggests that the Bologna process had a stronger effect on domestic implementation than might 
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be expected for a voluntary process, albeit not a homogenous one, for a voluntary process (Witte, 
2006).  
Although the Bologna process is not officially included in the EU competencies, the 
process has become progressively institutionalised to resemble and be attached to the EU’s OMC, 
which applied to European higher education after the 2001 Council recommendation (Racké, 
2005; Ravinet, 2007; Van der Wende and Huisman, 2004:2; Maassen and Olsen, 2007). The 
Bologna process is the first agreement to require significant cooperation between member states 
in the field of European higher education, excluding programmes to fund the mobility of students 
such as ERASMUS. It initially covered four EU member states, but quickly extended to thirty two 
European states the year after with the Bologna declaration of the 19th of June 1999. This 
process gradually grew to include forty five countries, making it a European instead of an EU 
undertaking.  
But the Bologna process remains very much influenced by the EU. Many of the features of 
the process echo the European Union’s OMC. Both the Bologna process and the OMC are by 
nature deliberative. Both processes lead to non-binding agreements on common targets, called 
action lines in the Bologna process.  Ministers decide on those targets every two years in the 
Bologna process as they would in the European Council in the framework of the OMC13. 
Participants tend to be the same across the Bologna process and the Lisbon strategy (interview, 
EF1, 04 July 2007). Participants come from various professions. Civil servants and representatives 
from civil society in particular meet to discuss progress on common targets and to prepare 
upcoming interministerial meeting. Participants also attend various seminars and conferences, 
                                               
13 Ministers actually meet three or four times a year for the OMC in the Education, Youth and Culture Council, 
although those meetings cover eucation as a whole.   
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exchanging best practice, and taking part in peer learning activities14. Finally, although the stress 
lies on voluntary learning, the achievement of targets is assessed in national reports, which 
provide a basis for ‘naming and shaming’. The European Union has therefore heavily influenced 
the institutional shape of the Bologna process. The European Commission is also very involved 
in financing the Bologna process.  
Yet, the Bologna process constitutes a more accessible object of study than the OMC, with 
its publicly available minutes of meetings and lists of participants. It also includes more material 
since it started earlier than the OMC in higher education - 1998 for the Bologna process versus 
2001 for the OMC in higher education.  
The Bologna process can appear as rather all-encompassing with regard to its direction. At 
first sight, the declarations themselves provide fairly general if not diluted statements. The first 
action lines of the process originally targeted apparently less contentious political objects, such as 
the length of degrees.  
But certain elements of the process entrusted it with a larger objective than its original action lines 
and gave it a clear political mandate to tackle more controversial themes. The Bologna process 
ambitiously tackled some themes within higher education provision which were traditionally 
heavily debated if not taboo: Its interministerial meetings extended to topics such as the role of 
the state in financing higher education, resulting in a statement on the social dimension of higher 
education being a public good (meaning that it necessitated some public funding) in the Berlin 
meeting of the 19th of September 2003. The Berlin communiqué also anchored the Bologna 
process within the direction defined by the Lisbon strategy, by recognising the conclusions of the 
European Union Councils of Lisbon (2000) and Barcelona (2002). As such, the Berlin 
                                               
14 Peer learning activities are conducted on topics such as the assessment of quality assurance agencies of member 
states, or of universities’ use of the European Credit Transfer System. The activities take place as part of both the 
open method of coordination and the Bologna process. 
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communiqué linked the Bologna process to subsequent European Union documents and 
agreements on the Lisbon strategy, which had larger ambitions regarding higher education 
(Council, 2001). The Lisbon strategy promoted an economically liberal perspective, including the 
free movement of students, competition between higher education institutions, the diversification 
of financial resources and the introduction of managerialism in the governance of universities 
(Commission, 2003/2003b/2003c).  The later communiqués of Bergen (20th of May 2005) and 
London (17th of May 2007) restated those principles. This study therefore also looks at how 
European deliberations, mostly originating from the Bologna process, helped to promote an 
economically liberal perspective in European higher education.  
A methodological challenge  
Such a study represents a methodological challenge. Deliberation is potentially ubiquitous, 
policy-making being contingent on the exchange of arguments (Majone, 1989). So how can one 
attribute policy change to a process of deliberation, especially when public policies take place in 
complex environments influenced by many factors? And how can a researcher concurrently 
address many levels of analysis - at the individual and the group/policy levels as well as the 
European and national levels?  
Using multiple lenses of analysis provides the most appropriate way to address such a 
challenge. It controls for the spurious associations created by the ubiquitous character of 
deliberation by triangulating the findings and uses each lens of analysis to complement each other.  
A first lens of analysis is survey research. The research presents a survey of state and non-
state participants in the Bologna process deliberations to understand how those participants have 
changed their attitudes. Case studies of the deliberations preliminary to the Sorbonne and 
Bologna declaration of the 25th of May 1998 and the 19th of June 1999 provide a second lens of 
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analysis to investigate strategic motivations underlying these changes of attitudes. A comparative 
study of two member states within the Bologna process, France and England15, constitutes a third 
lens of analysis to investigate the relationship between deliberation and policy change.  
This case study investigates the impact of deliberation on policy change in France and 
England from the mid-1980s until 2007 on topics related to the Bologna process, namely the 
design of degrees, quality assurance, financial contribution and the institutional management of 
universities. Both countries were among the earliest signatories of the Bologna process, France 
hosting the deliberation which started the Bologna process on the 25th of May 1998. England and 
France respectively also correspond to two of the main higher education models in Europe: the 
Anglo-Saxon and Napoleonic models (Neave, 2001). However, since then, France and England 
have had a different relationship with the Bologna process: France counts among the countries 
having undertaken the deepest reforms since the beginning of the Bologna process, whereas 
England has conducted few Bologna process related reforms. Although England has conducted 
few reforms, it is worth studying in-depth. According to some, England plays the role of a 
reference case in addition to being a participant to the Bologna process (Witte, 2006: 104).  
Overview and contribution 
The remainder of this thesis adopts the following structure. The first part discusses the 
existing literature, providing an assessment of the constructivist hypothesis, before presenting a 
refinement based on cognitive theories and justifying the multiple lenses of analysis of this 
research. The second part presents empirical evidence on the impact of deliberation gathered by 
the survey, deliberation case studies and comparison of policy changes in France and England 
                                               
15 The countries of the UK have a lot of responsibilities devolved to them in the field of higher education, notably in 
the area of financial contribution (setting up fees, etc.) and each country can have substantively distinct policies. I 
therefore concentrate on England, although education in England is the responsibility of departments of the 
Government of the United Kingdom (from June 2007, the Department of Children, Schools and Families and the 
Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills).  
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between the mid 1980s and 2007. This study seeks to contribute to two research strands: adding 
to the understanding of deliberative governance in European integration studies and to the body 
of work on European higher education. It shows in particular how deliberative governance 
facilitates increasingly fundamental reforms in European higher education policy.  
Part I The impact of deliberative governance on attitudes and policies: theory and 
measurement 
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Part I The impact of deliberative governance on attitudes and policies: 
theory and measurement 
 
This first part justifies the integration of cognitive theories as part of a framework for the 
empirical analysis of European higher education. What is the impact of deliberation on individual 
attitudes and policies? How can one produce a theoretical and methodological way to explain the 
chronology of reforms and to combine micro and macro levels of analysis, i.e. changes of 
attitudes to changes of policies?  
The literature on European integration studies and European higher education studies 
includes at first sight many contrasting strands as explained earlier: the constructivist hypothesis 
seems at odds with the realist perspective on deliberation and self-interest and with 
Europeanisation studies of domestic implementation. Comparing these different branches of the 
literature also raises the problem of multiple levels of analysis (chapter 2). But theoretical insights 
from cognitive psychology, which have also been used in political philosophy, complement the 
existing literature to explain deliberative mechanisms and justify a hierarchy of reforms (chapter 
3). Empirically investigating such theoretical insights however raises some methodological issues, 
which are solved by using multiple lenses of analysis (chapter 4).  
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Chapter 2 Literature on deliberative governance in European and higher 
education studies 
 
To change domestic policies, European deliberative governance should firstly affect the 
opinions of its participants, who can then reframe domestic debates. The impact of deliberation 
therefore occurs at a variety of levels. How does the literature from European and higher 
education studies account for this variable impact? More precisely, how intense is the impact of 
deliberation on individual opinions according to the literature? And which impact do European 
deliberations have on domestic policies? How does the literature account, if at all, for differences 
in how policy changes?  
Such questions are not only a matter of concern for researchers on deliberation in 
European integration studies. A wide political science literature has studied the impact of 
communication on cognition and policy changes, including studies on discourse (Schmidt, 2001; 
Radaelli, 2004; Radaelli and Schmidt, 2005), and learning in public policy (Sabatier, 1998), 
sociological institutionalism (Börzel and Risse, 2000), and on socialisation and persuasion in 
international relations (see special issue of International Organization, 2005).  
Those studies are of substantial theoretical variety. But they are all mostly interested in 
understanding how individuals, by talking to each other on a particular policy issue, integrate new 
information and adopt some new insight which affects the way they conduct policies, which is in 
essence what this research describes as deliberative governance16.  
                                               
16 This study uses the terminology of deliberative governance as opposed to other terms adopted by these studies. 
Deliberative governance implies the notion of being required to deliberate on a particular policy space, that the 
concept of socialisation does not include. Besides, deliberative governance reflects the idea of bilateral exchange that 
persuasion studies in international relations do not have, since they mostly concentrate on how an international 
organisation impacts on an individual or a nation state. Moreover, deliberative governance implies a polyarchy with 
many actors being involved and whose interests are considered equally (Dahl, 1956; Sabel and Zeitlin, 2007), which is 
not necessarily reflected by these other terms.  
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Some public policy studies also explain why policies change according to a particular 
chronology. Kuhn (1970), Hall (1993), Majone (1989), Sabatier (1987/98) Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith (1993) and Schmidt (2002: 222-4) have all elaborated a hierarchy of different elements of a 
policy and theorised that the superficial elements of a policy were more likely to change than the 
core elements. This literature review however shows that much remains to be done to connect 
such ideas concerning a hierarchy of elements of public policies to the impact of deliberative 
governance in European integration studies17.  
In European integration studies, the constructivist hypothesis is mostly applied to studies 
the impact of deliberation at the individual level and provides the most optimistic view of the 
impact of deliberative governance. Different branches of the literature contest the constructivist 
claim. These branches of the literature include rationalist theories concerning the significance and 
evolution of individual interests in deliberation, and implementation studies on the transition to 
the level of domestic policies. But each one of these different branches of the literature are not 
necessarily irreconcilable and include possible opportunities for theoretical synthesis. Such a 
theoretical synthesis implies solving how to combine micro and macro levels of analysis, i.e. 
explaining how deliberation impacts on individuals before explaining its dynamics at a group level 
and how it impacts on domestic policies and the chronology of policy changes.  
The constructivist hypothesis  
The constructivist literature concentrates mostly on the impact of deliberation on individual 
opinions. The intuition behind this constructivist literature is the following: through the exchange 
of arguments, individuals progressively adopt other-rewarding preferences, sacrificing their self-
interests in favour of the common good (Eriksen, 2003: 160). This results in a convergence 
                                               
17 Sabatier (1998:120-22) implicitly touched upon the relevance of these hierarchies for understanding European 
policy-making, although he more explicitly concentrated on how to study advocacy coalitions.  
Chapter 2 Literature on deliberative governance in European and higher education studies 
 
 
 24 
toward the common good, which ensues because participants will not dare to articulate the most 
selfish preferences and individuals progressively become convinced of the arguments they utter. 
Deliberative decision-making is therefore considered normatively superior to bargaining, which 
does not result in the same selfless property or potential to justify positions through reasoned 
arguments (Eriksen and Neyer, 2003: 8) 18.  
But the impact of deliberation runs deep and is not limited to the transformation of 
preferences and interests according to constructivists. Participants change their identities in 
European deliberations, until they eventually forge a feeling of ‘we-ness’ toward the European 
community that they put before their national identity (Beyers, 2005). Socialisation studies also 
demonstrate how norms become affected. Norms are ‘prescriptions for action in situations of choice, the 
actor may or may not choose to obey them, including a broad class of generalised prescriptive statements – principles, 
standards, rules and so on’ (Chayes and Chayes, 1995: 113).  
The extent to which this constructivist claim is a reality in deliberations in European higher 
education is debated. On the one hand, research concludes that the open method of coordination 
has had a limited effect on the learning of new ideas and norms which could have resulted in new 
policy practices. Gornitzka (2005:30) for example argues that the open method of coordination in 
education is still in the making and it is too soon to notice significant effects on policy practices, 
reflecting the pessimism of a broader literature. This literature argues for example that the 
legitimatory and problem solving capacities of the open method of coordination are limited by the 
                                               
18 This argument follows the epistemic justification of deliberation in political philosophy, which roughly speaking 
considers deliberation as better able to reach the ‘truth’ than other modes of decision-making. See Chappell (2008) 
for a definition and of distinction between epistemic and procedural justifications of deliberative democracy.  
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logic of contestation inherent to welfare policy and political economy (Chalmers and Lodge, 
2003)19.   
On the other hand, the literature is more optimistic regarding the effect of deliberations in the 
Bologna process. Although the literature on European higher education does not study 
deliberative governance as such, part of the literature adopts a constructivist perspective, analysing 
the impact of European agreements on cognitive maps. The literature firstly spends time 
decomposing how each action line of the Bologna process fits with a coherent overall rhetoric. It 
then explains how the Bologna process imposes this cognitive map on its participants (Fejes, 
2005; Nokkala, 2005; Ravinet, 2007). The Bologna process therefore has an impact on its 
participants’ cognition.   
Self-interest and deliberation  
 But one of the reasons to cast doubt on the feasibility of the constructivist hypothesis 
comes from the endurance of self-interest in public policy-making. The divide between the use of 
power and the use of reasoned argument is one of the most fundamental ones in the literature.  
The strategic pursuit of self-interest is traditionally studied by rational choice advocates, 
here called rationalists. Rationalists argue that participants reach compromises based upon 
exogenously fixed preferences (for example, see Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001) through bargaining. 
Some rationalists exclude the role of arguments, introducing the possibility that coordination 
occurs without communication (Axelrod, 1984), or when they do, those arguments are principally 
just ‘noise’.  
This rationalist fulfilment of self-interest becomes, according to some, a barrier to the 
achievement of the constructivist hypothesis. In that case, researchers need to make an ‘either/or’ 
                                               
19 The implication of this statement is that  actors are more prone to contestation in policy areas of a redistributive 
nature because such policy areas involve a zero sum game where the maximisation’s of one’s interests leads to the 
loss of another’s (Hix, 2005: 236). 
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choice supporting either rationalist bargaining or constructivist deliberation (Checkel, 2005). 
Researchers base this distinction on whether preferences are viewed as remaining fixed (which 
would indicate bargaining) or are allowed to change (which would indicate deliberation). For 
example, Lewis (1998) finds that rationalist accounts cannot explain all of the social interactions in 
his case study of the COREPER negotiations prior to the local elections directive. Lewis (1998: 
486) explains that the culture of compromise and the emergence of a collective rationality in 
COREPER shape national preferences and reinforce constructivist claims.   
Jacobsson and Viffell (2003/2004) and Jacobsson (2004) compare constructivism with 
rational choice views on individual preferences in their account of the Employment committee, 
part of the open method of coordination. They find some evidence in favour of deliberation 
(agents exchanged arguments with an ambition to reach agreement, committees’ decisions were 
non-binding, participants changed their preferences toward a consensual view). But at the same 
time, this deliberative capacity depended on the issue and type of participant (it was easier to 
reach consensus on technical rather than political issues, among experts of similar epistemic 
communities rather than political representatives among closed fora). And sometimes positions 
were ‘locked-in’ beforehand.  
Magnette and Nicolaïdis (2004), in their account of the negotiations leading to the 
European Convention, claim that participants exchanged arguments, which gave the impression 
of deliberation, and some problems were solved by discussing ideas in the early stages of the 
negotiations. But they acknowledge that the largest part of the proceedings was conducted by 
bargaining over fixed preferences. Magnette and Nicolaïdis (2004) also establish the conditions 
under which deliberation was more likely to occur than bargaining. They look at the type of 
policies concern the stage of deliberation and the type of actors and member states represented.  
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The types of policies they examine include a distinction between regulatory and 
redistributive policies: Regulatory policies are expected to produce outcomes that are beneficial to 
everyone (pareto-optimal) while redistributive policies are a zero-sum game where one actor loses 
while other actors win. Deliberation, because it can result in a common good, is more likely to 
occur in regulatory policies than in redistributive areas according to Magnette and Nicolaïdis 
(2004).  
Magnette and Nicolaïdis (2004) also single out the stage of deliberation: participants are 
more likely to listen to each other before concrete issues are being determined and before 
governments issue official positions.  
Moreover, the seniority of actors also influences their receptivity to deliberation. Being at a 
rather junior and inexperienced level with not much decision-making power increases the 
probability of changing one’s preferences, because junior participants have less at stake, since they 
do not make decisions. Magnette and Nicolaïdis (2004) find like Jacobson and Viffell (2003/2004) 
that the level of expertise also influences the impact of deliberation20.  
Finally, Magnette and Nicolaïdis (2004) explain that some member states are more likely to 
change their minds during deliberation than others. They argue that new member states were 
more likely to change their minds than old member states because they had less at stake. Newer 
member states were more inclined to accept arguments to ‘fit in’ while older member states are 
more likely to try to defend their interests. Many authors therefore attempted to define a 
particular meeting as either constructivist deliberation or rationalist bargaining depending on the 
type of officials and member states involved.  
                                               
20 Many authors discuss the function of a participant in relation to his openness to changing his mind (Hubbard and 
McGraw, 1996: 161-62; Gibson, 1998: 833-5; Checkel, 2001:  31).  
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But the difference between bargaining and deliberation is not as clear cut as some of the 
literature suggests. First, deliberation may not lead to preference change. Actors can take part in 
reasoned arguments but not change their preferences, especially if those preferences satisfy their 
own interests as well as the interests of the group. Actors can even become more convinced of 
their own preferences following deliberation (Sunstein, 2003).  According to Gehring (2003), the 
main condition for deliberation to occur is that participants exchange reasoned arguments. 
Moreover, bargaining need not imply fixed preferences. Many game theoretical models have 
shown that preferential change over actions occurs even under rational choice assumptions if a 
player receives new information which leads him to choose a different strategy to maximise his 
utility (see for example Austen-Smith, 1992).  
Secondly, deliberation becomes necessary in a rational choice framework under the 
condition of incomplete information. Actors need to exchange information to reduce 
uncertainty21. Indeed, actors cannot resort to power if they operate under a ‘veil of ignorance’ 
(Gehring, 2003). Deliberation provides actors with necessary information to maximise their utility, 
such as information about the relevant framework conditions, i.e. what the problem at stake is, 
how far they are affected and the norms underlying the social interaction or the rules of the game 
(Risse, 2000)22. Participants also need deliberation to determine their Pareto frontier. This means 
that participants need to communicate to determine which dimensions of the problem should be 
included or excluded from the agreement to make sure that no participant incurs a negative 
benefit (Gehring, 2003: 87). Deliberation and bargaining are therefore complementary modes of 
                                               
21 Such an argument is implicit in many recent game theoretical models which include the possibility of 
communication between players (see for example Landa and Meirowitz, 2006). 
22 Social norms provide the benchmark according to which individuals formulate their interests (Haas, 1989; 
Crawford, 2009).  
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interaction. And even under a rational choice framework, deliberation can play a part in the 
formation of preferences and strategies over preferences.  
The European higher education literature does not go into many details regarding the divide 
between rationalists and constructivists. But it describes extensively how self-interested actors 
joined the Bologna process and took part in various deliberations. Ravinet (2007) for example 
describes how the Sorbonne declaration corresponded to various self-interested strategies from 
the four joining Ministers of France, the UK, Germany and Italy. She explains how the French 
and Italian Ministers took part in the deliberations because they were keen to find a solution to 
facilitate domestic reforms, while the German Minister wanted to raise his political profile during 
his electoral campaign by being seen as instigating a European agreement.  
The fact that rationalist assumptions and constructivist predictions are necessarily 
incompatible shifts the focus of research away from trying to identify whether a particular 
meeting is a deliberation or a round of bargaining toward aiming at determining the mechanisms 
through which deliberation leads to a particular outcome.  
Relationship with domestic policies 
 Once deliberation affects individual opinions, it can translate into policies. Understanding 
how deliberative governance relates to domestic policies implies a delicate decomposition of the 
micro and macro levels of policy-making and dynamics between those two levels which is not 
always clear in the literature.  
Some of the constructivist literature acknowledges that European deliberations affect 
domestic policies, mostly using general predictions or correlations rather than mechanisms. 
Wessels (1998), in his fusion hypothesis, predicts that domestic administrations converge as the 
result of civil servants becoming socialised in Europe. Generally speaking, deliberation makes 
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implementation easier since it is more difficult to oppose a policy after having talked about it at 
length (Chayes and Chayes, 1995). Deliberation helps implementation especially if the individuals 
who participate have different roles since it encourages those different individuals to coordinate 
(Sabel and Zeitlin, 2007). While acknowledging that the convergence of ideas does not necessarily 
entail a convergence of domestic policy decisions, some of the literature also predicts that changes 
of preferences, interests, identities and norms resulting from deliberation23 lead to institutional 
change over time (Radaelli, 1997; Radelli, 2003: 9).  
The relationship between European decision-making and the domestic sphere also exists in 
European integration studies when accounting for bottom-up dynamics, i.e. domestic context and 
state-civil society relationships influencing European decisions. Moravcsik (1993) for example 
argues that non-state actors voice their opinions on particular reforms and contribute to the 
process of domestic preference formation which shapes the position of decision-makers in 
European deliberations. And delegation to the European level provides a way to avoid 
confrontation with non-state actors at the domestic level. Non-state actors can also find that 
European deliberations provide them with a window of opportunity, a finding supported by a 
large literature which shows that diffuse interests have turned to Brussels and sometimes 
substitute action at the national level (Geddes, 2000; Warleigh, 2000; Imig and Tarrow, 2001)24.  
But most of the literature on top-down dynamics, i.e. how European influence leads to 
domestic implementation, tends to separate itself from cognitive and behavioural analyses at the 
European decision-making level. Implementation studies concentrate on which factors can 
                                               
23 …or its semantic equivalent.  
24 Non-state actors are more interested in the European level because EU competencies have grown in areas of 
concern to them, such as internal market regulation for large firms (Cohen, 1997: 105). Moreover, the European 
Commission is understaffed, and relies on interest groups for the supply of expertise to a large extent. And the EU 
provides interest groups with more opportunities to influence the legislative process (Crombez, 2002) from 
prelegislative preparation through amendment during legislative adoption, and even post-adoption implementation 
than in the domestic level where interest groups are forced to focus their efforts on the prelegislative stage of policy-
making.  
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prevent transcription into domestic politics. Some of those factors are the degree of political 
commitment to reforms, opposite parliamentary vote, hostile non-state actors and socio-
economic influences. Hence, Kelley (2004: 50-52) explains that the commitment of political 
leaders influences policy outcomes, particularly in states which give those leaders a lot of formal 
and informal powers, such as authoritarian states.  
Moreover, a European agreement may fail to be transcribed into domestic policies if it has to go 
through parliament and does not gain enough votes. Governing coalitions (Kelley, 2004) or party 
constellations in parliament therefore influence domestic implementation (Schimmelfennig, 2005).  
The support of non-state actors is also important, particularly if a non legislative branch is 
involved in implementation, for example through a decree in France. Speaking more generally, 
non-state actors influence the transcription of European deliberations by taking part in domestic 
deliberations as the debate on multi-level governance indicated (Hooghe 1995; Marks et al.; 1996). 
Finally, different national socio-economic conditions provide more or fewer incentives for policy 
change (Scott, 1998) and therefore for implementing European deliberative agreements.  
The vast majority of studies on the Bologna process analyses its domestic implementation 
in various countries, on a single case or comparative basis (European Journal of Education, 
special issue “The Bologna process”, 2004; Fägerlind and Strömqvist, 2004; Barraud and Mignot, 
2005; Krücken et al., 2005; Mangset, 2005; Mignot Gérard and Musselin, 2005; Musselin, 2006; 
Witte, 2006; Amaral and Veiga, 2009).  
This literature recognises the cognitive impact of the Bologna process on domestic actors. For 
example, Amaral and Veiga (2009) show in their study of Portugal that the implementation was 
more one of ‘form’ than ‘content’. But the Bologna process helped soften the tension between 
European, national and local actors on the subject of degree programmes. The factors listed 
above are also shown in the literature as having played an important role in implementation.  
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Witte (2006), who provided the most recent comparative study of the implementation of 
the Bologna process in France, England, Germany and the Netherlands, explains how domestic 
actors in France, Italy and Germany used the arguments of the Bologna process strategically to 
justify those reforms and increase their legitimacy vis-à-vis resistant non-state actors. She also 
reports on the role of parliamentary votes and political commitment and the interplay between 
both. More precisely, Witte (2006) explains how the British Prime Minister Tony Blair, through a 
strong political commitment, promoted the reform of university fees despite popular opposition 
and managed to secure a tight parliamentary majority, while several French ministers did not dare 
to contemplate the legislative implementation of higher education reforms for fear of popular 
opposition and were therefore not very willing to implement large scale reforms. Witte (2006) 
finally explains how socio-economic factors such as the growing number of students, referred to 
as the massification of higher education, intensified pressures for reforms.  
The literature on domestic implementation is thus very broad. But very often top-down 
macro-level analyses on domestic-level phenomena tend to be separated from more micro-level 
analyses, which concentrate on the impact of deliberation on individual opinions.  
Explaining variation in policy change 
The difference between micro agreements and macro-level adaptation raises a puzzle 
regarding variations in levels of change between policies or countries targeted by European 
deliberations: If deliberation results in a convergence of individual preferences and norms, how 
can we explain differences in levels of domestic adaptation to European pressures, both across 
countries and policies?  
The literature on implementation in Europe and domestic comparisons reports many 
distinctions between levels of implementation between member states, especially in the European 
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higher education area.  For example, Witte (2006) finds that despite some convergence in general 
framework, long-lasting differences remain between the higher education systems in France, 
Germany, the UK and the Netherlands. More importantly, those differences in levels of change 
do not only occur across countries but also across policies and subsets of policies. As mentioned 
in the introduction, some policy objects, such as the length of degrees, have been the object of 
earlier reforms than others, such as financial management in the late 1990s in some countries in 
Europe. Those differences possibly come from the domestic factors mentioned in the earlier 
paragraph.  
But the specific characteristics of a policy may also influence differences in rates of policy 
change. Knill and Lenschow (1998) suggest such an explanation when looking at variations in 
paces of implementation of EU environmental policy measures across Britain and Germany. They 
explain that domestic policy context, defined as the degree of political support, political salience 
as well as supranational and international pressures, is not the sole explanation for differences in 
implementation.  
They explain instead that different levels of embeddedness of administrative arrangements affect 
the adaptation of administrations to European pressures. According to them, the level of 
embeddedness of an administrative arrangement is determined by the ideological depth of its 
paradigms25 and ideas and the number of links that changing this arrangement would break or 
reroute. Knill and Lenschow (1998)’s explanation can be used to account for differences between 
rates of change across policies or policy subsets: the more embedded aspects of a policy are 
harder to change than the less embedded ones.  
However, Knill and Lenschow (1998)’s account requires specification to be adapted to a 
cross-policy comparison. Knill and Lenschow (1998:611) argue that changes of the core are 
                                               
25 A paradigm here means a generally accepted perspective at a given time.  
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unlikely. Yet, they add that in the case of Britain, domestic reforms such as the Next steps initiative 
have ‘moved’ the core, which facilitated the implementation of a particular European directive: the 
directive contradicted the previous core, but not the more recent one. Therefore, there is room 
for additional theorising of the conditions under which the core can change. This theorising needs 
to take into account two particular points. The first point is the influence of changes in the less 
embedded aspects on changes of the core: Is there absolutely no relationship between changes of 
less embedded aspects of a policy and changes in its core? Does the core remain intact even when 
less embedded aspects change?  
The second point relates to the role of European pressures, for this research triggered by 
deliberative governance. Knill and Lenschow (1998) imply that only domestic reforms lead to 
changes of the core. Do European pressures ever generate ideas for domestic reforms which in 
turn alter the core? Can deliberative governance play a role in this mechanism of idea generation? 
To answer such a question, one needs to investigate how deliberative governance triggers such 
ideas, and in particular, whether individuals also change their opinions according to the particular 
level of ‘embeddedness’ during deliberations.  Clarifying such points would help us to understand 
whether changes in individual attitudes come from shifts in domestic policy or whether domestic 
policies change in ways which are consistent with newly learned preferences during deliberations 
(Checkel, 2005: 814).  
The existing literature thus faces a challenge in its clarification of the impact of European 
deliberation on domestic policies. This challenge relates to the difficulty of relating micro and 
macro levels of analysis.  It firstly implies identifying theoretically how the concept of policy 
embeddedness designed at the policy level can be transferred to individuals. It secondly leads to 
explaining how deliberation affects those different elements at the micro and macro levels.   
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Deliberative governance thus has an impact at a variety of levels. The constructivist 
literature argues that deliberation generates a convergence of individual preferences, norms, 
identities and interests - individuals sacrificing their self-interests toward other-rewarding ones - 
and facilitates domestic implementation. However, other strands of the literature show that 
different variables affect the realisation of this hypothesis at the micro and macro levels.  
At the micro level, some academics consider self-interest as a threat to deliberative 
governance. But the pursuit of self-interest is not separable from deliberation since rational 
individuals need deliberation to acquire more information to maximise their utility. Some macro 
elements also influence the impact of deliberation on domestic policies either by preventing or 
promoting such impact. Those domestic factors are political commitment, parliamentary votes, 
the role of domestic actors and the socio-economic context.  
Finally, variations in rates of policy change represent a puzzle for the existing literature. 
Those variations occur because policies have different levels of embeddedness. But this 
hypothesis poses a challenge for the literature, which mainly consists of explaining how policy 
embeddedness can be conceived of at the individual level and how it relates to deliberative 
governance. This challenge actually amounts to combining micro and macro levels of analysis.  
This challenge is relevant to the European integration literature on deliberative governance 
because it opens the door to the theorisation of deliberative mechanisms. But it is also common 
to a broader literature which addresses the impact of cognition on policies and multiple levels of 
governance. The next chapter takes up on this challenge using insights from cognitive theories 
found in psychology and political philosophy.  
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Chapter 3 Deliberative mechanisms of attitude and policy change 
 
This chapter derives the key hypotheses of this research. It provides a theoretical account of 
the impact of deliberation on both changes of opinions and policy changes.  
In order to do so, this chapter concentrates on finding a way to theoretically relate micro 
and macro levels of analysis. The micro and macro levels of analysis are both important to 
understand the impact of deliberative governance on domestic policies. After all, before actors use 
European deliberative outcomes and arguments to shape policies in the domestic sphere, they 
first need to learn about them.  
In other words, this chapter answers two sets of questions. The first set of questions relates 
the micro to the macro levels of analysis: how can a theoretical account combine a micro-analysis 
of the impact of deliberation at the individual level to a macro-analysis of policy changes? If 
policy is conceived as a group decision, is there a consistency between individual and group 
attitudes? If policies have different levels of ‘embeddedness’, do individuals also learn and change 
their minds according to those different levels?  
The second set of questions introduces deliberative governance into this multi-level 
analysis: why do some attitudes become an object of deliberative agreement and others not? 
Which factors other than learning motivate change induced by deliberation? More precisely, this 
chapter analyses under which conditions individuals learn new attitudes and it attempts to isolate 
the role of strategic motivation in this learning process. This distinction between learning and 
strategy is important to understand how deliberation matters, in other words whether the 
deliberative institution influences actors (through learning) or whether actors use the deliberative 
institution (through strategy).  
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This chapter first considers micro-level dynamics and connects the concept of policy 
‘embeddedness’ (Knill and Lehnschow, 1998) to the notion of ‘entrenchment’ of individual 
attitudes in cognitive theories. Such a connection indicates that some attitudes may change more 
than others because of their level of ‘entrenchment’. This claim provides a basis to elaborate on 
macro-level mechanisms, explaining how deliberation faciliates policy change at the European and 
domestic levels in the second part, and focusing on learning and strategic motivations. The 
chapter finally applies such insights to the Bologna process, showing that Bologna process 
deliberations result in attitude change toward an economically liberal perspective.  
Considerations on micro-level dynamics 
Cognitive theory provides a useful standpoint. It has been used extensively in psychology 
(for example Festinger, 1953; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1975/1980; Axelrod, 1976; Moscovici, 1980; 
Eagly and Chaiken, 1993) and also appears in political philosophy (for example Quine, 1951; 
Mackie, 2006; List, 2008). As will be explained in this chapter, its assumptions about individual 
minds parallel the earlier explanations of differences in levels of embeddedness of policy made in 
European studies by Knill and Lenschow (1998). In addition, since it focuses on individual 
cognition, cognitive theory explains underlying mechanisms of change more precisely than 
European studies as far as the micro-level of analysis is concerned, particularly accounting for the 
role of learning and the relationship between different levels of individual opinions. One of the 
most widespread assumptions in this theory is that an individual’s mind contains different objects 
which are related in a scheme or map, called a network structure26.  
 
 
                                               
26 The theory of association of ideas is very established in cognitive psychology, going back to Aristotle and 
vigorously developed in the nineteenth-century philosophers and psychologists (Stillings et al., 1987: 26).  
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Figure 1: Articulation of attitudes in a network structure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the cognitive view of an individual mind. The different boxes represent 
different attitudes. The definition of attitudes varies in the psychology literature (Petty et al, 1997). 
One of the few criteria which are common to those definitions is that an attitude is an evaluation 
of an object. In other words, it accepts or rejects a given proposition on an entity that is the 
object of evaluation. A proposition is the simplest complete unit of thought, typically capturing a 
relation, such as liking, e.g. Mary likes John (Stillings et al. 1981: 23). Several propositions can 
describe an object. For example, if the object is John, another proposition on the object John 
could be Mary dislikes John.   
The literature studied in the previous chapter explained that deliberation had an impact on 
various factors, from preferences to interests. How do those preferences, interests, behaviours 
and attitudes relate to each other? And why choose individual attitudes as the unit of analysis? 
Attitudes represent a convenient unit of analysis because they include many aspects. For example, 
they include preferences as motivational attitudes. In other words, preferences reflect the 
intention that an agent has regarding a particular proposition. Attitudes also include 
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representations, i.e. cognitive representations of what the world is like, such as beliefs (List and 
Pettit, forthcoming: 3)27.   
Moreover, attitudes are important to study because they lead to an intent to behave, i.e. act 
in a certain way. Taking into account intent means that only behaviours that individuals 
voluntarily wanted to perform and have reasoned on are taken into account (Ajzen and Fishbein, 
1980). This excludes behaviour which is not entirely volitional such as behaviour occurring with 
little intervening thought, e.g. craving for a pleasurable state induced by drug use, but also 
behaviours requiring particular skills, or habitual behaviour, such as buckling one’s seat belt.  
 
Figure 2: Transcription of attitudes into behaviour 
 
Figure 2 provides a summary loosely adapted from Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) of the 
transition between attitudes, intent and behaviour. It shows that an intent to behave also matches 
an individual’s interest and existing norms. This thesis assumes that an individual seeks to achieve 
his interests, i.e. maximise his utility in deliberation. An individual judges the relative importance 
                                               
27 Including beliefs as a category of attitudes is a contentious point. Sociocognitive psychology tends to distinguish 
beliefs from attitudes, arguing instead that a belief leads to the formulation of an attitude (Perloff, 1993: 29). 
However, if an attitude is an evaluation on a proposition, beliefs comply with the definition of attitudes. For example, 
‘the world is round’ is a belief, but also an acceptation of a particular proposition.  Perloff (1993:29) explains that the 
main difference is that a belief has a strong cognitive component while an attitude also has an affective component. 
But Eagly and Chaiken (1993) include a cognitive dimension within attitudes.  
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of attitudinal and normative components when conceptualising an intent to behave according to 
his interests. He also formulates a strategy, i.e. a course of action, to achieve this interest28. This 
course of action leads to his intent to act.  
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) add that norms constrain the relationship between attitudes and 
intent to act. Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) refer more particularly to subjective norms. A subjective 
norm is, according to them, a prescription toward an action emerging from the perceived 
likelihood that other people will approve of the action29. And individuals shape their behaviour 
not only based on their attitudes, but also their norms. The existence of norms however does not 
necessarily compete with attitudes to explain intentional behaviour. After all, norms represent a 
form of attitude: a norm emerges from an evaluation, the difference being that this evaluation is 
not directed at the object of the deliberation itself, but at other people’s perception of one’s action 
on this object. And an individual’s perceptions of norms can change during deliberation, as 
attitudes do, as explained in chapter 2 30. 
An attitude becomes activated or deactivated, added, moderated or strengthened as a result 
of new information or of another attitude being affected. Figure 1 shows that all attitudes are 
                                               
28 The classification of objects in a network structure complicates the understanding of a strategy. When only one 
object is concerned, the strategy is similar to the motivational attitude towards that object. For example, if a civil 
servant has an interest in guaranteeing that the government reduces its spending in higher education; his strategy 
could be to promote the use of student fees and he would adopt an attitude according to which student fees are 
preferable to finance higher education. But when multiple objects are concerned, a strategy includes many 
motivational attitudes. For example, the civil servant’s strategy on students’ fees may be influenced by a more 
encompassing strategy aiming at establishing an economically liberal university system. This encompassing strategy 
includes attitudes on funding, the management of universities etc. If the civil servant does not wish to pursue 
students’ fees, he will need to find another option which fits his overall strategy for an economically liberal university 
system.  
29 Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) add that norms also emerge from the motivation to comply. But the motivation to 
comply is a contentious element to measure (Erwin, 2001: 118).  
30 Different types of attitudes, motivational, representational and normative interact to form behaviour. This 
interaction is beyond the realm of this study, which is more interested in the different layers of attitudes and in how 
deliberation influences motivational and representational attitudes. For more information on the declination between 
types of attitudes and behaviour, see Eagly and Chaiken (1993: 172). Chapter 4 also continues to discuss the 
relationship between attitudes and behaviour. 
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connected to each other, either directly or indirectly, and form a network structure of attitudes, in 
which a change of one attitude influences a change in another attitude.   
The relationship between attitudes is backed by experimental evidence. For example, Fazio 
et al. (1986), when conducting a series of experiments analysing participants’ performance on 
adjective connotation tasks, showed that activating an attitude on a prime object led to a quicker 
activation of attitudes on other objects31.   
This relationship between attitudes obeys basic conditions of rationality, such as transitivity 
and completeness32, which allow for the application of relations of logic to attitude changes. For 
example, if an individual believes in p, and that ‘if p then q’, then he should also logically believe in 
q. As a consequence, if the individual changes his attitude on q (and believes ‘not q’) as the result 
of new information, and if he still believes that ‘if p then q’, he should modify p33. But logic alone 
does not explain how an individual changes his attitudes. The individual can either ignore the new 
information and strengthen or maintain his prior attitude ‘p’ or change his attitude toward the 
logical connection ‘if p then q’.   
Instead, the level of entrenchment of an attitude provides an indication with regard to this 
choice. The term entrenchment is similar to the term embeddedness used in the literature 
presented in the last chapter. The level of entrenchment explains that different attitudes are 
actually positioned in layers, with some attitudes being more central than others. In Figure 1, 
attitude 1 is more entrenched than attitudes 4, 5, 6 and 7. Entrenchment is defined by the 
                                               
31 Fazio (2001) uses as an example a negative attitude on the element “cockroach”. He explains that presentation of 
“cockroach” as the prime automatically activates a negative attitude. If a target adjective presented is also negative 
(“disgusting”), then the individual is able to indicate the connotation of the target adjective quicker than if the target 
adjective was more positive (“appealing”). 
32 A strict preference relation is transitive if, for any three possible alternatives (say x, y and z) if x is preferred to y 
and y is preferred to z, then x is preferred to z. A preference relation is complete if, for any two possible alternatives 
(say x and y), the chooser either prefers x to y, or y to x, or is indifferent between x and y (Shepsle and Bonchek, 
1997: 25-26).  
33 More elaborate models based on probability theory model the logical relations between attitudes. Those models are 
known as probabilogical models. See McGuire (1960) and Wyer and Hartwick (1980). For a summary, see Eagly and 
Chaiken (2003: 128-131).  
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generality of the attitude which it refers to. More precisely, the level of entrenchment of an 
attitude is measured by the strength of association between the evaluation of an object (attitude) 
and the object. For example, an individual’s cognitive map may relate knowledge to pens (since 
individuals need to write to reason, memorise and accumulate knowledge). But the attitude ‘pens 
contain ink’ is a closer evaluation to the object ink than the attitude ‘knowledge depends on pens’. 
Hence the attitude ‘pens contain ink’ is less entrenched than the attitude ‘knowledge depends on 
pens’ relatively to the object ‘ink’. 
The level of entrenchment cannot be measured as a positive function of the number of 
interconnections with other attitudes as Mackie (2006) argued. Indeed, Figure 1 presents an 
idealised version of a network structure of attitudes, where the most entrenched attitude 1 has 
two direct connections with less entrenched attitudes 2 and 3 and the least entrenched attitude 7 
has only one direct connection to attitude 3. In a less idealised version attitude 7 could equally be 
directly connected to attitudes 4, 5, and 6. In other words, many different combinations of 
interconnections between attitudes exist, and the number of relationships is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition to measure the level of entrenchment34.  
An important property of the level of entrenchment is that it is inversely related to the 
readiness toward which an individual is willing to revise his attitude: The more entrenched an 
attitude is, the more the number of superficial attitudes which need to be changed before 
changing the intended entrenched attitude. For example, if participants in deliberations deliberate 
on whether universities should compete between each other to attract students, before deciding 
whether universities should compete or not, they will have to decide on the various policy 
implications of a switch to competition. Such implications regard the freedom of universities to 
design their own curricula and degrees in order to differentiate from each other, their capacity to 
                                               
34 See chapter 5 for empirical evidence justifying the choice of definition.  
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group together to form bigger entities which implies that they are free to manage themselves etc. 
Only once they have decided on those implications will they be able to conclude that universities 
should compete. Here the policy implications are assumed to be less entrenched, and the idea of 
competition is more entrenched, because it is more general than its policy implications.  
Participants can also arrive at the insight that universities should compete by starting to 
deliberate on another object, such as the offer of curricula. Participants may start discussing 
whether universities should offer different curricula, and if they decide positively on this issue, 
they will then infer that it means that universities are competing between each other to attract 
students by designing different curricula.  
In other words, when new information affects one attitude, a stimulus is sent through the 
connected links in parallel across the network structure. This stimulus is rapidly weakened by 
successive divisions as it reaches successive nodes of attitudes of higher level of entrenchment, 
and affects only the attitudes which are relevant for the network to become fully consistent after 
this new information input. The stronger, i.e. more convincing a stimulus is, the more attitudes at 
different levels it will change (Mackie, 2006).  
This implies that an entire network structure of attitudes can potentially change as the result of 
new information to maintain a consistency of attitudes. A participant who changes his mind on 
whether universities should compete could change his mind on all objects related to competition, 
including the deeper meaning of competition in terms of the social system, i.e. a more liberal 
society. Because this change is indirect and requires changes in superficial attitudes, changes in 
entrenched attitudes can be latent and occur over time (Mackie, 2006). 
Figure 1 represents the connection between attitudes as an arrow going in two directions, 
meaning that an entrenched attitude can reverse back a less entrenched attitude if there is not 
enough information stimuli to maintain the less entrenched attitude (Stillings et al., 1987: 27). For 
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example, a participant who changed his mind to think that universities should offer different 
curricula, and then inferred that universities should compete between each other to attract 
students may reverse back to thinking that universities should not compete if he has not 
accumulated sufficient information to also change his mind on related objects to competition, 
mentioned earlier as the freedom of universities to design their own curricula and degrees, or the 
capacity to manage themselves and merge with other entities. 
This implies that all the objects at one layer of entrenchment usually need to change for a more 
entrenched connected attitude to change. In Figure 1, attitudes 4 and 5 have to change before 
attitude 2 changes. Attitudes 6 and 7 have to change before attitude 3 changes. Since attitudes 6 
and 7 are not connected to attitude 2, attitude 2 does not require attitudes 6 and 7 to change for it 
to change as well. Similarly, attitude 3 does not require attitudes 4 and 5 to change first. If only 
attitude 4 changes but not 5, then attitude 2 could change but revert back to be consistent with 
attitude 5. The same applies between attitudes 3, 6 and 7.  
This interconnection between different levels of attitudes informs earlier accounts of policy 
embeddedness, which did not explain the relationship between changes at different levels of 
embeddedness.  
Two complementary mechanisms of change at the macro level 
Once individuals change their attitudes, they first need to be able to reach a group decision 
before transforming this decision into a domestic policy. This means that the macro level actually 
incorporates two different levels: group decision and transcription into domestic policies.  
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 Deliberative mechanisms of attitude and policy change 
 
 
 45 
Figure 3: Relationship between European deliberations and domestic policies 
 
 
 
Figure 3 summarises the mechanisms and factors through which group decisions, at the 
level of European deliberations, relate to domestic policies. Two mechanisms account for the 
transcription of changes of attitudes firstly into group decisions and subsequently into domestic 
policies. The first mechanism, learning, is the one that cognitive theories in psychology and 
political philosophy mainly focus on. The second mechanism, strategic use, stems from the 
transfer of this framework into the reality of policy-making.   
Learning 
Learning is a term used by a vast literature in public policy (for example Bennett and 
Howlett, 1992; Hall, 1993; Sabatier, 1987) which has had applications in European integration 
studies (for example Kerber and Eckardt, 2007). In this research, learning contributes to creating 
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a particular deliberative outcome. It refers to an individual cognitive process: being presented with 
different options and arguments and deliberately adapting one’s attitudes to those new arguments 
and options. At the macro level, it is akin to Bennett and Howlett (1992)’s social learning in the 
field of public policy, which involves actors within and outside the government, challenges the 
beliefs underlying a policy and results in shifts in paradigms, a paradigm being an accepted 
dominant view. 
Learning is not necessarily synonymous with an alteration of behaviour or intention, since 
attitudes do not automatically transcribe into behaviour. Learning is therefore different from 
acceptance of a course of action (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980: 220). Learning may also result in, but 
does not forcibly imply a re-evaluation of policy instruments and the adjustment of policy 
implementation resulting in policy change, as Hall (1993: 278) argued. The latter process occurs in 
a post-learning phase in the realm of implementation.  
Finally, learning takes place at the individual level. But if all individuals of one group change 
their attitudes to adopt similar ones, and if they adapt their behaviours to match those newly 
acquired attitudes, then learning can result in one group emulating another. If this group is as 
wide as key decision-makers of the government of a country, then learning would be perceived as 
the government of a country emulating another (Rose, 1988/91) 35.     
One motivation for an individual to learn is to maintain consistency between different 
aspects of an attitude. If an individual is open to acquiring new information, the belief part of his 
attitude can change if the new information does not match his pre-existing belief. This creates a 
dissonance between representational and motivational objects if the individual adapts his belief 
but not his preference. Festinger (1962) argues that individuals prefer consistency to dissonance, 
                                               
35 For a more extensive discussion on the different definitions of learning in public policy, see Bennett and Howlett 
(1992).  
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and that dissonance motivates them to change their attitudes until full consistency is achieved. 
Hence individuals are motivated to learn, either until their preferences change, or until they find 
new beliefs consonant with their preferences or until their ancient consonant beliefs are justified 
and brought back.   
For all individuals of a group to learn, an implicit assumption is that all individuals in this 
group need to be able to formulate attitudes on the same propositions, or be able to add those 
propositions to their existing network structures. In other words, there is a certain consistency 
between the propositions individuals ponder on and the propositions all individuals in the group 
form attitudes on. Such a mechanism of attitudinal change has the potential to arise in any group, 
including state representatives who argue about the formulation of a particular policy agreement. 
In European deliberations, actors, despite coming from different countries or different 
organisations, talk about similar propositions when they sit in deliberations with their European 
counterparts. Those propositions take the form of particular policy options to solve a policy 
problem or of general principles. Actors learn new information about existing options to help 
them make a decision about those options. They also learn about options they have not thought 
about before, for example coming from ‘good practice’ procedures put forward by other member 
states.  Depending on the level of entrenchment of the corresponding attitude, an actor will take 
an option into account, and possibly intend to issue a policy proposal at the domestic level based 
on this option only if it suits his interests36. In other words, some actors fish for information and 
useful ideas for domestic policies when they meet in Europe. If some actors fish for ideas, it 
logically implies that other actors suggest those ideas. And those actors play a more persuasive 
role, convincing the group of the legitimacy of their arguments or policy options.  
                                               
36 See discussion later in this chapter for more information on the relationship between attitude change, interests and 
domestic policies.  
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Effect of learning in groups: persuasion, convergence and polarisation 
 Who is persuasive in deliberation? How does this affect the group outcome? A large part 
of the literature predicts that learning results in convergence toward a persuasive majority or 
minority, leading to a consensual agreement (Festinger, 1953; Moscovici, 1980; Mackie 2006; 
Martin et al., 2008).  Hence the majority and the minority are indicated as factors influencing 
learning in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 4: Influence of the majority in group deliberation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The majority is a numerically larger group holding the most widespread view among the 
totality of participants while the minority is a numerically smaller group holding a less widespread 
view. The majority triggers conformism as Figure 4 illustrates. Figure 4 represents a deliberation 
between three participants 1, 2 and 3, regarding object 4, which leads to participants formulating 
an attitude 4. Attitude 4 is superficial to the network structure of attitudes of each participant37. 
Participants 2 and 3 have a similar attitude 4, and influence participant 1 into changing his attitude 
4 (the dashed frame indicates a change of attitude).  Participant 1 compares his response to the 
majority’s response, resulting in compliance with the majority view (Festinger, 1953; Martin et al. 
2008).  
                                               
37 Attitude 4 is part of the network structure of attitudes presented in Figure 1. For simplicity, only the relevant 
attitude is represented and not the entire network structure of attitudes of each participant. See Figure 1 for a 
representation of a participant’s network structure of attitudes. 
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Festinger (1953) adds that the majority usually obtains compliance within the group by 
exercising social pressure, i.e. the capacity to punish or reward. The compliance resulting from 
majority pressure may result only in a ‘public’ change of attitudes, i.e. participants voicing a 
change of attitudes, while they may not necessarily understand what the majority argues (or not) 
in ‘private’ (Moscovici, 1980). But such change is sufficient to reach an agreement. Moreover, 
although the majority influence can involve some object of coercion through punishments, the 
process is still deliberative, since actors listen to each other’s arguments and exchange 
information, if only on punishments and rewards.  
 
Figure 5: Influence of the minority in group deliberation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The minority is persuasive through a different mechanism involving the presentation of an 
innovative view as Figure 5 illustrates. In this Figure, participant 1 persuades participants 2 and 3 
to change their attitude 4 through an innovative argument. Arguments presented by the minority 
are more likely to be reflected on in depth as opposed to conformed to and they result in ‘private’ 
changes of attitudes, which may or may no be admitted publicly (Moscovici, 1980).  The minority 
also exercises entrepreneurship, if this minority takes on the costs of deliberation, for example 
through drafting reports. And the monopoly of resources provides a way for the minority to set 
the agenda of the meetings and to influence the majority. Therefore, the deliberative outcome can 
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result in a convergence of attitudes toward the view of a conformist majority or of an innovative, 
entrepreneurial or resourceful minority.  
Finally, the most persuasive participants tend to be the ones who show a consistent opinion 
throughout deliberations (Moscovici, 1980). Because minorities cannot use the social pressure that 
the majority does, it becomes much more important for the minority to be consistent. 
Consistency leads to credibility. But consistency may not necessarily prevent attitude change. 
Moscovici (1980: 220) explains that a minority can be consistent by becoming rigid, i.e. blocking 
any solution that precludes the wholesale adoption of the deviant position. But it can also exercise 
consistency by being a fair minority, in other words leaving the door open to reciprocal exchange 
and remove an all-or-nothing character from the adoption of a deviant point of view. A fair 
minority can admit attitude change.  
In European deliberations, additional conditions than the majority and minority influence 
persuasion, including the level of entrenchment of the object, country represented or type of 
participant (see factors influencing learning in Figure 3).  
Firstly, participants already possess certain attitudes which are formed in the organisation 
they represent (e.g. member state government, trade union), particularly on entrenched objects, 
which are central to policy formulation. Organisations may not want to sacrifice those core 
attitudes easily. On core objects, if there has been no overall change in superficial objects, learning 
should result in an absence of change. However, participants may be more open to attitude 
change concerning more instrumental and less entrenched objects, to help them implement 
policies in line with their core attitudes in the domestic arena. They are more likely to be 
influenced by an innovative minority in this process of fishing for ideas. Hence on less entrenched 
objects, a convergence toward a minority view is more likely.  
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Secondly, different country representatives may have different rationales as covered in the 
previous chapter. Some representatives are from countries which are involved in deliberation 
before others. Country representatives who have recently joined or are attempting to join may be 
more willing to compromise on consistency, and to change their attitudes toward those of older 
member state representatives in a desire to ‘fit in’. In contrast, representatives from countries 
having joined deliberations at the beginning may be more inclined to influence the results of the 
deliberation and less likely to show attitudinal change. This does not mean that no attitudinal 
change is observable in representatives of countries from the oldest member states. While those 
representatives may aim at consistency within a given deliberation, they may have previously 
changed their attitudes at earlier stages of adhesion to deliberations. Attitude change may be 
observed in representatives from older member states as well depending on the period of analysis 
and the methodology employed.  
Thirdly, whether a participant is a principal or an agent affects the likelihood of being 
persuaded. A principal is an actor who stipulates what he wants done, such as a secretary of state 
or a minister. An agent fulfils the principals’ requests. On the one hand, principals may be less 
likely than agents to change attitudes. Principals value consistency highly, because they have 
individuals obeying their orders and need to be credible to be listened to. This need to maintain 
consistency, hence credibility, implies that principals would not confess to changing their 
attitudes. Conversely, since agents do not have subordinates (or have less of them), credibility and 
hence consistency are less important to them. And agents could for that reason be freer to change 
attitudes than principals.  
On the other hand, agents are bound to represent the attitudes of their organisations. They have 
many hierarchical superiors to defer to before they change an attitude. In that case, agents may 
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not reveal public attitude change. And principals may be more inclined to reveal attitude changes 
publicly, since they have fewer, if any, superiors to defer to when changing public attitudes.  
Finally, this likelihood to change attitudes or not also depends on trust. Trust plays an important 
part in persuasion. Participants are more likely to change their attitudes when they trust other 
participants. Trust increases when participants are a priori close, which favours comprehension 
(Janis and Hovland, 1959; Johnston, 2005: 1019). In other words, participants are more likely to 
trust other participants and the European deliberation process if they have already socialised with 
those participants or are acquainted with the international/European environment. According to 
the socialisation hypothesis, high exposure to supranational bodies and interactions with 
international counterparts facilitates the acquisition of a European ethos (Lewis, 1998/2003). If 
individuals socialised at the European or international level before engaging in Bologna process 
deliberations, it presumably makes them more open to arguments from their counterparts and 
more likely to reveal attitude change.  
 
Figure 6: Convergence toward new attitude 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, learning may not necessarily result in convergence toward the attitude of a 
minority or a majority represented by a particular constellation of states or types of actors and 
trusted members. It can also lead to convergence toward an attitude formed by deliberation that 
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all participants agree on, or to an attitude formed by the common adaptation of existing attitudes 
(Ajzen and Fishbein, 1975/1980). It is easy to conceive of a situation where one or group of 
participants would suggest an attitude, only for another participant or group of participants to 
suggest an addition to this attitude with a convincing argument in the process of deliberation. 
This results in a convergence of attitudes toward one which did not a priori belong to any of the 
participants. In Figure 6 for example, participants 1, 2 and 3’s attitude 4 is changed to converge 
toward an attitude 4 which did not a priori belong to any of them.  
 
Figure 7: Group polarisation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attitudes can also become polarised as a result of deliberation. In Figure 7, participants 1, 2 
and 3 polarise their attitudes 4 (as indicated by the dashed line and newly acquired attitude in a 
dashed frame). Polarisation occurs if individuals become convinced of more different views for 
two main reasons. First, more extreme attitudes are socially desirable. People want to be perceived 
favourably, and they want to signal that they are not cowards or cautious by adopting an extreme 
attitude. Secondly, the exchange of arguments reinforces polarisation. If participants are already 
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inclined to go in a particular direction, and hear more arguments in favour of that direction, they 
will be even more likely to move even further in that direction (Burnstein and Sentis, 1981; 
Sunstein, 2003).  
A variant of non-convergence also includes participants becoming more convinced of their own 
attitudes, without necessarily adopting more extreme attitudes. Whether participants polarise or 
become more convinced of their attitudes, an agreement is still possible. This agreement would be 
the result of compromise on a dominant view, accepted through threats and promises, which 
would be akin to bargaining. Or in a more traditional deliberative framework, the compromise 
could be made as general as possible to accommodate the different attitudes of individuals 
(Mackie, 2006).    
Strategic use 
A deliberative outcome is not only the result of learning. Individuals also come into 
deliberation with pre-existing interests (as indicated by Figure 2). In European deliberations, 
participants’ interests include achieving their domestic ambitions, or increasing their reputation 
among European colleagues for example. Those interests lead individuals to think strategically 
about their behaviour and participation in deliberation.  
Strategy influences the way individuals respond to deliberation: participants may not admit 
to changing their attitudes on a particular object if it does not fit their overall strategy. Participants 
may take part in deliberation mostly because the action of participating itself maximises their 
utility (by for example increasing their political reputation or legitimacy as they are seen as taking 
part in European deliberations).  
Even if individual attitude change through learning does not occur, the existence of 
strategies does not devalue the deliberative process. The necessary conditions for deliberation to 
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occur, i.e. an exchange of arguments, an openness to the arguments of others, and a willingness to 
reach an agreement, are not exclusive of strategic behaviour. Attitude change is a product of 
deliberation, not a necessary condition to define deliberation. 
Participants may also want to learn new arguments and options, potentially changing their 
attitudes, if it fulfils their strategy. In that case, strategy motivates learning. Finally, deliberation 
can also change strategy. A participant may learn about new options, changing his motivational 
attitudes, so that his strategy is affected38. And learning changes strategies. Therefore, learning and 
strategies complement each other at the level of group interactions.  
Transcription into policies 
Strategy is the main influential mechanism to transform the deliberative outcome into a 
policy goal. No transcription of the deliberative outcome arises if participants have not devised a 
course of action to do so. In other words, even if a participant learns a new attitude, he will also 
adopt a strategy in order to transfer this attitude into policies. 
Figure 3 shows that the deliberative outcome, either arising out of attitude change or not, 
leads to the formulation of a domestic strategy, involving policy goals and arguments. Policy goals 
are ‘a coming together of intent to deal with similar problems’ (Bennett, 1991: 218). Participants 
subsequently intend to change their domestic policies, in particular the content of those policies, 
to fit their newly acquired attitudes. Policy content is the formal manifestation of government 
policy – statutes, administrative rules, regulations, court decisions and so on. A new policy 
content may require a change in policy style to facilitate its adoption. Policy style is a more diffuse 
notion signifying the process by which policy responses are formulated (Bennett, 1991: 218) 39.   
                                               
38 See footnote 28on the relationship between strategy and motivational attitudes.  
39 This research focuses on policy goals, contents and styles. But policy convergence also been looked at from 
different angles including policy structures, instruments and techniques (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 349-50).   
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Participants use deliberation strategically to help them with the formation of a domestic 
paradigm facilitating domestic reforms. Participants can use the arguments heard during 
European deliberations strategically in domestic deliberative spaces to convince others or to 
legitimate their leadership or policy decisions vis-à-vis other domestic actors. Such a mechanism 
relates to the well-known argument in the literature on European studies according to which 
domestic actors use references to Europe in domestic negotiations (Dyson and Featherstone, 
1996; Jacquot and Woll, 2004; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1998/999).  
This use of arguments results in a shift in paradigms at the domestic level. The existing literature 
has shown that changes in policy paradigms occur at different levels: from first order change in 
policy instruments to third order change in the entire system (Hall, 1993; Schmidt, 2002:222-4; 
Radaelli and Schmidt, 2005:21). But those levels are not independent. This change in policy 
paradigm follows the level of entrenchment of network structures of attitudes so that to 
reestablish a consistency in the network structure, paradigm change occurs firstly in relation to 
policy instruments and then progressively changes the whole policy system.  
Encouraging actors from other organisations to take part in deliberations could result in 
those actors changing their attitudes on certain objects, and possibly reaching an agreement. 
Decision-makers use the participation of other actors in European deliberations, hoping that 
those non-state actors would be more open to listening to their arguments in a deliberative space 
further away from the domestic arena and that they would change their attitudes by listening to 
the arguments from participants from other countries. Domestic actors have an interest in taking 
part in European deliberations since they acquire a new policy platform which is less defined 
where there is opportunity to get their voice heard and strike bargains with decision-makers40.  
                                               
40 Domestic interests do not form a coherent entity, as established by Moravcsik (1993: 493). Instead, different 
organisations within the domestic sphere have conflicting interests and try to establish themselves in domestic 
politics. This research makes a broad distinction between the interests of state actors and the interests of non-state 
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The European policy-making arena being a complex environment, many domestic 
constraints influence both the European deliberative outcome and its transcription of domestic 
policy goals into policy content (or style) as Figure 3 illustrates. Some of those factors were 
described in the preceding chapter, including the commitment of leaders, governing coalitions and 
attitudes of non-state actors. Timing could also play a part in the ability of decision-makers to 
change policy content. More precisely, the level of opposition of domestic actors may vary 
throughout the year (some trade unions would not be able to gather much support for 
demonstrations during the holiday season for example). And policies could be easier to adopt at a 
low level of opposition.  Figure 3 indicates through its double arrow that at the same time as 
those constraints influence domestic policies, a new policy content or style can influence those 
constraints.  
If all those other constraints are held constant however, consistency between changes in 
individual cognitive maps and policy changes should follow. Figure 3 indicates that both changes 
in individual attitudes and policy content are affected by the level of entrenchment of the relevant 
object. Hence, in the same way as individual attitudes change according to their level of 
entrenchment, with a possible change of the entire network structure starting with the most 
superficial attitudes, policies can also change according to their level of embeddedness, provided 
that the intent to change domestic policies turns into behaviour and that this behaviour is 
successful. Hence European deliberations, by making participants question their cognitive maps, 
results in a progressive process of domestic policy change, starting with the least embedded 
objects and going more and more in depth.  
                                                                                                                                                   
actors in the domestic sphere. The next chapter discusses the relationship between individual and organisational 
interests and attitudes.  
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To sum up, deliberation impacts on domestic policies through two complementary 
mechanisms which lead to the main hypotheses of this research project. The first mechanism 
occurs through learning at the European level. Through learning actors are presented with 
different options regarding policies to pursue. They therefore change their representational 
attitudes. And they can change their motivational attitudes on those options depending on 
whether it satisfies their interests.  
H1. Deliberation at the European level leads to a change of attitudes among its participants.  
In a second mechanism, actors use arguments heard at the European level, the act of 
participating in deliberations and new attitudes strategically to accomplish their interests, to raise 
their profile and/or to convince actors concerning the need for reforms in the domestic sphere, 
creating a new domestic paradigm.  
H2. Deliberation inspires new domestic paradigms to facilitate domestic reforms. 
More importantly, in both those mechanisms, deliberation impacts on individual 
participants in a spiralling effect. Depending on domestic factors such as political commitment, 
parliamentary vote, non-state actors and socio-economic conditions, change at one layer of 
attitudes facilitates the adjustment of attitudes on more entrenched propositions.   
H3. The level of attitude and policy change induced by deliberation is inversely related to 
the level of entrenchment of the relevant propositions.  
An important implication of hypothesis 3 is that a change in a less entrenched object can 
trigger the change of an entire policy system.  
Application to the Bologna process 
If Bologna process deliberations have an impact, they lead participants to change their 
attitudes, according to hypothesis 1. Since the Bologna process has become integrated with the 
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Lisbon strategy41, it matches the same economic tendencies. And participants are correspondingly 
expected to converge their representations and possibly their preferences over options toward an 
economically liberal perspective, although they could respond by becoming more polarised in 
response to the cognitive pressure. Not all participants forcibly change their attitudes toward such 
perspective. Some member state representatives may already possess those attitudes. Van Vught 
(1989) showed that movements toward economically liberal policies had already started in the 
1980s in many Western European countries. In that case, the Bologna process does not create 
new attitudes or a new consensus but builds upon already existing domestic trends, as Neave 
argued (2002).  
Participants use the rhetoric built during Bologna process deliberations, articulated around the 
need to create internationally competitive universities in the European higher education area, to 
crystallise domestic reforms. For the purpose of such crystallisation, decision-makers encourage 
deliberations incorporating various domestic actors (H2). Domestic reforms occur mostly in the 
less entrenched areas of the Bologna process. However, those changes do not take place in 
isolation. They result in a more general questioning of higher education policy as a whole. As the 
rest of the chapter shows, less entrenched objects include issues of quality control, the design of 
degrees and credits. More entrenched objects include financial contribution, institutional 
management, competition and distributive justice (H3).  
Conversely, if Bologna process deliberations had no impact, this would change neither 
participants’ representational nor their motivational attitudes. Participants would not refer to 
Bologna process arguments in the domestic sphere nor would they encourage polyarchic 
deliberations with other domestic actors regarding the themes of the Bologna process. Finally, 
participants would not conduct domestic reforms on the basis of Bologna process 
                                               
41 See chapter 1. 
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recommendations. Policy change could occur, possibly in the same direction as the Bologna 
process. But those changes could have started before the Bologna process or in parallel to it and 
bear no relationship to the Bologna process. Participants would not question their higher 
education system as a whole after attending Bologna process deliberations, but they could have 
started an overall process of reflection on the basis of earlier considerations and reforms.  
The literature acknowledges that a shift in cognitive maps occurs in the Bologna process. 
Researchers on the Bologna process tend to study such cognitive shifts as part of a legitimising 
discourse, to justify a neo-liberal reform agenda (Nokkala, 2005; Fejes, 2005)42. The literature 
decomposes how each action line of the Bologna process fits this coherent rhetoric.  
According to Nokkala (2005), the Bologna process rhetoric leads universities to become 
more integrated with the market economy. Universities changed their accountability mechanisms 
and management techniques, with the emergence of performance-based funding and quality 
assurance. This leads for example to cutbacks in public funding, with private funding and tuition 
fees rising on the agenda.  
Fejes (2005) argues that experts have formulated a ‘planetspeak’ discourse in the Bologna process. 
This discourse states that Europe should become the most competitive knowledge economy in 
the world. Market oriented ideas such as quality assurance are part of this discourse according to 
him. Lifelong learning becomes a way to increase competitivity and employability key 
characteristics that citizens need to obtain.  
                                               
42 Network structures of attitudes applied to large groups relate to ideologies. Ideology, defined as a system of 
political ideas (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2009), include the idea of schematic network. Many authors 
have used the concept of network structures to study political ideologies (See for example Converse, 1964; Kinder 
and Sears, 1985; McGuire, 1985). Ideologies become clusters or configurations of attitudes that are interdependent or 
organised around a dominant societal theme such as liberalism or conservatism (Converse, 1964; Newcomb, 1950). 
In fact, people who hold ideologies are thought to derive their attitudes toward specific policies from the more 
general principles of the ideology. For example, a person holding a conservative political ideology might consult 
general principles of conservatism in developing a position on a specific issue such as federal supports for agriculture 
(Eagly and Chaiken, 1993: 145). 
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Ravinet (2007), whose analysis combines a cognitive approach with the notion of path 
dependency, alludes to the different levels of the cognitive map of the process as macro-socio 
objectives, related to efficiency, international competitivity, or European integration legitimising 
the construction of the European higher education area, sectoral objectives (such as student 
mobility, students’ employability and international attractiveness) as well as instruments (two cycle 
structure of university degrees), or more specific tools (credit system).  
The tension between the state and the market models of governance corresponds to more 
general higher education governance models. Clark (1983) was among the first to establish a 
typology of higher education governance systems. According to him, higher education governance 
consists of three dimensions: government, market and academic oligarchy. Clark (1983) allows 
different degrees within this tripartite typology. For example, government varies from highly 
centralised State authority to less state intervention.  
Van Vught (1989: 32-39) reduced Clark’s model to two dimensions with his state control and 
state supervising models of higher education. In the state control model, governmental actors see 
themselves as omniscient and omnipotent and able to steer a part of society according to their 
own objectives. They steer an object with stringent rules and extensive control mechanisms. 
Other actors have strong confidence in the capabilities of governmental actors and agencies to 
acquire comprehensive and true knowledge and take the best decisions. In the state supervising 
model, the government is mostly an actor supervising the rules of the game played by relatively 
autonomous players and changing the rules when the game is no longer able to lead to satisfactory 
results. Monitoring and feedback are emphasised.  
This shift from state control to state supervision relates to the liberalisation of higher 
education. As obstacles to students’ mobility diminish, more comparisons are drawn between 
higher education institutions across Europe. The competition between universities increases to 
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attract students. Higher education institutions want to diversify to become more attractive to 
students and claim more managerial autonomy and the State begins to set up general targets for 
this market to grow rather than imposing strict control mechanisms. This switch is not necessarily 
stimulated by universities’ demand. It can come from the State itself which would like to share the 
burden of higher education management with higher education institutions. It is also not 
necessarily synonymous with the ‘retreat of the State’ (Castles et al., 2008), but is closer to a 
reorganisation of modes of state intervention. It can lead to, but is different from, privatisation, 
which occurs when consumers of higher education, students or businesses, pay a greater part of 
the costs (Neave, 2000: 17). 
 
Figure 8: Network structure of attitudes within the Bologna process 
 
 
Figure 8 represents a simplified version of a network structure of attitudes which 
incorporates propositions on the role of the State in higher education. This network structure of 
attitudes is constructed relative to the European higher education area, which aims at opening 
borders between higher education systems. Figure 8 includes questions on redistributive justice 
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(1), competition between universities (2), financial contribution (3), institutional management (4), 
the length of degrees (5), the measurement of credits (6) and quality control (7). Figure 8 uses 
reformulations of the questions used in the online survey43.This network structure of attitudes is 
an ideal-type, and it excludes some of the objects of the Bologna process, such as lifelong 
learning. The propositions on each one of those objects aim at measuring both representational or 
motivational attitudes, meant to be two aspects of an attitude, hence the questions starting with 
two different formulations ‘is’ and ‘should’. Depending on the question, participants could choose 
to answer these questions either with a binary response (e.g. ‘yes’ or ‘no’ as is the case for an 
answer on whether there should be more competition between universities) or a response on a 
continuous scale (e.g. to answer questions on the length of degrees or the percentage of public 
funding going to higher education).  
Attitudes on the objects of this network structure spread along a state versus market 
continuum. This continuum is inspired by Van Vught (1989)’s state control versus state supervising 
models. In this model, attitudes are called state-centred if they satisfy the conditions of the state 
control model. Attitudes are said to be university-centred if they correspond to the state 
supervising model44.  
The cognitive map in Figure 8 includes the most relevant objects in Bologna process 
deliberations in relations to domestic reforms. But understandably, this network structure is an 
ideal-type open to falsification and is not all inclusive. Attitudes could include multiple 
dimensions. For example, an attitude on universities’ competition between universities could 
include an economic dimension (represented here which to the role of the State) as well as a 
                                               
43 The questionnaire is available in the appendix. The formulation of questions to measure attitudes on redistributive 
justice is inspired by Downham and Worcester (1986). 
44 Various official documents contain the terminology ‘student-centred’. This terminology refers more to teaching 
theory, and the terminology ‘university-centred’ is preferred to underline that the stress of this research lies on models 
of state intervention.  
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dimension on European integration. A respondent who is against European integration is less 
likely to want more competition between universities on a European scale, which has the effect of 
reducing the significance of borders between member states. For simplification, this project 
concentrates on the dimension that it perceives as the most important, i.e. the role of the State – 
but also accounts for other relevant dimensions (see chapter 6).  
It should be noted that other ideal types exist. Neave (1976) for example differentiates 
between elitist, socially-oriented and individually-centred attitudes. This ideal-type could be 
relevant to the Bologna process. For example, a university-centred attitude could also be elitist. 
But Neave’s (1976) typology mostly covered issues of access, and relates less directly to the 
Bologna process. Hence, this research only concentrates on the state vs. university-centred 
continuum, perceived as the most relevant to the Bologna process.  
Braun and Merrien (1999) isolate three dimensions concerning the governance of higher 
education: the procedural, substantive and cultural dimensions. The procedural dimension 
concerns the control of universities by policy-makers. The substantive dimension concerns the 
goal-setting capacity of the Government in matters of education and research. The political 
culture of countries regarding the role of higher education in the public sector is the third 
dimension, ranging from a non-utilitarian culture to utilitarian culture. But two of those 
dimensions, i.e. the procedural and substantive ones, actually address the same issues as Van 
Vught’s (1989) state control model.  
Finally, Enders (2004) highlights that higher education governance models have increased in 
complexity and he shows several avenues which call for further conceptualisation. Analysing 
deliberative governance in the Bologna process fits two of those avenues: the development of 
networks, which are growing in influence versus the hierarchical control model, and the 
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significance of global forces, with aspects such as the European dimension becoming more 
integrated into the mainstream national level higher education policy.  
 
Figure 9: State-centred network structure of attitudes in the Bologna process 
 
 
 
Figure 10: University-centred network structure of attitudes in the Bologna process 
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Figures 9 and 10 articulate the two opposite networks of attitudes based on the 
propositions in Figure 8. Figure 9 represents a state-centred network structure of attitudes while 
Figure 10 represents a university-centred network structure of attitudes. At the heart of this 
network lies an attitude concerning redistributive justice, in other words whether the self, i.e. the 
creation of wealth, or the group, i.e. caring for others, matters the most in society.  An individual 
with a state-centred network structure of attitudes is likely to prefer equality among individuals, 
while an individual with a university-centred network structure of attitudes would prefer 
individual achievement as a fundament for society45.  
Related to the central object of distributive justice is the object of competition between 
universities. If an agent prefers the promotion of the self above the group, he will be comfortable 
with universities’ competition, where universities compete between each other to attract students. 
Inversely, if an agent puts the group above the self, he will prefer to make sure that all universities 
have equal standards, and this concern for equality does not encourage competition.  
The relationship between attitudes on distributive justice and university competition 
illustrates how idealised the network structure of attitudes is. In the state-centred network 
structure of attitudes, an individual cares for others and favours equality among individuals. He 
also believes that there should not be a need for competition between organisations or individuals 
(because there is no need to distinguish individual performance). But one could also imagine an 
individual for whom caring for others matters the most, but who still would prefer universities to 
compete. This is however the case only if the individual considers another object to make his 
decision. For example, such other consideration could be that the individual believes that 
                                               
45 The distinction between social equality and individual liberty does not correspond stricto sensu to a distinction 
between egalitarians and libertarians: Individuals valuing social equality may not only be egalitarians, but could also be 
social liberals who value the welfare state for example (Swift, 2001).  
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competition between universities is the best way to achieve a quality higher education service and 
to subsequently provide a quality higher education to all.   
The objects financial contribution and institutional management relate to the issue of 
universities’ competition between universities. Financial contribution touches upon the role of the 
government versus private actors in paying for higher education. Institutional management refers 
to the role of the government in the internal management of universities, including programmes, 
staff, assets etc. If universities compete among each other to attract students, they will want to 
attract their own private funds to make themselves more competitive, and vice versa, if they are 
privately funded, universities will de facto have to compete to attract funds, including funds 
coming from students. Moreover, if universities are in competition with each other, they need a 
certain level of managerial autonomy to be able to differentiate their offers from other 
universities, and vice versa, if universities are autonomous, they will de facto compete against each 
other.  
The objects of the length of degrees, both undergraduate and postgraduate, the 
measurement of credit systems and the regulation of quality control are the least entrenched. 
Those objects relate either to financial contribution or to institutional management - and 
therefore indirectly to the object competition.  
If universities rely more extensively on raising their own funds, they will want to increase 
those funds by increasing the input of students, who presumably will contribute as private 
investors (Bassnett, 2006; Farrington and Palfreyman, 2006).  A way to attract students is to 
provide an attractive product to them, such as shorter degrees, both at the undergraduate and 
postgraduate levels. Moreover, in such a competitive environment, universities will be expected to 
show an output, or in other words to show to students that they will get ‘value for money’ if they 
register. An output-based approach to higher education favours the measurement of credits in 
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terms of learning outcome - how much and what students have learnt throughout their degrees - 
and not the number of hours worked, where students could attend many lectures or classes but 
not take out much depending on the quality of staff and content46. The length of undergraduate 
and postgraduate degrees and credits come under the heading of the qualifications framework47 .  
Finally, if universities are autonomous and compete between each other, an external quality 
control system is needed to ensure the standards and quality of higher education services. Quality 
control is a ‘mechanism for ensuring that an output (product or service) conforms to a predetermined specification’ 
(Harvey, 2004-2007). It is used interchangeably with quality assurance, ‘the collections of policies, 
procedures, systems and practices internal or external to the organisation designed to achieve, maintain and enhance 
quality’ (Harvey, 2004-2007).  
This quality control system could apply to many levels: internal to the higher education 
institution, external to institutions but still national, or European. External quality control 
provides a way to set up standards, which are necessary to promote a liberalised higher education 
space (Kawamoto, 1999). At the same time, external quality control provides an accountability 
mechanism which helps the consumers of higher education to be informed. It also promotes 
academic productivity while guaranteeing the efficiency of resource usage (Neave, 2000: 20). And 
the extension to the European level depends on the geographical scale at which universities are 
competing (national or European). 
Quality control takes place either before higher education provision, through a priori 
accreditation and regulation, or a posteriori provision through evaluation. A posteriori quality 
                                               
46 On the relationship between curricular reform and the growing influence of the private sector, see Bache (2006: 
254) and McMurty (1991).  
47 The length of undergraduate degrees, postgraduate degrees and credits represent aspects of the qualifications 
framework according to the recommendation of the European Council and the European Parliament of 23 April 
2008. This research also sometimes refers to the design of degrees when looking at length and names of levels of 
qualifications for undergraduate and postgraduate degrees without taking credits into account.  
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evaluation includes peer review, document examination, research performance review etc. It 
answers the need to control quality while leaving room for universities to offer differentiated 
products. If universities are managed mostly through state control, then a priori national quality 
control through accreditation and regulation is more likely to occur, since the State will fix a priori 
procedures. Hence controlling the delivery of higher education will be less important and external 
a posteriori quality control will also be less important in a state-centred network structure.  
A transition from a state- to a university-centred network structure of attitudes leads to a 
tension in quality control. On the one hand, it is not because higher education becomes 
university-centred that the Government would not want to have any control on the quality of 
output. After all, the Government would still be one of the financial providers, and in that respect 
would want to ensure the ‘value for money’ of the investment it made into higher education, in 
addition to ensuring that the quality of higher education is guaranteed despite growing diversity 
among higher education institutions. On the other hand, a university-centred perspective implies 
that higher education institutions define their own management, and achieve and assess their own 
quality. One way to assess the quality of outcomes while leaving some autonomy of management 
to universities is a posteriori accountability, preferred in university-centred systems. Quality 
control occurs a posteriori in such system to allow universities to set and monitor the 
achievement of their own targets and rules in a competitive environment. 
Those two network structures of attitudes therefore represent the two perspectives 
influenced by the Bologna process. They are subjective constructs, being perceived differently 
depending on the original standpoint of the observer. For example, academics with a university-
centred perspective could actually perceive an increase in a posteriori quality control as an 
increase in state control instead of a university-centred perspective, especially if the observer came 
from a country with little or no formal quality assurance (be it a priori or not).  
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To sum up, cognitive theories complement the literature on European integration and 
European higher education studies. Using such theories provides information on the consistency 
between the level of entrenchment of individual attitudes and the embeddedness of policy layers 
to connect the micro and macro levels of analysis of deliberative governance. It also provides one 
of the main predictions of this thesis, that deliberations change policies from the less entrenched 
to the more entrenched objects toward a university-centred view (following from H3), using the 
mechanisms of learning in European deliberations (following from H1) and providing strategic 
justifications in the domestic sphere (following from H2).  
But further challenges arise from the connection between micro and macro levels of 
analysis. Those challenges come from measuring attitude change and policy change and 
combining those different levels of analysis to study the impact of deliberation.  
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Chapter 4 Using multiple lenses of analyses 
 
The theory underlined in the previous chapter raises a certain number of measurement 
issues which need to be addressed before any empirical analysis. Deliberation may be a significant 
tool to facilitate policy change. But its impact is difficult to determine if it is potentially 
ubiquitous. How can deliberation be measured given its ubiquitous character? Moreover, 
measuring attitudes and policy change already present a challenge of their own separately. How 
can measurements of individual attitudes and policy change be combined? This chapter proposes 
multiple lenses of analyses as an answer to those questions. Multiple lenses of analyses determine 
the impact of deliberation and unpack its relevant dimensions. Multiple lenses of analysis also 
address the difficulties of combining different levels of analysis.  
The three lenses of analyses include a survey of Bologna process participants (1997-2007), a 
case study of the deliberations leading to the Sorbonne declaration of the 25th of May 1998 and 
Bologna declarations of the 19th of June 1999 and a comparative study of policy change in France 
and England (mid-1980s until 2007). This chapter first presents those lenses of analysis before 
discussing their advantages in terms of operational diversity and addressing the issues of studying 
deliberation through triangulation.  
Three lenses of analysis 
 Survey of attitudes of participants  
A survey designed to measure changes in individual attitudes and the direction of those 
changes constitutes the first empirical test. The survey was sent to participants in Bologna process 
deliberations. Out of the 161 respondents who filled in the questionnaire, 68.32% took part in the 
interministerial meetings taking place every two years. Among those who had not attended those 
interministerial meetings, up to 75% took part in the follow-up activities of the steering body of 
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the Bologna process, called the Bologna Follow Up Group (BFUG) but no interministerial 
meetings. (Those participants took part either in meetings of the board of the BFUG or follow-up 
and working group meetings). A very small number of respondents took part in neither BFUG 
nor interministerial meetings: 0.62% participated in Bologna seminars and conferences sponsored 
by the Bologna Follow Up Group but no BFUG or interministerial meetings. Respondents who 
only took part in related European or international deliberations (for example from UNESCO, 
the Council of Europe or meetings of the Organisation for Economics Cooperation and 
Development OECD) constituted 0.62% of responses, and participants involved in national 
deliberations but not exposed to either the Bologna process or other supranational deliberations 
included 0.62% of responses48. On average, respondents have attended 2 interministerial 
meetings, 15 to 16 follow-up meetings, and 13 to 14 national meetings. 76.40% of participants 
were involved in domestic implementation of higher education policy. 
Participants received the questionnaire by email for the first time at the end of January 
2007, after a pilot sent to five volunteers earlier the same month to test the questionnaire. 
Participants received two reminders at the beginning of October 2007 and during the third week 
of October 2007. Respondents had the choice between a French and an English version49.  
To encourage participation, respondents had the choice of indicating their name and 
availability for an interview or to submit the survey anonymously. The response rate was 26.32%, 
with around 75% of responses provided in October 2007. This response rate, even if it seems 
rather low (Babbie, 2001: 256), is actually exactly similar to the average response rate for online 
                                               
48 The respondents who did not take part in relevant BFUG or interministerial deliberations were initially included 
originally as a control, but this scenario covered only a negligible number of respondents. Instead, the variation in 
number of deliberations attended provides a check on the significance of the number of deliberations attended.  
49 The email provided a link to fill in the questionnaire, available online at: 
https://www.survey.bris.ac.uk/lsewebsite/bp/ (English version) or 
https://www.survey.bris.ac.uk/lsewebsite/bpfrench/ (French version)  
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surveys of 26% (PeoplePulse, 2008). An online survey was used because such a survey is 
particularly cost and time efficient in comparison to postal or telephone surveys. 
The survey asked respondents about their attitudes on seven objects relevant to the 
Bologna process, which correspond to the ones listed in the network structure of attitudes in 
Figure 850. These questions are inspired by the Bologna declaration of the 19th of June 1999 and 
several Bologna process documents. In a second part of the questionnaire, respondents were 
asked to remember prior attitudes for the same questions. Respondents also answered questions 
aiming at determining the extent of their participation in the Bologna process in addition to 
demographic questions. Questions on attitudes had slight changes of wordings between the first 
and second part, and cases where those wordings may affect the results are excluded from the 
analysis51. The survey results include the responses of the online questionnaire only and do not 
aggregate results from other sources, such as interviews conducted later, which are treated 
separately.  
 
Table 1: Respondents by profession  
 
 Profession Count 
Political Minister or secretary of state 3 
 Representing a minister or secretary of state 11 
 Diplomat - national representation 3 
Administrative Civil servant for national government 33 
 Civil servant for European institution 5 
 Other public body 3 
Non-state actor Head of university 15 
 Academic 15 
 University administrator 10 
 Interest group 8 
 Expert 1 
 Student 31 
Unspecified Many 17 
                                               
50 Financial contribution and institutional management correspond to the funding and autonomy dimensions of the 
survey and quality control corresponds to quality assurance.  
51 These changes of wordings mostly related to the formulation of ‘do not know’.  
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 Other 6 
 Total 161 
Table 2: Respondents by country of origin 
 
Country Count  Country Count  Country Count 
Andorra  1  Germany  9  Portugal  5 
Austria  5  Hungary  1  Romania  1 
Azerbaijan  1  Iceland  5  Scotland  7 
Belgium  2  Italy  1  Serbia  3 
Bulgaria  2  Kosovo 2  Slovakia  5 
Croatia  7  Liechtenstein  1  Slovenia  4 
Cyprus  4  Lithuania  2  Spain  3 
Czech Rep. 2  Macedonia  1  Sweden  5 
Denmark  2  Malta  2  Switzerland  4 
England  11  Moldova  1  Turkey  1 
Finland  4  New Zealand  2  Not m. state  33 
France  11  Norway  1  Total 161 
Georgia  9  Poland  1      
 
Participants from 36 countries and 14 professions filled in the survey as Tables 1 and 2 
show. The distribution of respondents is skewed toward particular member states and socio-
economic activities, the highest number of respondents coming from France and England (given 
the in-depth research conducted in those two countries) and being civil servants and students. 
This bias is controlled for by grouping responses into binary categories of principal and agents 
and new versus old member states52. Moreover, case studies and comparisons of policy change 
provide an additional check on the level of attitude change.  
Case studies of deliberations 
Case studies provide a way to further investigate attitude change and explain how a change 
of attitudes translates into policy action. This research uses two case studies: the deliberations 
                                               
52 See chapter 5 for more information on this grouping. 
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leading to the Sorbonne declaration of the 25th of May 1998 and to the Bologna declaration of the 
19th of June 1999.  
The deliberations leading to the Sorbonne declaration of the 25th of May 1999 and to the 
Bologna declaration of the 19th of June 1999 were of particular significance since they started the 
Bologna process. Moreover, both deliberations provide interesting variance, for example in the 
length of deliberation (three months for the Sorbonne declaration versus seven months for 
Bologna), topic (mostly the length of degrees for the Sorbonne declaration versus six ‘action lines’ 
for the Bologna declaration) and number of participants (four participatory states for the 
Sorbonne declaration versus thirty two member states for the Bologna declaration in addition to 
non-state actors).  
Data to analyse those deliberations came from archives obtained through the British 
Freedom of Information Act (2000) and its French equivalent, archives of the Austrian Ministry 
Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft und Verkehr, which administered the preparation of the Bologna 
declaration, in addition to secondary literature, various media sources and interviews of key 
actors. A total of 72 interviews were conducted for the thesis as a whole, 33 of which were 
conducted to investigate the deliberations leading to the Sorbonne and Bologna declarations. The 
rest of the interviews covered the theme of domestic policy changes, particularly in France and 
England.  
 
Table 3: Interviews conducted for case studies of the Sorbonne and Bologna deliberations 
 
Profession France England Italy Germany Austria Europe Total 
Political state actors 5 2 3 0 0 0 9 
Administrative state/Eur. actors 4 0 2 2 2 3 13 
Non-state actors 3 1 3 1 0 2 10 
Total 12 3 8 3 2 5 33 
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Table 3 describes the country and function of interviewees. Interviewees came from France, 
England, Germany, Italy, Austria and Brussels (i.e. EU). France, England, Germany and Italy took 
part in the deliberations of the Sorbonne declaration of the 25th of May 1998. Austria, the 
European Commission and European university representatives53 in Brussels took part in the 
preparation of the Bologna declaration of the 19th of June 1999. To facilitate openness, interviews 
were conducted anonymously following Chatham House rules. Most interviews took place face-
to-face, but a few of them were conducted by phone. For three interviewees, questions had to be 
translated and were filled in by hand. Most interviews were recorded upon permission of the 
interviewee and fully transcribed, and in some cases notes were taken. Some interviewees also 
replied to the survey. But since respondents to the survey could choose to remain anonymous, it 
is difficult to check which interviewee has also answered the survey. An overlap between the 
survey participants and the interviewees is not problematic. Both the results of the interviews and 
the survey are analysed separately. The survey results provide a relatively longitudinal comparison 
of attitude change and the case studies provide an analysis of attitude change over particular 
deliberations.  
Comparative studies of policy change 
A comparative study of policy change in France and England from the mid 1980s until 
2007 complements the survey and deliberation cases by looking at the transcription of the 
Bologna process into domestic policies. Such a comparative study traces policy goals, contents 
and style in addition to the temporal sequence to show when key decisions were made (time) the 
sequences of decisions (timing) and the speed (tempo) to infer policy change (Dyson, 2002).  
                                               
53 At the time called the Association of European Universities (CRE) and the Confederation of European Union 
Rectors' conferences.  
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The cross-country comparison covers four policy objects: the design of degrees, quality 
control, financial contribution and institutional management. The choice of countries corresponds 
to policy, theoretical and practical considerations.  
In terms of policy relevance, England and France symbolise two of the main models of 
higher education in Europe: the Anglo-Saxon and Napoleonic models (Neave, 2001). Both 
countries also count among the earliest instigators of the Bologna process having signed the first 
declaration of the 25th of May 1998. However, since then, France and England have had a 
different relationship with the Bologna process: France counts among the countries having 
undertaken the deepest reforms since the beginning of the Bologna process, whilst England has 
conducted few Bologna process related reforms. Those cases therefore ensure a certain amount 
of variance corresponding to Mill’s (1843) method of difference, recommended by many 
methodologists such as King et al. (1994: 129) or Haverland (2006).  
But as Lodge (2000: 9) argues, the effectiveness of this method is mostly reliant on the level of 
technical detail in which the researcher wishes to pursue the comparison. To find change, one 
could be tempted to go into as much detail as possible. However, this course of action risks 
drowning the analysis in a sea of details. A deductive methodology articulated around theory 
testing is applied to avoid this bias (King et al, 1994). 
Theoretically, England, although it has conducted few reforms, is worth studying in-depth. 
According to some, it plays the role of a reference case in the Bologna process (Witte, 2006: 104). 
Finally, practical considerations, such as language skills, initial familiarity with cases and data 
availability, motivated the choice of cases.  
The period from the mid-1980s until 2007 provides a necessary and almost symmetrical 
number of years to compare the period anterior to Bologna process deliberations and posterior to 
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the deliberations. Such a time period is also sufficiently long to study policy change54. Finally, the 
barrier of the mid-1980s includes major changes which occurred before the Bologna process, 
such as the change to polytechnics in England with the Further and Higher Education Act of 
1992, and various attempts to change the financial contribution and institutional management of 
universities in France with the Devaquet proposal of 198655. 
 
Table 4: Policy objects in case studies of domestic implementation  
 
Main objects Content 
Financial contribution Type of contributor:  
Public  e.g. central and local governments  
Private e.g. students and families, businesses 
Institutional management Internal management rules, including allocation of funding 
Level of decision-making (institutional, national or European) 
Quality control Level of control (institutional, national or European) 
Actor in control (ministry vs. independent agency) 
Type of control (a priori rules and targets vs. a posteriori evaluation)  
Design of degrees Length and division of qualifications 
Names of levels of qualifications 
Level of decision-making (institutional, national or European) 
 
The comparative study only includes four objects out of the seven studied in the survey as 
Table 4 shows. This choice obeys considerations of parsimony and theoretical fit. A comparative 
study requires in depth analysis, and word limits constrained the number of cases to develop. The 
object of credits is left out for this reason. Distributive justice and competition are left out from 
an explicit comparison because those objects are more entrenched and hence have been more 
implicit to higher education policies in the countries studied, although they are implicitly part of 
the following comparison (all attitudes being related and changing attitudes on financial 
                                               
54 Some researchers, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993: 118) in particular,  argue that policy change  occurs over a 
period of a decade or more.  
55 See chapter 7 for a summary of higher education policy at that period in France and England.  
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contribution and institutional management can change perspectives on competition and 
distributive justice for example).  
 The objects selected are subject to different levels of entrenchment. The design of degrees 
and quality control are assumed to be less entrenched than financial contribution and institutional 
management. Those four objects also represent the most contentious areas of reforms; both for 
the Bologna process, and for national reforms.  
The design of degrees was the first theme of the Bologna process, launched in the Sorbonne and 
Bologna declarations of the 25th of May 1998 and the 19th of June 1999. The Sorbonne declaration 
recommended the adoption of a system with ‘two main cycles, undergraduate and graduate’. The 
Bologna declaration added that the length of the undergraduate degree should last ‘a minimum of 
three years’.  
The topic of quality control became the second main action line of the Bologna process. In 
Bologna, ministers declared that they supported the ‘promotion of European co-operation in quality 
assurance with a view to developing comparable criteria and methodologies’. Quality assurance became a key 
priority for the Bologna agenda with the Berlin communiqué of the 19th of September 2003. 
The objects of financial contribution and institutional management were not originally included in 
the early declarations of the Bologna process and therefore were not key action lines. Besides, 
since those objects are more entrenched, they also tend to be more implicit. But they 
progressively emerged in the Bologna process. The Sorbonne declaration of the 25th of May 1998 
only vaguely alluded to the ‘Europe of knowledge’ as an alternative to a Europe ‘of the euro, banks and 
the economy’ and referred briefly to the idea of making students find their own ‘area of excellence’ as a 
potential reference to the creation of a more competitive higher education system.  
The Bologna declaration of the 19th of June 1999 inserted institutional management and financial 
contribution into the Bologna process. The Bologna declaration declared ‘of the highest importance’ 
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that universities became ‘independent and autonomous’ and recognised the Bologna Magna Charta 
Universitatum of 1988. The Magna Charta Universitatum advocated the principle of autonomy, 
with an intellectual and moral separation of teaching and research from political authority and 
economic power.  
In the area of financial contribution, the link with the Bologna process started indirectly. 
The Magna Charta Universitatum that the declaration acknowledged requested ‘more investment in 
higher education’.  
The Berlin communiqué of the 19th of September 2003 made the relationship with financial 
contribution more explicit. At the same time as reassuring trade union members on the idea that 
the government should play a role in this policy object, stating that ‘higher education was a public good 
and a public responsibility’, the Berlin communiqué also anchored the Bologna process within the 
direction defined by the EU Lisbon strategy, by recognising the conclusions of the European 
Councils of Lisbon (2000) and Barcelona (2002). Those conclusions set out the objective of 
making Europe ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world’.  
Doing this, the Berlin communiqué linked the Bologna process to subsequent European Union 
documents and agreements on the Lisbon strategy.  Later communiqués of Bergen (20th of May 
2005) and London (17th of May 2007) restated this link between Bologna and the European 
Community. 
EU documents on the Lisbon strategy, linked to and recognised by the Bologna process, 
focused in more details on institutional management and financial contribution. This EU agenda 
was first discussed in a report from the Education Council (2001) called Concrete and Future 
objectives of education and training systems, which advocated a more market oriented approach to higher 
education related to a more efficient use of resources, and a reliance on the expertise of member 
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states having developed performance indicators for institutions and the outcomes of national 
policies.  
The Commission followed up on this report with two communications in 2003: The Role of 
Universities in the Europe of knowledge and Investing efficiently in education and training, an imperative for 
Europe. Those two documents discussed a strategy for institutional management and financial 
contribution. The Commission’s communication The Role of universities in the Europe of knowledge 
recommended for example a diversification of the sources of funding through private donations, 
tuition fees and universities selling services - more transparency to calculate the costs of research 
and a review of accounting mechanisms.  
The second communication, Investing efficiently in education and training: an imperative for Europe 
suggested an efficient management and financial contribution scheme through more private 
funding and measures to make performance indicators more efficient with regard to the drop out 
rate, employment at graduate level, the length of degrees, and exchange of best practice. In a 2007 
document, the European Commission recalled the relationship between the Bologna process and 
the reports driven by the Lisbon strategy (European Commission, 2007).  
Data for this comparative study comes from the analysis of various official documents 
obtained through interviews and archival work, and various media sources. Many participants of 
the Sorbonne and/or Bologna deliberations also contributed in implementation: 29% of the 
interviews covered both the topic of the Sorbonne and/or Bologna deliberations and domestic 
implementation. 
 
Table 5: Additional interviews for comparative study  
 
Profession France  
England/ 
Scotland Europe  Total 
Political state actors 5   5 
Administrative domestic & European actors 6 6 2 14 
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Non-state actors 8 12  20 
Total 19 18 2 39 
 
The additional interviews conducted for implementation are represented in Table 5. They 
exclude the interviews which also covered deliberation cases. Interviews to understand policy 
change took place mostly in France and England, but also in Scotland to better understand the 
reaction of England to the Bologna process. England and Scotland share the same political 
representation in European deliberations. But their higher education policies are different because 
of devolution. Hence Scottish actors have a unique insight in the English policy-making system. 
Civil servants in Brussels were also interviewed to obtain a more distanced evaluation of 
implementation in both countries.  
Operational complementarity between multiple lenses of analysis 
 Combining three lenses of analysis represents a challenge, particularly because it requires 
several operationalisations of key variables. But this diversity of operationalisations also represents 
a theoretical advantage, since it sheds light on many complementary sides of analysis, particularly 
on the key concepts of deliberation, convergence and entrenchment.  
The diversity of measurements of deliberation through the three lenses of analysis provides 
analytical variety. The survey relies on the number of times an individual took part in meetings as 
a proxy for his exposure to deliberation. The proxy for deliberation is an aggregation of the 
number of meetings, including ministerial meetings; follow-up meetings (including board, working 
group and members’ meetings of the Bologna follow-up group (BFUG)) and relevant national 
meetings.  
The proxy includes national meetings for two reasons. First, many of those national 
meetings are sponsored by the BFUG and actually are deliberations gathering participants from 
across Europe around a theme of the Bologna process.  
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Secondly, the change of cognitive map occurs through a reflexion which takes place after 
information has been heard: Participants, when hearing new information during a European 
meeting, take time to assimilate information into their network structure of attitudes. To facilitate 
this assimilation process, they exchange arguments and reflect once they are back in their member 
states, or with their national counterparts. As Beyers (2005) argues, the ideas and role conceptions 
of individuals who participate in European fora are actually influenced by many arenas, European 
and domestic. Attitude change need not necessarily imply the adoption of a similar supranational 
view. It also includes how similar attitudes can be altered, possibly during subsequent domestic 
deliberations on the same theme.  
The total number of meetings is treated as a binary variable (high or low number of 
meetings attended). The category ‘low number of meetings’ includes up to 38 meetings, and the 
category ‘high number of meetings’ includes attendance at more than 38 meetings. 38 
corresponds to the median value of possible numbers of meetings (respondents attended between 
10 and 76 meetings). And this ensures that there are enough cases per category to achieve 
statistical reliability. 
Operationalising deliberation in terms of the duration of contact, i.e. time spent in 
meetings, is a popular way to study the impact of deliberation56; but it neglects the qualitative 
context of the meetings. For example, it does not provide suitable information to understand how 
attitude change has occurred, i.e. what were the roles of learning and strategic use.  
Case studies of deliberation investigate the qualitative dimensions of deliberation. Such 
qualitative approach requires a looser operationalisation of deliberation. The case studies of 
deliberation identify deliberation as a policy space where participants exchange arguments, are 
open to listening to each other and to reaching an agreement. This broad definition of 
                                               
56 See for example Hooghe (1999). 
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deliberation allows the exploration of the mechanisms leading to attitude change, group outcome 
and policy decisions. Finally, the comparative study between France and England treats 
deliberation as an external influence. It looks at the transfer of deliberative outcome into policy 
strategies, decisions, contents and possibly styles. In particular, this lens of analysis complements 
the survey and deliberative cases by looking at the consequences of diffusing a paradigm which 
started from the Sorbonne and Bologna deliberations on the higher education policies of France 
and England.  
  A similar complementarity arises with the operationalisation of other variables. The 
survey measures different aspects of attitudes, motivational or representational. It uses 
respondents’ rankings of various alternatives and degrees of agreement with a proposition as a 
measurement of motivational and representational attitudes respectively. The change of attitudes 
and this possible convergence comes from calculating the difference between the attitudes prior 
and post deliberation57. This difference provides an indication of the direction of change. 
Attitudes were coded differently to distinguish ‘university-centred’ from ‘state-centred’ attitudes’. 
Generally, university-centred attitudes had smaller values than state-centred attitudes. Hence a 
value closer to 0-20 would correspond to a university-centred attitude and a value closer to 80-100 
to a state-centred attitude58. A difference between the attitude prior participation to the Bologna 
process (Aprior) and since participation in the Bologna process for each category of attitude 
(Apresent) of zero obtained the coding ‘no change’. A difference greater than zero was interpreted 
                                               
57
 Those results were standardised. This coding took into account and controlled for the original ordering of 
possible answers in the questionnaire. For example, the original order of agreement was inverted for present 
attitudes on competition to match prior attitudes on competition. Respondents choosing the category ‘other’ as 
well as ‘do not know’ and missing cases as well as inconsistent motivational attitudes are counted as missing 
variables to make the interpretation between ‘university-centred’ and –state-centred’ attitudes more 
straightforward.  
58
 For more details, see chapter 5.  
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as going toward a state-centred attitude. A difference smaller than zero meant a switch to a 
university-centred attitude. To summarise:  
APrior – APresent = 0 → ‘no change’ 
Aprior – Apresent > 0 → ‘change to state-centred attitude’ 
Aprior – Apresent < 0 → ‘change to university-centred attitude’ 
 This implies that change occurs by degree (as opposed to a binary switch). Hence, a 
change of attitudes occurs if an individual strengthens or moderates an existing attitude. If the 
attitudes of individuals change in the same direction, and if the variation between different 
attitudes decreases, then those changes of attitudes constitute overall convergence.   
The case studies and comparative studies also look at convergence in attitudes using 
behaviour as a proxy. Comparing policies to infer policy convergence, in the same way as policy 
change, requires particular caution regarding the meaning of similarity and level of analysis 
(Holzinger, 2006).  
A growing similarity may mean that the policies of two countries are both changing in the 
same direction, conventionally called σ-convergence. But convergence may also occur from one 
country adopting similar policies to another (β-convergence) (Holzinger, 2006: 275). But there is 
no convergence if the policies are already similar. This issue with convergence measurement, 
which Holzinger (2006) qualifies as ‘saturation effect’, is more of a problem with quantitative 
analyses, where data is ‘thin’. Qualitative analyses, because of their breadth, are well able to 
document pre-existing similarities and to control for saturation effects. This qualitative analysis 
covers the period preceding 1998 and will therefore be able to detect prior similarities.  
But qualitative analyses, as well as survey-based analyses, face the problem of the level of 
analysis. If the analysis does not focus on a similar level in the two countries (one level could be 
domestic regulation, another could be more regional for example), this can result in an erroneous 
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conclusion of convergence. Sticking to a consistent level of measurement prevents the erroneous 
conclusion that change or convergence has occurred based on using different units of analysis.  
Finally, the survey, deliberation cases and comparative studies complement each other on 
the measurement of entrenchment. They use the level of generality of an object to define the level 
of entrenchment. And they test this assumption by measuring the likelihood of attitudes or 
policies to change, although chapter 5 also tests the competing definition according to which the 
level of entrenchment of an object is a function of the number of relationships it has with other 
objects.  
This raises a difficulty for the measurement of the most entrenched attitudes. As Majone 
(1989: 152) explained, some elements that the researcher may assume as implicit and hence 
entrenched could actually never have been perceived or consciously articulated by the actors. If an 
element is neither perceived nor articulated, can it legitimately exist as an object of study? Majone 
(1989: 152) responds that a policy is an analytical construct rather than a directly observable 
phenomenon. The only requirement for theoretical confirmation is that empirical findings match 
this analytical construct. And testing the level of entrenchment through three different lenses 
increases the validity of the results.  
Triangulation in multi-level analysis  
Studying the impact of deliberation on individual attitudes and policies is challenging with 
regard to validity and reliability. Three main validity and reliability challenges arise, regarding the 
measurement of individual attitudes in a network structure, the connection between attitudes and 
policies and the significance of deliberation for those changes. Multiple lenses of analysis do not 
eliminate any of those challenges. But since each lens of analysis is limited by those challenges, 
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using several lenses of analysis potentially limits measurement errors arising from one single lens 
of analysis by triangulating results.  
Firstly, multiple lenses of analysis control for measurement errors in the significance of 
deliberation by multiplying sources of data. Even if the survey indicates a change of attitudes, and 
if there appears to be a correlation between changes of attitudes and attendance at periods of 
deliberation, the change of attitudes may have occurred independently from deliberation. It could 
be the result of the acquisition of new information through the media for example. Research on 
cognitive dissonance even suggests that internalisation can occur even in the absence of any 
attempts at persuasion in a process of personal reflexion (Festinger, 1962). Relying on cases of 
deliberation and comparative studies provides additional evidence for this relationship.  
Multiple lenses of analysis also reply to the challenge of measuring individual attitudes by 
multiplying the type of proxy used. Individual attitudes cannot be directly observed, since they are 
inside an individual’s mind. Individual behaviour and revealed attitudes are used as proxies for 
‘true’ attitudes. Existing research, especially inspired from cognitive psychology, has conducted 
many semi-experiments and other quantitative studies relying on revealed attitudes (for example, 
Beyers, 2005; Boucher et al., 2007; Davidson et al., 2009). Case studies, popular in European 
studies, concentrate on using individual behaviour as a proxy (Beyers and Dierickx, 1998; Van 
Schendelen; 1998; Hanny and Wessels, 1998; Joerges and Vos, 1999; Christiansen and Kirchner, 
2000; Trondal and Veggeland, 2000; Lewis, 2003; Maurer, 2003; De la Porte and Nanz, 2003; 
Jacobsson and Viffell, 2004).  
But each one of those proxies suffers from validity issues when used separately. Observing 
behaviour may not be an accurate proxy for attitude. Mackie (2006) argues that participants’ 
behaviour hides attitude change in deliberation for credibility’s sake. This means that observing 
participants’ behaviour in deliberation alone is not a valid indicator of attitude change. But 
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participants may be more likely to reveal changes in confidential interviews or anonymous 
surveys.  
The roles actors play in deliberation also forces them to adopt a certain type of behaviour 
which may not correspond to their private attitudes. Surveys and experiments tend to conceive of 
actors as free agents when they enter deliberative institutions. But actors are actually embedded in 
multiple domestic and international contexts (Checkel, 2005: 811). And participants are likely to 
behave differently in an experiment than in “real life” (Lusk et al., 2006; McDermot, 2002). 
According to Johnston (2005), individuals’ compliance with roles is strategic: individuals suffer 
from uncertainty regarding their sense of belonging in various contexts, and mimicking, i.e. 
playing a role, is the first step for agents to belong to a group. On the one hand, playing a role 
creates a potential issue of validity for researchers who observe actors’ behaviour in order to 
estimate actors’ attitudes. Role play could also force agents to mask their true attitudes when 
revealing them: if an individual’s true attitudes are conflicting with his role, he is more likely to 
reveal the attitude expected from his role.  
On the other hand, role playing need not cancel out the relevance of studying individual 
attitudes. Zürn and Checkel (2005) rely on Festinger (1953)’s cognitive dissonance theory to 
explain that actors who act in a certain manner need to justify these activities to themselves and 
others. Doing so, actors internalise the justification, incorporating the attitudes and interests of 
the organisational role, even if they were initially critical of it. Johnston (2005: 1022) agrees with 
this argument when he explains that mimicking leads to the internalisation of norms through 
repetition. The role that actors play constitute individuals’ public and possibly private attitudes 
and intentional behaviour59.  
                                               
59 An implication of role playing is that individuals may change their perceptions of their social role. They may also 
adopt a sense of identification and belonging for a different group during deliberation, a mechanism that Lewis 
(2005) studies in his account of socialisation in COREPER meetings. 
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Relying on individuals’ accounts of their own attitudes instead of behaviour may suffer 
from a problem of retrospectivity: Individuals may not remember their past attitudes correctly or 
they may be hesitant to report attitudes which do not depict them in a positive light (Schwarz, 
2008: 48)60. This problem is particularly likely with the retrospective survey conducted in this 
research. In addition, common issues of survey design affect responses: the design of questions in 
the survey can distort respondents’ attitudes. For example, the order of questions can bring to 
mind an attitude on a preceding question to the respondent and affect his answer to a given 
question. And the interpretation of a rating scale by the respondent is context dependent 
(Schwarz, 2008: 44-48). Case studies also suffer from difficulties regarding revealed attitudes. 
Interviewees may be influenced by the interviewer’s questions. For example, a question including 
positive information often results in a more positive attitude (Schwarz, 2008: 44).  And using 
written sources could lead to reliance on public attitudes that intend to persuade or manipulate an 
intended audience more than they reveal a private attitude (Axelrod, 1976: 43).  
It is difficult to measure exactly the extent to which norms, role playing and retrospectivity 
affect the validity of measuring individual attitudes through behaviour and revealed attitudes. And 
every single lens of analysis seems to suffer from shortcomings. Faced with those doubts about 
the validity of the measurement of attitudes, the use of a combination of revealed attitudes and 
behaviour as proxies for individual attitudes is intended to limit potential measurement errors by 
triangulating the results (Huston et al., 1997: 381).  
Moreover, multiple lenses of analysis also multiply tests of the correlations between 
different attitudes to establish the existence of a network structure. The exposure to new 
information means that a network structure of attitudes is permanently being reshaped and 
                                               
60 Participants rationalising their attitudes by revealing those which depict them in a positive light shows the influence 
of dominant paradigms against which participants judge which attitude will make them come out in a positive light.  
Chapter 4 Using multiple lenses of analysis 
 
 
 90 
adapted to this new information. Hence a given network structure may not be entirely consistent 
at a given time. A survey takes a snapshot of an individual’s cognitive scheme at that given time. 
If at this time, an individual is digesting new information, he may have some inconsistencies in his 
network structure, and the survey would report that inconsistency. Other methodologies, such as 
case studies and comparative studies, clarify this potential inconsistency, concentrating on how 
individuals assimilate this information over time and integrate it into a consistent cognitive 
scheme.  
A combination of lenses of analysis tests the connection between individual attitudes and 
policy change. Deliberation affects domestic policies indirectly by changing individual attitudes 
first. For this theoretical link to hold, a relationship needs to exist between changes in individual 
attitudes and changes in domestic policies. The connection with policy limits options for research 
design. For example, panel surveys are common to measure changes of opinion arising from 
exposure to new information (Slaton; 1992; Bruter, 2003). A panel survey would be a valid way to 
assess changes of attitudes between two time periods in this study. However, the transcription of 
changes of attitudes into national policies takes time. One needs to study changes in attitudes 
which are well in the past to be able to analyse their impact on policies. This makes a panel survey 
difficult and leaves only the retrospective survey as a viable option.  
However limiting methodologically, establishing the connection between attitudes and 
policies is crucial to fully understand the implications of deliberation for policy-making. But the 
relationship between changes of attitudes and changes in policies is not an impervious one.  Many 
other factors can influence policy change at the domestic level as covered in the earlier chapters. 
The survey controls for some of the relationship between attitudes and policies. For example, it 
controls for experience of domestic implementation when measuring attitude change (with the 
hypothesis that the more individuals are involved in implementation, the more strategic 
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motivations they have, and the more likely they are to use deliberation strategically to justify pre-
existing attitudes rather than change attitudes as such).  
But using only a survey does not provide a deep understanding of the reasons for and 
articulation of the strategic use of deliberation if these were not included in the design of the 
questionnaire; hence, the use of case studies. Moreover, process tracing in the comparative studies 
uncovers other complex domestic dynamics of transfer of deliberative outcomes into domestic 
paradigms and policies, as well as the role of political commitment, parliamentary votes, socio-
economic conditions and the interplay between state and non-state actors in policy formation. 
Multiple lenses of analysis therefore make it possible to test many different explanations and 
mechanisms for policy change.   
 
The methodological approach of the thesis thus involves multiple lenses of analysis. A 
survey analyses how deliberation changes individual attitudes. A qualitative study of two 
deliberative cases and a comparative study of policy change in France and England complement 
the results of the survey.  
Studying the impact of deliberation on individual attitudes and policies presents several 
methodological challenges, regarding the measurement of deliberation and individual attitudes, 
and the connection between attitudes and policies. Using multiple lenses of analyses provides an 
attempt to limit measurement errors arising from those challenges by multiplying the types of 
measurements and sources of data. It also brings a richness of empirical analysis by unpacking 
deliberation in its most relevant levels.   
Overall, the first part of this thesis showed that the literature on deliberative governance in 
Europe needed to focus on establishing a connection between micro and macro levels of analyses, 
i.e. connecting individual changes of attitudes during European deliberation to policy changes in 
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the domestic arena. It proceeded to solve this challenge theoretically, using insights from 
cognitive theories. This part acknowledged that the impact of deliberation had cognitive 
implications, changing individual network structures of attitudes, but also strategic implications, 
with European deliberations used to facilitate domestic reforms. The part then went on to solve 
the methodological challenge of connecting individual changes of attitudes to policies in an 
analysis of deliberation, arguing that the most appropriate approach was to use multiple lenses of 
analysis. The next part presents the findings of these multiple analyses and investigates to which 
extent these findings complement each other.  
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Part II Empirical results from multiple lenses of analysis  
 
 This part presents empirical results testing three hypotheses inspired by cognitive theories: 
European deliberative governance leads to a change of attitudes among its participants and 
particularly their representations of the world (H1). Policy-makers use European deliberations to 
diffuse new paradigms to facilitate domestic reforms (H2). The level of attitude and policy change 
induced by deliberation is a negative function of the level of entrenchment of the relevant 
propositions (H3).   
Chapter 5 provides a quantitative measurement of changes in individual attitudes obtained 
through the survey of participants in the Bologna process, testing H1 and H3. Chapter 6 connects 
those changes of attitudes and participation in European deliberations to political decisions by 
studying the impact of learning and strategic motivations in the deliberations leading to the 
Sorbonne and Bologna declarations of the 25th of May 1998 and  the 19th of June 1999, testing 
H1, H2 and H3. Chapter 7 analyses the consequences of those decisions for domestic policies and 
how deliberations contributed to shift paradigms and facilitate domestic reforms in its 
comparative study of policy changes in France and England (mid-1980s to 2007), testing H2 and 
H3. 
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Chapter 5 Changes of attitudes in deliberation, survey results 
 
Chapter 5 compares the attitudes of survey respondents before and after participation in 
Bologna process deliberations. This first lens of analysis tests hypotheses 1 and 3 according to 
which European deliberations change individual attitudes depending on the level of entrenchment 
of the relevant propositions. It also discusses the direction of this change, the type of change – 
representational or motivational -, and finally critically assesses this relationship by analysing how 
different factors affect it. Such factors relate for example to who is persuasive in a group, i.e. the 
majority or the minority. Variables which are not directly included in the survey are also discussed. 
For example, the prior European and/or international experience of participants can influence 
their openness toward Bologna process deliberations and likelihood to change their minds 
accordingly.  
Descriptive statistics measure the variation, direction of change of individual attitudes and 
how correlated those attitudes are with each other. They test whether a convergence of attitudes 
has occurred and to what extent attitudes change according to their level of entrenchment. Binary 
and multinomial logistic regression models indicate how significant deliberation is in creating 
those changes. This chapter concludes that deliberation did indeed contribute to attitudinal 
change in less entrenched policy objects such as the qualifications framework and quality 
assurance, but that the mechanisms leading to those changes, i.e. learning or strategy, need to be 
distinguished to fully understand the nature of the impact of deliberation on attitudes.  
Convergence and correlation between attitudes 
A first step toward testing hypothesis 1 consists in assessing to what extent convergence has 
occurred in individual attitudes by looking at the variation in change before analysing the direction 
of this change. The study initially divided attitudes in two elements: representational and 
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motivational, which correspond to beliefs about the state of the world and preferences about 
particular policy options.  
Although the second part of the chapter groups the representational and motivational 
elements of an attitude together, it is nevertheless important to understand which part of an 
attitude changes the most to specify the type of mechanism regarding which deliberation has an 
impact. If deliberation changes mostly participants’ representations but not their motivations, an 
inconsistency between motivations and representations ensues: this inconsistency could come 
from a willingness to maintain interests despite contradictory representations. But inconsistency is 
not inevitable: a new representation may actually match the previous motivations of participants if 
this new representation provides further arguments and facts to support an existing motivation. 
On the contrary, if mostly motivations change, then this could mean that participants value group 
cohesion more than factual consistency.   
Measure of variation 
The interquartile range (iqr) provides a measure of variation and hence convergence 
between representational attitudes before and since attendance in European deliberations. The 
smaller the iqr, the more attitudes have converged. The interquartile range is the difference 
between the two most extreme 25th percentiles of a distribution which includes 50% of the data. 
The interquartile range is used to measure representational attitudes because those attitudes have 
been standardised on a 0-100 scale depending on the tendency of the respondent to agree to a 
particular statement (100 meaning strongly agree). The iqr is a more adequate measure of variation 
(and conversely convergence) than the standard deviation in this context. Different objects have 
different sample sizes as a result of the deletion of missing data, ‘do not know’ and inconsistent 
cases, and the interquartile range is less influenced by variations in sample size than the standard 
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deviation. Hypothesis 3 predicts a reduction in iqr in the objects of qualifications framework and 
quality control, but no diminution in other more entrenched objects. 
 
Figure 11: Variation in changes of representational attitudes  
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Figure 11 represents changes in interquartile range for representational attitudes before and 
after participation in deliberation. The largest restriction in iqr occurred regarding qualifications 
framework, from 50 to 27.5. The iqr also became 10 points smaller in quality control as predicted. 
The iqr even became 10 points smaller in the objects of financial contribution, suggesting a 
convergence in representational attitudes not only in the less entrenched objects of qualifications 
framework and quality control, but also in financial contribution61.  
The data being categorical, the iqr would not be suitable to measure convergence in 
motivational attitudes. Convergence occurs in preference ranking if individuals come to prefer the 
same alternatives. Fishkin et al. (2006)’s index of substantive agreement provides an indication of 
whether preferences have converged. Substantive agreement represents the extent to which 
individuals have the same first preference, and hence converge toward the same alternative.  
Fishkin et al. (2006) measure substantive agreement (A) using a simple formula. If n 
represents the total number of individuals, n1 represents the number of individuals who most 
                                               
61
 The increase in iqr in the case of competition does not contradict the original predictions. H1 and H3 predicted 
that the least entrenched attitudes should converge, i.e. the qualifications framework and quality assurance. These 
hypotheses did not make any assumptions for the more entrenched attitudes regarding competition.  
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prefer alternative 1 and n2 the number of individuals who most prefer alternative 2, nk the 
number most preferring the kth alternative, then A = (n1/n)² + (n2/n)²+ … + (nk/n)².  A=1 if 
everyone has the same preference, A = 1/k when an equal number of individuals equally prefer 
each alternative. Calculating an average across all policy objects indicates that the measure of 
substantive agreement went from A = 0.46 before deliberation to A = 0.49 after deliberation for 
individuals who have changed their attitudes62. Although this increase in substantive agreement is 
rather modest, it indicates that motivational attitudes, like representational attitudes, converged 
overall. 
Direction of change  
 This raises the question of the direction of change. Such question itself covers two 
aspects: firstly toward which ideological direction attitudes have converged and secondly which 
groups of participants were particularly persuasive and convinced others to adopt their attitudes.  
In order to understand the ideological direction of change, more information is necessary 
regarding the measurement of representational and motivational attitudes. As alluded to earlier, 
representational attitudes are measured in relation to the tendency to agree of the respondent on a 
scale from 0 to 100: the higher the score, the more the respondent agreed with a particular 
proposition. For distributive justice, competition and institutional management, the tendency to 
agree is adapted from a Likert scale. A score of 81-100 means ‘strongly agree with’. A score of 0-
20’ means ‘strongly disagree with’. The proposition for distributive justice was ‘everyone has 
enough to live a fulfilling life in this society’. For competition, respondents had to evaluate the 
proposition ‘there is no competition to attract students between universities’. For institutional 
management, respondents were required to judge their agreement with the proposition: 
                                               
62 A = 0.57 for individuals who have not changed their attitudes. 
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‘universities lack autonomy to design programmes to teach first cycles (i.e. undergraduate) 
students in this country’. 
For financial contribution, respondents had to evaluate how much they thought their 
governments funded universities systems in their countries. 81-100 should therefore be 
interpreted literally as the Government funds 81 to 100% of higher education in the respondent’s 
country. The original ten point scale for this question in the survey was computed to a 
standardised scale.  
For the qualifications framework - including length of degrees and credits - and quality 
control, respondents had to rate their agreement with the statement according to which the 
qualifications framework and quality control were different throughout Europe. A score of 81-
100 means that the respondent thought that the qualifications framework or quality control 
systems were very different across Europe. A score of 0-20 means that the respondent believed 
that the qualifications framework and quality control were relatively similar across Europe.  
The tendency to agree is therefore used as an indicator of the ideological orientation of a 
respondent. If a respondent strongly agrees with the fact that there is no autonomy for 
universities to design their own programmes, his representational attitude toward the object 
autonomy is interpreted as state-centred. This interpretation however hides a difficulty: an 
individual could genuinely observe that there is no autonomy no matter what his motivations are. 
Or his underlying motivational attitude could modify his answer to this question. If an individual 
wants to have more autonomy for universities, he will be very critical of the existing amount of 
autonomy in his country, and rate the level of autonomy as very low. Knowing that, it would be 
difficult to uncover respondents’ ‘hidden agendas’ from the results of the survey alone. And this 
chapter does not attempt to see how a respondent’s motivations influenced his perceptions. 
Instead, it uses respondents’ self-reported motivations (detailed later in the chapter) to analyse 
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respondents’ motivational attitudes, taking respondents’ answers at ‘face value’ and using other 
lenses of analysis to verify the results. 
 
Figure 12: Change of representational attitudes  
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Figure 12 illustrates the representational attitudes of participants who have and have not 
changed their minds since taking part in deliberations. The values in the stacked columns indicate 
the percentages of participants having indicated a particular tendency to agree (ranging from 0 to 
100). ‘Before’ and ‘after’ is used to distinguish what the attitudes of participants who have 
changed their minds were before deliberation and since they took part in deliberation. ‘No 
change’ represents the attitudes of participants who have not changed their minds. Figure 12 
shows that participants believe that there have been fewer differences between qualifications 
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frameworks and quality control systems in Europe since they participated in deliberation. Among 
those who changed their minds, the modal participant strongly agreed (81-100) with the statement 
according to which qualifications frameworks were very different across Europe before 
deliberation (48% among participants who changed their minds). After deliberation, among 
participants who changed their minds, the modal respondent dropped to believing that 
qualifications frameworks were less different after deliberation, 39.58% of respondents ranking 
differences at 41-60. The same diminution occurred regarding representations of differences 
regarding quality control. Among those who changed their minds, 47.27% believed that 
qualifications framework were very different before deliberations (81-100). The mode dropped to 
a lower ranking of differences after deliberations (40.39% of participants ranking differences as 
61-80).  
In addition, participants believed more intensively that there was competition between 
universities following deliberation (the mode going from 41-60 to 21-40). They also believed that 
the government funded a lower percentage of higher education in their country, the mode shifting 
from a perception of almost total funding (81-100) to a lower level of perceived funding (61-80). 
In addition, participants had a stronger belief that universities lacked autonomy to design 
university programmes, the mode going up from 61-80 to 81-100.  
The object with the least perceived differences in representational attitudes was distributive 
justice. Regarding distributive justice, participants who changed their minds were relatively equally 
likely to have the same representation regarding distributive justice, the mode remaining the same 
on whether everyone had enough to live on in society (21-40). Distributive justice, being a very 
entrenched object, was less likely to be affected by those changes. 
Overall, the combination of changes, particularly in the qualifications framework, quality 
control, competition and financial contribution indicated that, after deliberations, respondents 
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believed that there were fewer perceived differences between European nations, more 
competition and private funding than they did prior to deliberations, suggesting a shift of 
representational attitudes towards a university-centred perspective. And the growing perception of 
not enough university autonomy may reflect more a motivational aspect than a representation. 
Hence the importance of also analysing changes in the motivational aspects of attitudes.  
 
Figure 13: Change of motivational attitudes 
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Figure 13 compares changes – and absence of changes - in motivational attitudes by policy 
object. Figure 13 represents the most preferred alternative that respondents chose per object. 
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Figure 13 contains more categories than Figure 12. Regarding the qualifications framework, it 
adds a differentiation between two types of degrees (undergraduate and postgraduate) and adds a 
motivational attitude regarding the credit system because more motivational questions were 
included in the survey, which assumed that the representational question on qualifications 
framework also covered all those aspects.  
The ideological direction of changes in motivational attitudes was consistent with changes 
in representational attitudes toward a university-centred perspective. The mode for participants 
who changed their minds indicates that those participants switched after deliberations to 
preferring competition over no competition (competition was preferred by 91.7% of respondents 
who changed their minds after deliberation vs. 7.69% before deliberation). Respondents who 
changed their minds also increasingly preferred a funding system including diverse sources instead 
of public funding (54.8% preferred that mixed system after deliberations versus 27.3% before). 
They increasingly favoured a full autonomy for universities as opposed to a mixed system 
including some form of government control (full autonomy is preferred by 45% of respondents 
who changed their minds after deliberations versus 25% before deliberations). Finally, 
respondents who changed their minds increasingly preferred shorter undergraduate degrees of 
three instead of four years. After deliberations, 60% of them preferred three year long degrees vs. 
30% before deliberations. Respondents finally switched to preferring a credit system based on 
learning outcomes as opposed to the number of hours worked, learning outcomes obtaining 
81.3% of preferences after deliberations as opposed to 17.8% before deliberations.  
Two exceptions regarding changes of attitudes toward a university-centred perspective 
include quality control and postgraduate degrees. In those categories, the mode indicates that 
participants who have changed their minds have respectively switched from preferring a 
European to a national system of quality review (43% of them preferred a national system after 
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deliberations versus 33% before deliberations), and from being indifferent between a one-year 
master to a two-year master to preferring a two year master (support for the two-year master’s 
degree increased by 10% with participation in deliberation).  
Regarding quality control, the overall tendency still seems to be to increasingly prefer an 
external level of quality assurance – by definition university-centred – as opposed to internal 
reviews. Preferences for internal reviews have decreased from 28 to 21% among participants who 
have changed their minds.  
The diminishing preference for European integration in quality assurance may stem from 
the consideration of objects not included in the network structure of chapter 3, such as European 
integration. Respondents may be economically liberal, but not support the delegation of quality 
assurance to the European level, for example because of fear of losing national sovereignty. 
Regarding the length of the postgraduate degree, this preference for a two-year degree as opposed 
to the shortest possible degree (in one year) may stem from a desire to preserve some form of 
national particularity after the trend to harmonise undergraduate degrees, or from domestic norms 
or interests which were not measured in this survey.  
However, both representational and motivational attitudes changed toward a university-
centred perspective in most aspects. And it logically follows that when combining those two 
aspects of an attitude, the direction of change remains as going toward a university-centred 
perspective. 
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Table 6: Changes in attitude by policy object 
 
  To state 
 
No 
change 
 
To university 
 
N 
Distributive justice 10 73.04 16.96 230 
Competition 9.40 62.82 27.78 234 
Financial contribution 8.10 63.81 28.10 210 
Institutional managt. 8.26 59.63 32.11 218 
Length under. degree 16.37 57.31 26.32 171 
Length postgr. degree 13.37 61.63 25.00 172 
Credit 10.76 59.49 29.75 158 
Quality control 25.14 46.29 28.57 175 
Note: results in percentages 
 
Table 6 confirms this logical prediction. Table 6 illustrates the direction of change for 
both representational and motivational attitudes by policy object. It groups changes of attitudes in 
three types: no change, change to a state-centred network structure and change to a university-
centred network structure of attitudes as explained in chapter 4. Table 6 does not distinguish 
representational and motivational attitudes but presents results from a dataset including both 
types of attitudes by policy object63. Representational and motivational elements are indeed two 
aspects of an individual attitude (chapter 3). Moreover, a chi-square test of correlation between 
changes in representational and motivational attitudes (change being coded as no change, change 
                                               
63 The sample size is higher in Table 6 than the actual sample size because attitudes were coded vertically. To a given 
individual corresponds sixteen observations, i.e. eight observations corresponding to the eight different policy 
dimensions measured by representational and motivational attitudes. (Motivational attitudes on the qualifications 
framework are associated with the representational attitude on the qualifications framework). 161 respondents 
produce 2576 cases. 
Dataset design 
ID Dimension Attitudes Variable 1 
1 1 1 3 
1 2 2 4 
2 1 1 8 
2 2 2 9 
This table illustrates the coding of variables in the dataset for two individuals (IDs 1 and 2) and two policy 
dimensions (Dimensions 1 and 2). To each individual and dimension correspond various attitudes - representational 
(coded as 1) and motivational (coded as 2) - and other variables.  
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toward university-centred perspective or change toward a state-centred perspective) refuted the 
null hypothesis of no relationship, obtaining a value of Chi2 = 12.55 and p < 0.05.  
A comparison of frequencies indicates that individuals who changed their attitudes went 
toward a university-centred perspective rather than a state-centred perspective in all policy 
objects. Respondents changed their minds to believe that their countries were able to provide a 
sufficient standard of living for most citizens, provide more competition between universities to 
attract students, less public contribution to the funding of universities, not enough autonomy to 
universities, and had similar curricula and quality control systems throughout Europe. They also 
increasingly preferred competition between universities, shorter undergraduate degrees, a funding 
system which did not entirely rely on public funding, more autonomy of universities in 
institutional management, a conception of credits based on learning outcomes and an external 
quality assurance system.  
The move towards a university-centred system suggests that participants who already had a 
university-centred system are less likely to change their attitudes, and if they do, are more likely to 
reinforce their university-centred attitudes. Confirming that certain participants changed their 
minds less than others leaves us to ponder on whether those individuals changed their minds less 
than others because they were particularly persuasive in convincing others of their own attitudes 
and, if so, who constituted this group of persuasive participants.  
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Figure 14: Frequency of change by policy object 
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This stable and persuasive group often constitutes a majority, as Figure 14 indicates. Figure 
14 represents the frequencies of participants who have changed and not changed their minds by 
policy object and subset of attitude (representation or motivation). Figure 14 shows that fewer 
participants have changed their motivations than their representations. The number of 
participants who changed their motivations always constituted a minority. Earlier on, Figure 13 
illustrated that when respondents changed their motivational attitudes, they adopted those of the 
stable group. Since the stable group constituted the majority, it therefore seems that this stable 
majority was significant in influencing the motivational attitudes of participants.  
The influential majority is likely to be constituted by a particular profile of respondents. 
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Figure 15: Member states in majority opinion 
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Those respondents come from particular member states or groups. Figure 15 presents the 
distribution of majority opinion by member state on average across all policy areas. Figure 15 
shows that representatives who classify themselves as representing ‘Europe’, meaning a European 
level actors from European institutions or European non governmental organisations64, are the 
most likely to belong to that influential majority, with the highest average percentage of 
representatives in the majority across all policy objects (17.4%). England follows with 10.6% of 
respondents on average belonging to the majority across all policy objects, preceding Georgia, 
Germany, Scotland and France.  With the exception of Georgia, the countries which on average 
appear the most frequently in the majority are early participants in the Bologna process, and also 
from the diplomatically most influential EU member states or institutions. This suggests that the 
persuasive influence of those participants may depend on the strategic use of resources that the 
next chapter concentrates on more extensively.   
                                               
64 A European non governmental organisation is for example the universities’ representative body the European 
University Association EUA.  
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However, this result should be taken with caution, not be seen as any more than a 
preliminary finding and not be used to make general inferences. The percentages do not control 
for variations in the number of respondents by member state. For example, thirty three 
respondents claimed that they belong to the category ‘Europe’ while 1 respondent claimed that he 
was coming from Lithuania. This variation in sample size could explain the position of Georgia in 
the majority: Georgia having 9 respondents, if 9 respondents were often in the majority, this 
would provide Georgia with a large position in the majority. The significance of the country of 
origin is investigated later in the chapter, controlling for those variations in sample size. 
 
Figure 16: Distribution of majority opinion by profession of participants  
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Besides, participants from certain professions are more likely to hold the majority opinion. 
Figure 16 shows that respondents with a political profession (defined in chapter 4 as including 
ministers, secretary of states, cabinet members or diplomats) belong to the majority opinion on 
average 63.58% of the time, i.e. more than other types of participants, including administrative 
professions, non-state actors and other types of participants65.  Here again, these results are 
preliminary and should also be taken with caution since they do not control for variations in the 
                                               
65 Figure 16 computes the average percentage in majority opinion differently than Figure 15. Figure 15 calculates 
percentages by column and Figure 15 by row.  More precisely, Figure 15 shows on average how many times a 
respondent from a particular country belonged to the majority. Figure 16 illustrates whether respondents from 
particular professions were more likely to be part of the majority or the minority.  
Chapter 5 Changes of attitudes in deliberation, survey results 
 
 
 109 
number of respondents by profession either. The category ‘political’ attracted 17 respondents and 
‘non-state actors’ 80 respondents for example. The significance of the profession of the 
participants is investigated controlling for variation in sample size later in this chapter.  
Moreover, these figures do not necessarily mean that participants from the majority always 
remained stable and persuaded others to change their attitudes. In fact, the picture is different for 
certain representational attitudes. Figure 12 indicates that participants who changed their minds 
moved away from those who have not changed their representations, especially regarding the 
qualifications framework and quality assurance. This move away from the stable group may be 
because a majority of participants actually changed their minds regarding these representational 
attitudes. Indeed, Figure 14 indicated that 48 and 55 participants respectively changed their minds, 
which confirms the idea of the majority moving away from the stable minority in their 
representations on the qualifications framework and quality control.  
A majority of participants also changed their representations regarding institutional 
management, but in that case the majority moved toward the stable minority. Figure 12 indeed 
indicates that participants who changed their minds adopted the same views as those who did not 
on institutional management (81-100). This means that although the majority plays an important 
role in persuading participants by either converting those participants to their stable attitudes or 
encouraging a group change of attitudes, especially regarding motivational attitudes, a minority 
can also be convincing.  
Testing the concept of network structure of attitudes  
So far descriptive statistics have provided information on the direction and variation of 
change across policy objects. But discovering that change occurs in some policy objects does not 
prove that attitudes on those objects are related in a network structure. The concept of a network 
Chapter 5 Changes of attitudes in deliberation, survey results 
 
 
 110 
structure of attitudes is important, because it assumes that if a new information input affects one 
element, it may stimulate a change in other attitude elements as well, which implies that 
deliberation has an indirect effect on more attitudes than initially targeted. The main 
characteristics of a network structure of attitudes are not only that attitudes are related to each 
other, but also that those attitudes locate themselves in a hierarchical ordering depending on their 
proximity to the object of study and their likelihood to change, defined as the level of 
entrenchment.   
A widespread way to test the relationship between attitudes in a network structure of 
attitudes in the literature on mass ideology occurs through tests of correlation. The literature uses 
different statistical correlation measures, such as chi-square, beta-coefficients or gamma 
coefficients depending on the type of variable (see for example Converse, 1964: 228; Peffley and 
Hurwitz, 1985).   
This study uses a Fisher’s exact test to measure the correlation between changes of attitudes 
across objects. Fisher’s exact test is a significance test of correlation used for categorical data. The 
most common test of correlation for categorical level data is the chi-square test. But chi-square 
requires as a rule of thumb that at least eighty percent, and under its most restrictive version all 
frequencies in each cell, be at least five. And the data for this test includes cells with counts lower 
than or equal to five, for example in the object of distributive justice. Fisher’s exact test relaxes 
the restriction of a minimal number of values per cell and is therefore more appropriate. Fisher’s 
exact test tests the null hypothesis according to which there is no significant relationship between 
changes of attitudes in one object and changes of attitudes in another object. The variable ‘change 
of attitude’ still includes the following categories: ‘no change’ or ‘change toward a state-centred’ or 
to a ‘university-centred perspective’. The p-value resulting from the test is not a measure of the 
strength of the relationship (as gamma or beta coefficients would be respectively for ordinal or 
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interval level data). But it gives an indication of the certainty with which one can reject the null 
hypothesis of no relationship between a change of attitude on one object and a change of attitude 
on another object. 
 
Table 7: Relationship between attitudes of the Bologna process - Fisher’s exact test 
 
 Compet. 
Financ. 
contrib. 
Instit. 
managt 
Length 
degrees 
(under.) 
Length 
degrees 
(post.) 
Credit 
Quality 
control 
Dist. Just. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.20 
Competition 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 
Financial contribution 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Institutional management 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Length of degrees (undergraduate) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Length of degrees (postgraduate) 0.00 0.00 
Credit 0.00 
Note: the cells include p-values 
 
Table 7 provides the results of Fisher’s exact tests conducted across each combination of 
attitude objects66. A p-value of p < 0.1 indicates a significant correlation between two objects. As 
Table 7 shows, most tests of correlations obtain a p-value of p < 0.1. This means that most 
changes of attitudes have a significant relationship with most other changes of attitudes with a 
90% confidence level. Every single change of attitudes on an object is related to at least one other. 
The only combinations of propositions which are not correlated are distributive justice and quality 
control (with p > 0.1).  But the objects quality control and distributive justice are each 
significantly related to other objects. 
                                               
66 Such results relied on merging changes in representational attitudes with changes in motivational attitudes. The 
merger coded the change in attitudes as missing when changes on both representational and motivational attitudes 
were missing. It coded the observation as change (either toward a state or a university perspective) when at least one 
of the representational or motivational change of attitudes existed. The coding also controlled for cases where 
representational and motivational attitudes did not go into the same directions, which occurred only in 1.47% of 
cases. 
Chapter 5 Changes of attitudes in deliberation, survey results 
 
 
 112 
This test also shows that the definition of entrenchment which relies only on the number of 
relationships that a given attitude holds with other attitudes is necessary, but not sufficient to 
determine the level of entrenchment of an attitude, as explained in chapter 3. Indeed, most 
attitudes hold many significant relationships with other attitudes, and the assumed superficial 
attitudes (for example the length of degrees) hold as many significant relationships as other 
presumably central attitudes (such as distributive justice). Looking at the likelihood of attitudes to 
change provides a way to determine the levels of entrenchment of attitude objects.  
 
Table 8: Frequency of change of attitudes by object, predictions vs. findings 
 
Likelihood to change Object Likelihood to change in % 
Distributive justice 26.96 
Competition  37.18 
Financial contribution 36.19 
Most stable 
  
  
  
Institutional management 40.37 
Undergraduate degree 42.69 
Postgraduate degree 38.87 
Credits 40.51 
 Most likely to change 
  
Quality control 53.71 
 
Table 8 provides a hierarchy of objects according to their predicted and actual likelihoods 
to change. It also compares the percentage of change of attitudes by policy object to the original 
prediction of chapter 3. Chapter 3 predicted that the most entrenched objects were less likely to 
change than the least entrenched objects. It also identified the most entrenched objects as 
distributive justice, competition, financial contribution and institutional management based on 
their level of generality. Less entrenched objects were predicted to be the qualifications 
framework, and more precisely the length of undergraduate and postgraduate degrees and credits, 
in addition to quality control.  
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Table 8 mostly confirms this theoretical prediction. It shows that the object the most likely 
to change is quality control, registering 53.71% of attitudes having changed since the beginning of 
the respondent’s participation in the Bologna process. The length of undergraduate degree is the 
second object which is the most likely to change with 42.69% of attitudes having changed. The 
object the least likely to change is distributive justice with 26.96% of attitudes having changed.  
One exception to the predicted hierarchy is the attitude concerning the length of 
postgraduate degrees. The percentage in change of attitudes concerning postgraduate degrees is 
lower than for institutional management, constituting respectively 38.87%, and 40.37%. This 
relative discrepancy between theoretical prediction and finding may be due to survey design 
and/or the evolution of topics deliberated on in the Bologna process. The order of questions in 
the survey may have influenced the findings. Since the question on the length of postgraduate 
degrees followed the one on undergraduate degree and was similar in shape (indicating 
preferences over lengths of degrees), respondents may have been affected by an impression of 
repetition. And it is possible that respondents reflected less about their prior attitudes on 
postgraduate degrees than undergraduate degrees and hence reported fewer changes than for the 
undergraduate degree.  
But the evolution of topics deliberated on in the Bologna process may also impact on those 
changes. Chapter 6 indicates that the length of undergraduate degrees was more deliberated on 
than postgraduate degrees from the start of the process when preparing for the signature of the 
Sorbonne deliberation of the 25th of May 1998 for example. And institutional management may 
have been more deliberated on and prone to change than the theoretical prediction assumed. 
Institutional management appeared in several declarations, in particular the declarations and 
communiqués of Bologna, Bergen and London, suggesting that the Bologna process had a deeper 
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impact on this object than originally assumed.  In other words, deliberative governance may 
already have started to affect more entrenched policy objects in European higher education.  
Inferring the impact of deliberative governance 
How much impact does deliberative governance have on this change of attitudes? So far 
this chapter has only presented results on changes of attitudes. But finding a change of attitudes 
does not mean that deliberative governance was significant in accounting for those changes. After 
all, participants could have changed their attitudes because of new experiences or information that 
they collected outside deliberations.  
Opinion of participants on learning and attitude change  
The opinion of participants on what they have learnt during deliberations provides some 
indication of the impact of deliberation. Some researchers ask participants to assess the impact of 
deliberation themselves (Checkel, 2001). Although such a technique required respondents to 
acquire a certain critical distance from their participation in deliberation, it also bears a very 
intuitive motivation: since respondents participated in deliberation, they are able to assess the 
effect deliberation had on them. 
 
Table 9: Effect of deliberation on learning  
 
Intensity of learning Percentages 
Learnt a lot 45.96 
Learnt on some aspects 47.20 
Learnt very little 5.59 
Learnt nothing 0.62 
Do not know 0.62 
Question:  How much do you think you have learnt on higher  education policy from those meetings? 
N = 161, results in percentages. 
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Table 9 shows that most participants agree that they have learnt from deliberation. 45.96% 
of participants estimate that they have learnt a lot and 47.20% think that they have learnt on some 
aspects. But learning is not synonymous with attitude change. An individual can learn new 
information but confirm his existing attitude.  
 
Table 10: Effect of deliberation on attitude 
 
Effect of deliberation  Percentages 
Change  37.27 
Strengthen  24.22 
Moderate  29.81 
No influence  7.41 
Do not know 1.24 
Question: How do you think the meetings referred to at questions 5 and 6 have influenced your opinions on higher 
education related issues?67  
Note: if participants ticked two different options, only the strongest indicator of change was coded 
N = 161. Results in percentages. 
 
Table 10 shows the extent to which individuals thought deliberation impacted on their 
attitudes. Most respondents agreed that deliberation affected their attitudes. They changed 
(37.27%), strengthened (24.22%) or moderated them (29.81%). Only 7.41% of respondents 
claimed that deliberation has had no impact on their attitudes68.   
Regression results 
Conducting a regression provides more than descriptive results. Regression analysis 
provides a quantitative measure of the strength and significance of the impact of deliberation on 
                                               
67 The survey used the term ‘opinion’ as a more colloquial and readily understandable from synonymous with  
‘attitude’. Questions 5 and 6 asked participants to indicate which meeting they attended.  
68 In Table 10, the option ‘change’ has a different meaning from the one coded earlier. In this table, change is 
measured in a binary way, meaning a switch from one type of attitude to another. In the rest of this chapter, change 
includes changes by degree. The rest of the chapter considers strengthening and moderating as controlling change as 
well, which is not the case in Table 10. The formulation of the question includes a different meaning to simplify 
respondents’ understanding of the question. If the categories ‘strengthen’ and ‘moderate’ are included as a change of 
attitude, then 91.3% of participants estimate that deliberation had an effect on their attitudes.  
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individual attitudes by object. This study presents two models: a logistic regression model and a 
multinomial logistic regression model.  
The logistic regression model tests the significance of deliberation on whether or not 
participants have changed their attitudes. The dependent variable ‘change of attitudes’ is 
categorical by nature69. However, a logistic regression has the disadvantage of losing explanatory 
power by losing variation because it recodes variables into two categories.   
A multinomial logistic regression is therefore also presented70. Such a model retains some 
variation in the direction of change, decomposing the category ‘change’ as ‘state’ and ‘university-
centred’ shifts. Only the results presented for ‘changes to a university-centred perspective’ are 
presented. The category ‘move to state-centred perspective’ does not contain enough cases to 
guarantee that each cell of the independent variables would comprise at least 10 cases and that the 
results would be reliable71. In any case, respondents were more likely to change toward a 
university-centred perspective (Table 6).  
                                               
69 A logistic regression represents a simple way to treat categorical variables, because it does not assume any equal 
distance between categories and instead groups the dependent variable into two types (change or no change). 
70 The logistic and multinomial logistic regression models appear to be the most suitable ones from the toolbox of 
statistical modelling. For example, a multiple linear regression, which is widespread in political science, would not be 
appropriate, because the dependent variable ‘change of attitude’ is not interval. Using a linear regression model would 
violate the condition of homoscedasticity, i.e. the error terms would no longer be normally distributed. Moreover, 
some expected results would be meaningless because they would be smaller than 0 or greater than 1 (Kouha, 2008: 
109). Assigning different numerical scores to the dependent variable (for example on a continuum from 0 to 100) to 
solve this problem would specify not just an artificial ordering, but also arbitrary intervals between the categories of 
the responses (Kouha, 2008: 131).  
Models for ordinal variables, such as the ordinal regression model, introduced among others by McKelvey and 
Zavoina (1975) and McCullagh (1980), appear equally unsuitable. Such models rely on ordering the dependent 
variable on a scale ranging from smaller to larger. The value of the dependent variable in this study: change, move 
toward state-centred network structure of attitudes and move toward university-centred network structure of 
attitudes cannot be arranged on a scale. 
71 In essence, the multinomial logistic regression is used for categorical level data which is not ordinal but has more 
than two categories. The multinomial logistic regression model works in the same way as the logistic regression. It 
uses a logistic transformation, also called logit, to transform a binary variable into a linear shape, and then runs a 
number of iterations to fit the line which provides the best fit to the data.  In fact the multinomial logistic regression 
runs a series of logistic regressions on the various categories of the dependent variable. Because of the number of 
iterations performed on the model, the multinomial logistic regression model requires a large N, and  a rule of thumb 
is that the minimum number of cases of each category of independent variables should be at least ten (see Concato et 
al., 1996 and Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000). If the number of cases is lower than 10 for each category, the results 
become unreliable or the statistical software can fail to produce the results. 
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`Models 1 and 2 are respectively the logistic and multinomial logistic regression models.  
Model 1 is formally written as:  
 
log (change_attitudes) = α + β1deliberation +  β2proxmaj + β3profession + β4country + 
β5implementation + β6age 
 
where ‘change_attitudes’ is the dependent variable concerning whether the respondent has 
changed his attitude or not, ‘deliberation’ is the total number of meetings attended by 
respondents, ‘proxmaj’ is the proximity to the majority, ‘professsion’ the profession of the 
respondent ‘country’ the country represented in the negotiations, ‘implementation’ whether the 
respondent has been involved in policy implementation, and ‘age’ is his age.  
Model 2 corresponds to the multinomial logistic regression model formally written as:  
 
log (change_attitudes(2) / change_attitudes(0)) = α  + β1(2)deliberation + β2(2)proxmaj + 
β3(2)profession + β4(2)country + β5(2)implementation + β6(2)age  
 
where ‘change_attitudes’ is the dependent variable concerning whether the respondent has 
changed his attitude or not (of value 2 if he moved to a university-centred attitude and 0 if he has 
not changed), ‘deliberation’ is the total number of meetings attended by respondents, ‘proxmaj’ is 
the proximity to the majority, ‘profession’ is the profession of the respondent, ‘country’ is the 
country he represented in the deliberations, ‘implementation’ concerns whether he has been 
involved in policy implementation and ‘age’ his age. The baseline category is ‘no change’ for 
models 1 and 2. α and  β1, … β6 are parameters estimated from the survey data in both models.  
The main explanatory variable of interest here is the proxy for deliberation ‘delib’72. The 
proximity of the respondent to the majority ‘proxmaj’ is calculated by dividing the observations 
by the mean of all observations prior deliberation by policy area. Results are then recoded into a 
                                               
72 See chapter 4 for more details on the operationalisation of the variable ‘total number of meetings’.  
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binary variable defined as 1 for the 50% of cases for which the proximity index was close to 1, i.e. 
meaning that the observation was between within +- 25% of the mean and 0 for the 50% of cases 
for which the proximity index was above +-25% of the mean. 
‘Profession’ and ‘country’ provide information on the background of the respondents73. 
The analysis groups professions into two categories: professions where respondents are agents 
and where they are principals in their daily activity. This division tests the theoretical prediction 
according to which principals may be less willing to change their attitudes74.  
Such a division also corresponds to the statistical motivation of grouping cases in categories 
with a high number of respondents to prevent high standard errors and to have categories of 
more or less equal number. 77 respondents are principals: secretaries of state, ministers and their 
cabinets, heads of universities or rectors, diplomats, experts, academics and respondents 
accumulating many professional functions (mostly political and academic). 82 participants count 
as agents: students, civil servants, university administrators, participants from other public bodies, 
representatives of interest groups and participants from other professions.  
Bologna process deliberations are polyarchic, implying that principals have not necessarily 
participated in more meetings than agents. In fact, the percentage of agents having participated to 
a high number of meetings (35.56%) is higher than the percentage of principals having attended 
many meetings (30.43%)75. This means that if the profession of participants significantly affects 
changes in attitudes, this relationship is not due to a spurious association with the number of 
meetings attended by profession.  
                                               
73 Figures 15 and 16 hinted at the possibility of perfect collinearity between the independent variables ‘proximity to 
the majority’ and ‘profession of participants’ and between the ‘proximity of the majority’ and the country represented. 
But measuring the profession of participants and the country represented with a dummy variable, as well as 
controlling for variations in sample size, reduce the risk of perfect collinearity. Conducting a logistic regression on 
‘proxmaj’ using the profession of participants and the country represented did not lead to a rejection of the null 
hypothesis of no relationship (at p<0.05) because of very low values of pseudo R2 (respectively 0.0003 and 0.0005).   
74 See chapter 3.  
75 Many meetings meaning more than thirty eight meetings.  
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This research also divides respondents between two categories of member states. The first 
group, coded as 1, includes countries involved early in the Bologna process, joining in 1998, i.e. 
France, the UK, Germany and Italy; which took an active role because they had the Council 
presidency at the time (Finland and Austria) or were generally strongly pro-European (for 
example Belgium) (Commission, 2000:10). Those countries roughly correspond to the Western 
and Northern European areas, apart from Italy and Spain who are placed in this category because 
of their active involvement76.  This group includes 63 respondents from Andorra, Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the UK.  
The baseline category includes countries which have joined later or have been less active in 
the process. Those latecomers correspond to Eastern, Southern European and non-European 
regions. This category includes 60 respondents from Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, Kosovo, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, New Zealand, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and 31 other respondents not affiliated to any 
member state, who are likely to be non-state actors or representatives from European or 
international institutions. Non-affiliated participants have played an active role throughout the 
process, but they were originally only observers and only gradually gained full participant status 
and competencies especially in the Berlin communiqué of the 19th of September 2003. This 
distinction tests the prediction made in chapter 3 according to which participants from newer 
member states are more willing to reveal attitude change than participants from older member 
states.  
An explanatory variable on policy implementation – ‘implementation’ - is included to 
further test the notion of involvement in deliberation. As alluded to in earlier chapters, the impact 
                                               
76 See chapter 6.  
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of implementation could go both ways. On the one hand, if an individual is involved in 
implementation, he will want to be perceived as credible to convince domestic actors to 
implement reforms. Hence participants are more likely to mask attitudinal change. Instead, they 
use deliberative outcomes such as the various Bologna declarations to justify their existing 
attitudes and convince other actors. On the other hand, the more participants are involved in 
domestic implementation, the more they could be using European deliberations to find solutions 
to the problems they face in domestic policies and the more willing they could be to change their 
attitudes. Finally, the variable ‘age’ is a control demographic variable, stemming from the idea that 
the older participants are, the more information they have accumulated throughout their lifetime 
to seal their attitudes. Or possibly, the older participants are, the more willing they are to be 
persuasive, and hence to show consistency versus a certain malleability of attitudes. 
Since the elements on the length of undergraduate and postgraduate degrees and credits 
correspond to the same object of the qualifications framework77, those three different elements 
are merged into the same policy category, but this does not significantly affect the results. Finally, 
the models control for missing values using the commands mark and markout (in Stata), as 
advised by Long and Freese (2006: 80) to make sure that the samples remain the same for the 
Likelihood ratio tests.   
                                               
77 See footnote 47. 
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Table 11: Logistic and multinomial regression results  
Object Distrib. Justice Competition Financ. contrib. Instit. manag. Qualifications Quality control 
Models 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Delib. -0.50 -0.64 0.37  0.41 0.26 0.33 0.62 0.80 
* 
0.57 
** 
0.69  
*** 
0.39 0.74 
* 
 0.37 0.47 0.34 0.39 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.22 0.25 0.40 0.45 
Prox. maj -1.02 
*** 
-1.68 
**** 
-1.18  
**** 
-1.52 
**** 
-0.87** -1.18 
*** 
-2.64 
**** 
-2.95 
**** 
-0.19 -0.75 
*** 
-0.35 -0.97 
** 
 0.39 0.42 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.45 0.47 0.24 0.25 0.38 0.42 
Profession -0.12 -0.24 -0.00 -0.29 0.65 
* 
0.58 -0.36 -0.36 -0.14 
 
-0.00 -0.03 -0.13 
 0.35 0.42 0.32 0.37 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.21 0.23 0.35 0.42 
Country. -0.07 0.00 0.26 0.44 -0.68 
** 
-0.29 0.42 0.60 
* 
0.32 
* 
0.46 
** 
0.13 -0.16 
 0.33 0.40 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.37 0.19 0.22 0.33 0.40 
Implemt. 0.01 -0.36 -0.45 -0.55 0.32 0.27 0.11 -0.20 -0.01 
 
-0.09 0.70  
* 
0.55 
 0.37 0.43 0.36 0.39 0.41 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.23 0.27 0.42 0.51 
Age -0.24 0.01 -0.16 -0.17 0.10 0.10 -0.47 
** 
-0.35 -0.21 
* 
-0.06 -0.11 0.00 
 0.20 0.25 0.19 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.12 0.14 0.20 0.25 
Constant 0.62 0.46 0.67 0.64 -0.69 -0.90 2.24 
**** 
2.11  
*** 
-0.04 -0.44 0.04 -0.28 
 0.57 0.64 0.52 0.56 0.52 0.57 0.66 0.68 0.36 0.40 0.59 0.70 
N 207 211 209 213 188 192 203 206 464 472 161 163 
LR chi2 11.88 27.59 18.34 32.28 15.31 50.55 58.27 70.32 13.76 63.57 7.1 25.81 
P > Chi2 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.3 0.01 
Log-likeld -118.68 -154.86 -127.82 -164.24 -112.91 -133.25 -107.40 -139.17 -303.84 -400.90 -106.92 -161.59 
Note: The first line represents log-odds; standard errors are on the second line for each category. 
Note2: * significant at p ≤ .1; ** significant at p ≤ .05; *** significant at p ≤ .01; ****significant at p ≤ .001. 
Note 3: 1 and 2 indicate models 1 and 2, respectively the logistic regression and the multinomial logistic regression. 
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Interpretation of log-odd coefficients on deliberation and predicted probabilities   
Table 11 presents coefficients in log odds for models 1 and 2. Log-odds as such do not lead 
to a very meaningful interpretation, unless they are turned into odds ratios or predicted 
probabilities. To understand what the log-odds coefficients β from the table mean, let us assume 
that 1 means that an event occurs and 0 that it does not occur. If the value of an explanatory 
variable D1 is 1 while all the other variables are held constant, the log-odds of the response 
variable being 1 rather than 0 increase by β1, and the odds of the response variable being 1 are 
exp (β1) 78 times higher than when the explanatory variable D1 is 0 (Methodology Institute, 2005: 
41). In other words, the coefficients of the explanatory variable β1 show by how much (in log-
odds) the likelihood of the response t variable ‘change of attitudes’ being 1, i.e. confirming a 
change of attitudes, would increase/decrease.  
But log-odds still provide some useful information without conversion, especially regarding 
the significance of each variable and the direction of the impact of the explanatory variable on the 
odds of changing one’s attitudes. The sign of the coefficient βi indicates whether the variable 
increases or decreases the odds of changing one’s attitudes. If the coefficient βi > 0, then exp(βi) 
> 1, the independent variable increases the odds of changing one’s attitudes rather than not 
changing for model 1. For model 2, if the coefficient βi > 0, then exp(βi) > 1, the independent 
variable increases the odds of changing one’s attitude toward a university-centred perspective 
rather than not changing.  
If the coefficient βi < 0, then exp(βi) < 1, the independent variable decreases the odds of 
changing one’s attitudes - or changing one’s attitude toward a university-centred perspective - 
rather than not changing.  
                                               
78 βi is the coefficient, exp stands for exponential.  
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And logically, if the coefficient βi = 0, then exp(βi) = 1. The independent variable does not 
change the odds of changing one’s attitudes - or changing one’s attitude toward a university-
centred perspective - rather than not changing.  
As predicted by hypothesis 3, the proxy for deliberation is not significantly correlated with a 
change of individual attitudes for entrenched objects, i.e. from distributive justice to financial 
contribution. For those objects, the p value is greater than .1. However, deliberation becomes 
significant concerning the objects which are assumed to be superficial, i.e. the qualifications 
framework, quality control and to an extent institutional management (with p < .1 for models 1 
and 2 on qualifications framework and model 2 for quality control and institutional management).  
Participating in a high number of meetings significantly increases the odds of changing 
one’s attitudes for less entrenched objects, and particularly changing towards a university-centred 
perspective. For example, for qualification frameworks, the log-odds of changing one’s attitudes 
are .57 for someone participating in a relatively high number of meetings, in other words exp(.57) 
= 1.76 times the odds of changing attitudes when participating in a small number of meetings. 
This means that participating in a high number of meetings increases the odds of changing 
attitudes by 76%, controlling for other variables (at p ≤ .05). For someone participating in a 
relatively high number of meetings, the log-odds of changing attitudes toward a university-centred 
network are .69, i.e. are exp(.69) = 1.99 times the odds of not changing toward a university-
centred network when not participating in a high number of meetings (p ≤ .01).    
For quality control as well as institutional management, the number of meetings attended 
significantly increases a participant’s likelihood to change his attitude toward a university-centred 
network of attitudes, multiplying the odds respectively by exp(.74) = 2.09 and exp(.80) = 2.22, in 
comparison to someone who attends a lower number of meetings (p ≤ .1). 
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So far looking at the regression table has shown the significant impact of the number of 
meetings attended on attitude change mostly for less entrenched objects. But such a relationship 
needs to be specified. Are there also differences in the scale of impact across policy objects of 
different levels of entrenchment? Converting the log-odd coefficients into predicted probabilities 
provides more straightforward information on the impact of deliberation on attitude change and 
allows for an easier comparison between policy objects. Predicted probabilities indicate the 
probability of the dependent variable occurring (i.e. being equal to 1) given a one unit increase in 
the independent variable. The transformation can be written formally as follows:  
 
pi = Pr(Y=1) = exp(logit) / 1 + exp(logit)  
 
where pi is the predicted probability of the dependent variable being one (Pr(Y=1), logit the 
log-odd coefficient and exp(logit) the exponential value of this log-odd coefficient. Those 
predicted probabilities are plotted on graphs using Long and Freese’s (2006) commands for 
categorical variables. 
 
Figure 17: Probability of change of attitudes by policy object 
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are plotted for a respondent who is a decision-maker, from an early participatory state, takes part 
in domestic implementation and who adheres to the majority opinion, and is between 35 and 54 
years old.  
Figure 17 shows that controlling for other variables, the probability of a respondent 
changing his mind is a positive function of the number of deliberations attended for all objects 
apart from the most entrenched object distributive justice. More importantly, the figure shows 
that participants’ likelihood to change their minds depends on the policy object: participants are 
more likely to change their minds concerning quality control and qualification frameworks, which 
are assumed to be less entrenched, than other objects. For both quality control and qualification 
frameworks, the probability of changing one’s mind increases by a rough average of .1 if a 
respondent increases the number of deliberation he attends from a relatively low number to a 
relatively high number of meetings, i.e. with the x axis going from 0 to 1; going up to a probability 
of respectively above .55 and close to .7 when participants attend a high number of meetings (i.e. 
x=1).  This probability is lower for other policy objects, dropping to .2 for distributive justice. In 
the case of distributive justice and for this sample of respondents, the probability decreases: the 
more participants attend deliberations, the less likely they are to change their minds. This suggests 
that participants, although they are willing to reconsider less entrenched attitudes, are much more 
attached to their deepest core attitudes and defend them by intensifying their attitudes when they 
deliberate.  
The positive correlation between deliberation and change in attitudes does not mean that 
participants who attend few meetings are not open to hearing the information presented in 
European deliberations. Participants who attended a low number of meetings (x = 0) still have a 
probability of close to .6 of changing their attitudes on quality control.  Moreover, attending few 
meetings does not mean that participants have refused to attend those meetings. The 
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deliberations take place upon invitation. Although the same participants tend to be invited to 
various Bologna process deliberations, some participants who attended fewer meetings may not 
have had access to a larger number of deliberations.  
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Figure 18: Confidence intervals for change of attitudes 
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The positive correlation between the number of meetings attended and probability to 
change one’s attitude is not sufficient to make inferences to a larger population79. So far this 
chapter has used the p-value as a way to make inferences. The p-value assesses whether it is 
plausible, given the evidence in the observed data, that a population parameter has a particular 
single value.  As Kouha (2005: 96) argues, a ‘more natural approach would be to identify all those 
values of the parameter which are plausible given the data’. The range of plausible values is the 
confidence interval.  
Figure 18 provides confidence intervals for the predicted probability of changing one’s mind for 
each policy object. The confidence interval provides the range of plausible probabilities of 
changing one’s mind given the data. In the graphs that Figure 18 includes, the predicted 
probability to change one’s attitude is represented by the line, and the grey area indicates the 
confidence intervals, called lower bound/upper bound in the legend. The 90% confidence interval 
for the probability of changing one’s mind is generally .1 to .15 below or above the plotted 
predicted probability.  For example, the graph on the qualification framework indicates that we 
are 90% confident that the average probability of changing one’s attitude regarding the 
qualifications framework is between .3 and .55 for participants having attended a low number of 
meetings (when x = 0) and between .43 and .72  for participants having attended a high number 
of meetings (when x = 1). The confidence intervals appear relatively large given that the increase 
in likelihood to change one’s mind according to the number of meetings is quite smooth for many 
objects. But at least confidence intervals do not contradict the hypothesis of a positive correlation 
between number of meetings and likelihood to change one’s mind in most objects. The lower and 
upper bounds represent an increase meaning that the positive correlation between number of 
meetings attended and likelihood to change one’s mind remains robust.  
                                               
79 In this research, the population refers to all the participants in Bologna process deliberations.  
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Interpretation of other variables  
Other variables than the number of meetings also influence attitude change, as Table 11 
shows. One of the most constantly significant variables is the proximity to the majority. The log-
odd coefficients for the variable ‘proximity to majority’ have a negative value for all policy areas. 
Being part of the majority significantly decreases the odds of changing one’s attitudes (with at 
least p<0.05). This result confirms the descriptive results presented earlier in the chapter, which 
showed that in most cases, the stable group also constituted the majority.  
 
Figure 19: Impact of the majority on qualification frameworks 
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Figure 19 represents the probability of an individual changing his attitude on the 
qualifications framework toward a university-centred perspective (i.e. model 2) if he is part of the 
majority as opposed to the minority80. The grey areas represent the 90% confidence intervals81. 
Figure 19 shows that a respondent who is from the minority has .2 more probability of changing 
his mind than a participant who is from the majority. The majority therefore exercises 
considerable influence on the minority during deliberation, with the minority adopting the 
                                               
80 Those predicted probabilities are plotted for a decision-maker, from an early participatory state, of 34-54 years of 
age and involved in domestic implementation. Figure 19 is plotted for model 2 since the proximity to the majority is 
not significant for model 1.   
81 Confidence intervals become smaller the higher the number of cases. More participants belong to the majority than 
the minority (53.75% versus 46.25%), hence a larger confidence interval for the minority.  
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conformist view of the majority in an attempt to ‘fit in’. This measurement is however taken at an 
aggregate level incorporating many deliberations. It does not exclude the possibility of a more 
important role for the minority, who could have convinced other participants by suggesting 
innovative arguments, during particular deliberations.  
The case for deliberative governance is reinforced if the majority gained influence through 
the force of the better argument. But deliberation becomes less important, although not totally 
unimportant as explained in chapter 2, if the majority influenced others through threats and 
promises. This survey, by nature more quantitative, is less able to look at those motivations. But 
the next chapter, which concentrates on particular deliberative cases, investigates them.  
The variables which have less effect than predicted on attitude change include age and 
implementation. Participating in implementation does not significantly affect one’s likelihood to 
change one’s attitudes82. And age significantly decreases the odds of changing one’s mind for 
institutional management (β = -.47 at p ≤ .05) and the qualifications framework (β = -.21 at p ≤ 
.1).  
Table 11 also shows that the country of origin is significant in relation to the objects of 
qualification framework, institutional management and financial contribution (with at least p ≤ 
0.1). The log-odd coefficients indicate that being from an early participatory state increases the 
odds of changing toward a university-centred perspective in qualifications frameworks (β = .46) 
and in institutional management (β = .60). But becoming an early participant decreases the odds 
of changing attitudes on financial contribution (β = -.68).  
Early member states have had ample time and deliberations to change their minds on 
qualifications frameworks, which was the first action of the Bologna process. And they apparently 
did not mind changing their attitudes on such object since it was less entrenched. As chapter 7 
                                               
82
 … Except in quality control.  
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will show, some member states have also started to reform their system of institutional 
management. However, the object of financial contribution has not been reformed to the same 
extent. It is associated with strong values on the type of welfare state. And early member states 
are particularly defensive of such an entrenched object. They are more willing to convince others 
of their own models than they are to change their minds on financial contribution, which justifies 
the significant decrease in log-odds for that policy object for early joiners.  
Conversely, the absence of significance of the country of origin for changes in attitudes 
concerning quality control and competition suggests that both groups of countries’ 
representatives have changed their attitudes on such topics in the same way.  
Being a principal is significant and increases the odds of changing attitudes only regarding 
financial contribution (β=.65 with p≤.01). For all objects but this one, becoming a principal is not 
significant and decreases the odds of changing attitudes.  
The object of financial contribution has seen recent reforms (Eurydice, 2008: 18-19). But those 
reforms have not come without much debate and opposition (see chapter 7). The high cost of 
domestic opposition made principals more willing to admit changes in attitudes during European 
deliberations than non-decision makers as this might help them to find solutions to problems at 
home. As far as other policy objects are concerned, the absence of significance of the profession 
of participants illustrates the strength of deliberative governance in the sense that principals and 
agents seem to be influenced in the same way by deliberative governance, indicating that they 
potentially both want to show credibility and consistency and to use deliberations strategically. 
The next two chapters investigate these motivations more deeply.  
Following from Lewis (1998/2003), the predisposition of participants toward Europe could be 
more significant than the profession or country of origin of participants. If individuals were 
socialised at the European or international level before Bologna process deliberations, it 
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presumably made them more open to arguments from their counterparts and more likely to reveal 
attitude change. A way to model international predisposition could have been to use the 
professional and/or academic experience of participants and insert an interaction effect between 
professional and/or academic experience and number of deliberations attended in the regression 
models. The models presented in Table 11 could not take into account this predisposition, 
because the small number of cases of such interaction effect inflated standard errors. 
  
Table 12: Impact of international experience and deliberations on attitude change 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
  No change Change Odds  No change To univ. Odds  
Few delib. 113 72 0.63 113 43 0.38 
Many delib. 43 36 0.83 43 23 0.53 Low 
exposure Total 156 108  156 66  
  p> 0.1 p > 0.1 
Few delib. 99 52 0.52 99 37 0.37 
Many delib. 30 40 1.33 30 29 0.96 High 
exposure Total 129 92  129 66  
  p < 0.01 p < 0.01 
Note 2: p value obtained from Fisher’s exact test 
 
Table 12 presents tests of correlation between the number of meetings attended and 
attitudinal change depending on the international predisposition of the participant, i.e. whether 
the participant in question has some experience of working or studying abroad. It uses models 1 
and 2 for qualifications frameworks as an example, because qualifications frameworks achieved 
the most consistent significant relationship between deliberation and attitude change. The 
predisposition of the participant to the international dimension is coded as ‘high exposure’ if 
participants have worked and studied abroad for any period of time - from less than a year to 
more than five years - and ‘low exposure’ if they have either worked or studied abroad, or if they 
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do not have any international experience83. Table 12 also differentiates the impact of deliberation 
by the number of deliberations attended (‘few delib.’ and ‘many delib.’ corresponding to whether 
participants have attended fewer or more than the median number of meetings in the distribution, 
i.e. thirty eight).  
Table 12 shows that the international experience of participants in the international sphere 
affects both the significance of the relationship between deliberation and attitude change and the 
scale of this relationship. The p-values indicate that the relationship between deliberation and 
attitude change is not significant when participants have had little international exposure (p>.1) 
but becomes significant when participants have had higher international exposure (p< .1).  
The table also shows that international exposure influences the extent to which 
deliberations affect the likelihood to change one’s mind. The table confirms the relationship 
between deliberation and attitude change. The odds of changing one’s mind over not changing are 
systematically higher when attending many deliberations rather than a few, independently of 
whether participants had a high or low prior international exposure (between .15 and .81 higher84).  
More importantly, the impact of deliberations varies according to the level of international 
exposure. The odds ratio of changing one’s mind when attending many meetings depending on 
the level of international exposure is: 1.33/.83 = 1.60. And the odds ratio of changing one’s mind 
toward a university-centred perspective when attending many meetings depending on the level of 
international exposure is: .96/.53 = 1.81.  
This means that participants with international experience have 160% of the relative 
propensity of participants who have had less international experience to change their minds, and 
181% the relative propensity of participants with less international exposure to change their 
                                               
83  70.25% of respondents have studied abroad and 71.15% of them have worked abroad. 
84 The lowest and highest differences in odds to change one’s attitudes when attending many or few deliberations 
comes from the difference between odds for model 2 with low exposure (.53 – .39 = .15); and the difference between 
odds for model 1 with high exposure (1.36 - .52 = .84). 
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minds toward a university-centred perspective. The correlation between attitude change and the 
number of meetings attended is therefore stronger and more significant for participants who have 
some exposure to the international scene, by having worked and studied abroad, than for those 
who have not. 
 
In conclusion, this chapter provided the first insight in the impact of deliberation on 
individual attitudes testing hypotheses 1 and 3 according to which deliberation had an impact on 
individual attitudes depending on their level of entrenchment. The chapter showed that attitudes 
were connected with each other and more likely to converge toward a university-centred 
perspective when they were less entrenched, i.e. regarding especially quality control or 
qualifications frameworks. But some changes also occurred in institutional management as well as 
competition and financial contribution. Attitude change occurred more extensively in 
representations than motivations. The definition of representations and motivations implies that 
deliberation, if significant in accounting for those changes, would have the role of providing 
supporting information and arguments to existing motivations (Figure 14). The chapter also 
supported the assumptions related to the network structure of attitudes (Figures 11, 12, 13 and 
Tables 6, 7, 8).  
Binary and multinomial logistic regression models measured the significance of deliberation 
in this change, confirming that deliberation played a significant role in changing attitudes 
according to their levels of entrenchment (Tables 9, 10, 11, Figures 17 and 18). This change of 
attitudes is more likely over several deliberations than just one, reinforcing the idea that the 
impact of deliberation on attitudes occurs over time.  
However, the mechanisms through which deliberation has an effect on attitudes and 
policies are more complex than the survey suggests. The chapter admittedly underlined that 
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various factors affected the relationship between deliberation and attitude change, such as the role 
of the majority or the predisposition degree to which participants had been subject to 
international socialisation (from Figure 19 and Table 12). But the survey results do not explain the 
outcome of changes of attitudes, i.e. whether an agreement ensues, and to which extent 
agreement is contingent on attitudinal change. Nor do they explain mechanisms leading to those 
changes, which could be the result of learning as well as strategic motivations. The next chapter 
investigates those mechanisms in a study of the Sorbonne and Bologna declarations of the 25th of 
May 1998 and the 19th of June 1999.  
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Chapter 6 Learning and strategies in the Sorbonne and Bologna 
deliberations 
 
A second lens of analysis explains how participants integrate their changes in attitudes and 
how participating in European deliberations influence their policy decisions. This analysis 
distinguishes whether deliberation affects participants’ decisions through learning or through 
strategic use. Learning occurs when participants adapt their attitudes to the information they 
receive during deliberation. Strategic behaviour takes place when a participant does not necessarily 
change his attitude, but uses the outcome of deliberations or participation in deliberation to 
satisfy his own interests or the ones of the organisation he represents85. Strategic behaviour can 
happen concurrently with and motivate learning. The distinction remains important to understand 
the mechanisms and extent to which deliberation affects individual attitudes (H1) and how 
deliberation influences the decisions of policy makers on domestic policies (H2) depending on the 
level of entrenchment of the policy object (H3).  
This second lens of analysis includes deliberations leading first to the Sorbonne declaration 
of the 25th of May 1998 and secondly to the Bologna declaration of the 19th of June 1999. It in 
particular aims at explaining why the Bologna declaration took longer than the Sorbonne 
declaration to be agreed on (two weeks for the Sorbonne declaration and seven months for the 
Bologna declaration). Were the strategies of participants more diverse? Did those deliberations 
lead to less learning? 
This chapter concludes that strategic motivations dominated the decisions of participants in 
the two deliberations. But strategies also motivated learning particularly in the Sorbonne 
declaration, where a convergence of attitudes among principals ensued. Learning depended on the 
                                               
85 The distinction between self and organisational interests may not be clear at an empirical level. Chapter 4 explained 
that when a participant has the role of representing the interests of a particular organisation, he often merges into this 
role so that the organisation’s interests become his own.  
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level of entrenchment of the object, the trust between participants, whether participants were 
principals or agents and whether they belonged to the majority or the minority86.  
Some learning in the Sorbonne deliberations 
Four Ministers took part in the preparation of the Sorbonne declaration: Luigi Berlinguer 
for Italy, Claude Allègre for France, Jürgen Rüttgers for Germany and Tessa Blackstone for 
England. 
It is a priori difficult to see why those four Ministers would manage to agree by consensus 
on creating a common higher education area. After all, those four Ministers came from different 
countries with different traditions and political parties. France had a Napoleonic model, was by 
tradition very centralised and interventionist in its approach to higher education, while Germany 
was the motherland of the Humboldtian model and its higher education was federal. England was 
decentralised akin to the Oxbridge model (Deer, 2002). And Italy was rather centralised (Moscati, 
2006).  
Moreover, the Ministers came from different political parties. While Luigi Berlinguer was a 
communist by family tradition (he was the cousin of the head of the party), Claude Allègre and 
Tessa Blackstone belonged to their countries’ socialist parties (Parti Socialiste PS and Labour) and 
Jürgen Rüttgers belonged to the conservative Christian Democratic Union CDU.  Despite these 
different political allegiances, the Ministers signed the Sorbonne declaration in ‘record time’ and 
drafted it within two weeks of the official declaration. Yet, common interests leading to domestic 
deliberations facilitated agreement in the Sorbonne.  
                                               
86 Other researchers, such as Ravinet (2005b, 2007) and Witte (2006) also documented the emergence of the 
Sorbonne declaration. But they concentrated on strategic behaviour and interests rather than deliberative learning.  
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Similar interests in favour of reforms and domestic constraints 
Ministers shared a common interest to move the higher education sector away from state 
control and the domestic opposition they faced in doing so. Such proximity of interests led to a 
climate of trust which was particularly unique in European politics. Higher education, at the 
domestic level, was mostly a ‘majoritarian’ policy area, where parties in institutions such as the 
parliament or the government influenced the outcome. Because the different Ministers were from 
different parties and because of the zero-sum game nature of welfare policies such as higher 
education, one would expect them to have had different redistributive interests and to adapt their 
policies differently according to those different interests87.  
Italy  
In Italy, Luigi Berlinguer had a very ambitious reform programme for higher education 
when he arrived in power after the elections of the 21st of April 1996 (email communication IT5, 
September 2007; interview IT3, 06 September 2007).  These ambitions to reform higher 
education were long-lasting. He set up a commission to modernise higher education while he was 
General Secretary of the Rector’s conference and later Rector.  He also took part in the ministerial 
commission for university development while Minister of Education between 1986 and 1988. 
Some journalists called his reform package ‘the most radical revolution in Italian higher education since the 
Second World War’ (Bompard, 1996). 
In fact, Luigi Berlinguer mostly wanted to restart the process of liberalisation of universities 
launched a few years before. Opposition by various domestic actors including the Parliament, the 
Ministry’s administration, academics and students had occasioned the previous reforms, which 
                                               
87 This assumes that the left-right dimension is the same across countries in Europe as Budge et al. (1987: 392) and 
Bartolini and Mair (1990: 193-211) argued.  
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went in the same direction (Times higher education supplement, 1994; email communication IT5, 
September 2007).   
Antonio Ruberti, who became Minister for the Coordination of Scientific and 
Technological Research in 1987, previously attempted reform in 1991-1993 with the triennial 
programme. This programme included giving the power to universities to define their own 
statutes and regulations within a general framework through the reenactment of a constitutional 
regulation (art. 33, comma 6) after forty years, following the recognition of the statutory  
autonomy of universities in 1989, which re-enacted the law of the 9th of May 1969 n° 168 (Gori, 
1998:86). Faculties became able to manage autonomously the budgets granted by the Government 
(art. 5 of the law of the 24th of December 1993, n. 537).  And a partial reform (law of the 19th of 
November 1990, n. 341) of academic courses took place in 1990 (email communication IT5, 
September 2007).  
In July 1996, Luigi Berlinguer started a bundle of reforms concentrating on the ‘didactical 
autonomy’ of universities (email communication IT5, September 2007; interview IT3, 06 
September 2007). Law 127/97 on the 15th of May 1997, known as ‘Bassanini bis’, provided the 
basis for the reforms on didactic autonomy. This law enhanced the autonomy of universities in 
the fields of recruitment and teaching and aimed at ‘creating a culture of academic management’ 
(Bombard, 1996; interview IT3, 06 September 2007). It required the reorganisation by higher 
education institutions of the study courses they had on offer, encouraged an approach to teaching 
centred around students and decentralised the recruitment of teachers from the Central 
Government to higher education institutions (Gori, 1998: 86).  
Luigi Berlinguer met domestic opposition from non-state actors during this reform plan. 
Many demonstrations took place against various aspects of the reforms in 1996 and autumn 1997 
(Chronicle of higher education, 1997; Osipov, 1997). Those demonstrations led the Italian 
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Government to back down on some of their reforms, for example abandoning the attempt to 
introduce limits on university admissions after student demonstrations (Associated press 
worldstream, 1996).  
Germany 
In Germany, the Sorbonne declaration also emerged in a context of higher education 
reforms and opposition from non-state actors. Jürgen Rüttgers, Minister for Higher Education, 
Research and Technology under Helmut Kohl from 1994, had since 1996 prepared a reform 
aimed at deregulating higher education. He aimed at reducing the scope of the framework law by 
more than 50% - among other reforms allowing the creation of private institutions, but also 
changing the structure of German degrees to make them more attractive internationally, more 
competitive, autonomous and able to raise profits (Interview D3, 19 September 2007; BMBF, 
2005). The Government also planned on introducing selectivity in admissions, the first league 
table, quality assurance, a reform of degrees, and the deregulation of tuition fees (Brookman, 
1997/1997b; HRK, 1997).  
As a response to worries about competitiveness, the German federal Ministry of Education 
and Research (BMBF) funded the programme ‘internationally-oriented degree programmes’ 
(Auslandsorienterte Studengange) carried out jointly by the German academic exchange service 
DAAD and the conference of rectors of higher education institutions HRK and taken up with 
great enthusiasm by German higher education institutions (HEIs) in 1996 (DAAD and HRK, 
2001). A similar DAAD programme (Master plus) launched in 1997, was funded by the Foreign 
Office. The Kultur Minister Konferenz (KMK) (1997:1) had pleaded for the strengthening of the 
international competitiveness of German HEIs and the opening of the German degree system to 
the introduction of a bachelor and master’s degree. The HRK even developed parameters for the 
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design of the new degree programmes (HRK, 1997). Employers’ demands for reforms of degrees 
structures also became more pronounced (Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie et al., 1992/1997).   
Reform plans divided non-state actors and created intense opposition. Top universities 
were in favour of the diversification of sources of funding. But students demonstrated against the 
reforms, fearing that it would lead to the introduction of fees (Brookman, 1997, Boyes, 1997 and 
Traynor, 1997). This opposition resulted in the federal Bundesrat rejecting the framework law 
Hochschulrahmengesetz (HRG) on the 6th of March 1998 (Steghaus-Kovac, 1998)88.  
France 
Claude Allègre also had ambitious reform plans. Claude Allègre became French Minister for 
National Education, Research and Technology after the legislative elections which started the 
cohabitation period and the arrival of Lionel Jospin as Prime Minister on the 2nd of June 1997.  
Like Luigi Berlinguer, Claude Allègre’s plans for reforms had been maturing for a long time 
period. Claude Allègre thought of many of his reform plans between 1988 and 1992 when he was 
special counsellor to Lionel Jospin, who then had the position of Minister for National 
Education89. At that time, Claude Allègre pushed for the implementation of the contractual policy, 
which provided universities with the autonomy to negotiate their resources with the Ministry 
(Musselin, 2004: 67). He set up a new financing system of universities called U2000, which shifted 
financial pressure from the Central Government to regions (Allègre, 2000: 267). Finally, he 
created the IUPs (Instituts Universitaires Professionnels) to increase vocational training and the 
relationships between the labour market and universities90.  
But some of Claude Allègre’s reform plans did not come to realisation. Claude Allègre also 
attempted to reform degrees, including a reform of the preparatory classes to grandes écoles at the 
                                               
88 This rejection ruled out a federation-wide policy on tuition fees. However, each Land was still able to introduce 
fees if it wished to do so. For example, Baden-Württemberg allowed the introduction of fees (Gardner, 1998). 
89 Claude Allègre was known as ‘unofficial minister’ or ‘vice-minister’ of higher education and research at that time. 
90 See chapter 7 for more details on the French reforms of the late 1980s.  
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time of his mandate with Lionel Jospin (Witte, 2006: 272). But this project failed as a result of the 
opposition of the Conference of the heads of engineering schools (CDEFI) and the Conference 
of grandes écoles (CGE), which recruited students from those preparatory classes (interview, FPA4 
09 June 2007). 
Claude Allègre also aimed at providing a more student-oriented approach to higher 
education, largely inspired by his stay in the US.  He explained:  
 ‘From the beginning, the French university has been built and organised by and for the teachers. In 
the traditional conception, the professor is at the heart, at the centre of the institution. He owns the 
knowledge and hands it down… to those who are capable of receiving it! In such a conception, 
students are not pupils, they are disciples, privileged people allowed to benefit from the teaching of the 
master.(…) Among the disciples the master chooses those few that he judges capable of becoming in 
turn the future masters’ (Allègre, 1993:12).  
‘In the USA, the professor has as an aim, a function, to serve the student; in France, the professor is 
the central point, and the student his disciple’. (Allègre, 1998)91. 
In addition, Claude Allègre aimed at making the French higher education landscape more 
recognisable internationally. This involved bringing universities into the centre of the higher 
education and research landscape in France, developing links with research centres92, grandes écoles93 
and universities and encouraging the mobility of researchers (Balter, 1998: 2162, Allègre, 2000: 
263).  
In the late 1990s, Claude Allègre’s ministerial cabinet even considered the option of a 
reform of tuition fees, setting up differential fees according to the revenues of the families of the 
students (Soulas, 1997). But this measure did not go beyond the brainstorming level in the 
cabinet, probably because of the strong national tradition of free education (Interview FM1, 02 
                                               
91 All translations are by the author.  
92 Research centres, such as the CNRS, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, were mostly responsible for research. 
93 Grandes écoles are the most prestigious higher education institutions in France, with a selective recruitment very 
different from the tradition of open access at universities. Grandes écoles were set up after the Second World War to 
train students for particular professions (Interview FM1, 02 April 2007). 
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April 2007)94. And higher education in France was a sensitive topic, often leading to mass 
demonstrations and the Government having to retract its reform proposals95.  
Claude Allègre was not willing to compromise on his reform plans for fear of retaliation. 
And difficult relationships with non-state actors started a mere few weeks after his nomination on 
the 24th of June 1997. His famous statement: ‘one has to trim the fat of the mammoth’ (Gurrey, 1997; 
SNESUP, 1998b/1998d) frankly stated his ambitions to reform the academic profession by 
making it more cost efficient. Leftwing staff and student trade unions reacted strongly to this 
sentence, from this moment on branding Claude Allègre as an enemy promoter of economically 
liberal policies. Claude Allègre’s rebuttal of the ‘co-management’ tradition between trade unions 
and the Government and his criticism of staff holidays fed this opposition with trade unions 
(SNESUP, 1998d; Allègre, 2000: 273).  
England 
England was also undergoing a series of reforms, marked by the opposition of some domestic 
actors. Opposition rose in the 1990s particularly with the reform of quality assurance, which set 
up regular external audits and subject reviews of universities, conducted by HEQC and HEFCE 
in 1992 and the creation of the Quality Assurance Agency since the 2nd of April 1997 (QAA, 
1997).  However, domestic opposition took place more at the level of academic debate than street 
demonstrations like in Italy, Germany and France, one factor for this difference being the change 
in trade union influence resulting from the Thatcher era (McLeod, 1993; Griffith, 1994; Times 
Higher Education, 1994; Tysome, 1997).  
During the period preceding the Sorbonne declaration, David Blunkett and Tessa 
Blackstone were preparing the reintroduction of tuition fees. David Blunkett had been Secretary 
                                               
94 Universal access to education is a guaranteed by the French Constitution.  
95 See for example demonstrations against the Devaquet project of 1986 in chapter 7. 
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of State for Education and Employment, and Tessa Blackstone Minister of State with special 
responsibility for Higher Education and Lifelong Learning since the general elections of May 
1997. The Government drafted the teaching and higher education bill in the first half of 1998, 
which proposed a re-introduction of tuition fees on a means-tested basis to cover a quarter of the 
costs of higher education. The bill was debated in Parliament in spring and summer and signed 
into law by royal assent in July 199896.  
Thus, the four ministers had similar interests in lowering the level of state control in higher 
education in their respective countries. Interviewees underlined those similar interests as a ‘shared 
vision’ or ‘synergy of thought’, adding that those similarities were fuelled by similar past careers in 
academia and pre-existing friendships (Allègre 2000: 261; interviews FM1, 02 April 2007; IT2 06 
September 2007; IT3, 06 September 2007). These similarities facilitated a climate of trust ideal for 
deliberative learning (Johnston, 2005: 1019). But Ministers, especially Jürgen Rüttgers, Claude 
Allègre and Luigi Berlinguer, were constrained by potential or already existing domestic 
opposition which made their overarching reform plans difficult to maneuver.  
Similar national deliberations 
To think of suitable reforms given their domestic constraints, the four ministers adopted 
similar strategies and decided to set up national deliberations on the future of higher education. 
Three of those deliberations considered a reform of the structure of university degrees.  
In Italy, a working group was constituted to think about the reform of higher education in 
June 1996. This group, chaired by Guido Martinotti, presented its conclusions on the 3rd of 
October 1997 in a report entitled Autonomia didattica e innovazione dei corsi di studio di livello 
universitario e post-universitario. Guido Martinotti drew inspiration from his academic experience of 
UC Berkeley in the US in 1964 to issue his suggestions on the modernisation of the Italian 
                                               
96 See chapter 7 for more information on reforms in England.  
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university system (email communication IT4, 12 September 2007). The report contained a 
proposal for the innovation and reform of the entire system of academic course planning. This 
aimed at increasing the autonomy of universities and staff in the design of courses.  
The report did not mention the idea of reorganising the Italian higher education system into 
a bachelor and a master and/or doctorate degree. But it suggested an intermediate certificate (the 
CUB) before the laurea; the laurea being the equivalent of an undergraduate degree of four to five 
years (for an English summary of the Martinotti report, see: Chu et al., 2000).  
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Table 13: Degree structures in Sorbonne signatories versus Bologna process recommendations 
 
Entry 
age 
France 
 
Germany Italy England Bologna 
process 
 University Grandes 
écoles 
Vocational University Vocational University Vocational  University Vocational  University 
18                     
19 DEUG Preparatory  BTS, IUT, IUP     CL DU Bachelor Short  Bachelor 
20   class             degree   
21 License Grande école  Diplom  Diplom 
(FH) 
         
22 Maîtrise    Staatsexam       Master  Master 
23      Magister       Doctorate   
24         Post      Doctorate 
25 DEA/DESS       Lauream        
26 Doctorat   Doktorat  Dottorato       
27               
28               
29             
30             
31            
32           
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This constituted an attempt to reduce the length of non-vocational university degrees. As Table 
13 indicated, a short two year course already existed, - the Corso di Diploma Universitario (DU) – but 
it was mostly vocational97.  The most widely acknowledged level of exit was the Laurea degree 
courses (Curso di Laurea, CL)98.  
In December 1997, Luigi Berlinguer presented the conclusions of the report to the academic 
community, and committed to the principle of the intermediate degree in two years (Ravinet, 
2005b: 17).  
In Germany, the reform of degrees had been prepared for many years. Senior civil servants 
in the federal Ministry of Education and Research99, including Hans Reiner Friedrich, started 
preparing a fourth amendment to the HRG. This amendment included the introduction of a 
bachelors-masters degree system that could be taught in English. This reform foresaw several 
graduation levels which could broadly be split up into two levels. The first level was equivalent to 
the masters’ level with three main degrees: a Diplom (originally a professional degree in technical 
and science subjects), a Magister and a Staatsexam (originally for entrance to civil service or teacher 
training). There was little control of knowledge apart from the first Staatsexam after a period of 
university studies, and a second Staatsexam after an internship.  
The second level was a doctorate taking an average of five years. For vocational education, 
Fachhochschulen awarded a Diplom (FH).  The Federal Government and the Länder launched a pilot 
scheme in 1998, where a number of bachelor and master programmes had already been set up on 
the special authorisation of Länder governments (Witte, 2006: 164).  
In France, Claude Allègre asked Jacques Attali on the 21st of July 1997 to set up a 
commission aiming at reforming higher education.  Claude Allègre wanted Jacques Attali to set up 
                                               
97 Courses run by the Scuole dirette a fini speciali (schools for special purposes). 
98 Third level studies (post-lauream) complemented the laurea by offering specialisations in scuole di specializzazione 
(specialization schools), corsi di dottorato di ricerca (DR) (research doctorate programmes) and corsi di perfezionamento. 
99 Bundesministerium für Bildung, Wissenschaft, Forschung und Technologie, BBWFT. 
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some proposals about how French higher education could answer the challenges of European 
integration and globalisation, especially looking at how to solve national issues, such as the 
distance between grandes écoles and universities.  
The Attali report, published in February 1998 and endorsed by the Ministry (MEN, 1998), 
proposed a reorganisation of degrees in three levels, with an undergraduate degree in three years, 
a master in two years, and a doctorate degree in a further three years100. As Table 13 indicates, the 
French qualifications system had many different levels and was metaphorically described as “jungle 
of diplomas” (interview FCM1, 28 April 2007). It had a system articulated around 2 years of DEUG 
(Diplôme d’Etudes Universitaires Générales), 1 year of license, 1 to 3 years of maîtrise, 1 year of DEA 
(Diplôme d’Etudes Approfondies) for research training or DESS (Diplôme d’études supérieures spécialisées) 
for vocational training and a doctorate at university, which makes a total of five levels for 
universities. The first exit point recognised by the job market was after the maîtrise. Grandes écoles 
had two levels: two years of preparatory school and three years of grandes écoles. Vocational training 
institutes offered of one level of qualifications over two years101.  
England was the only country where no reform of qualifications was envisioned. To some 
extent, England’s levels of qualifications mirrored the changes considered in other countries. It 
had three levels of qualifications in most disciplines, including a bachelor’s degree in three years, a 
master’s degree in one year and a doctoral degree in around three years. Completion of the 
master’s degree was desirable but not compulsory to access a doctorate. Tessa Blackstone set up 
an independent commission to think about higher education reforms, directed by Lord Dearing, 
which deliberated from May 1997 and published a report on the 23rd of July 1997, under the title 
Higher education in the learning society. The report’s main recommendation concerned the costs of 
                                               
100 This shows that the articulation and length of those levels was already defined in March 1998 (Meynadier, 1998). 
101 See chapter 7 for more information on the French qualifications system and its reforms.  
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higher education. Its only advice on the design of degrees was the diversification of sub-degree 
courses as the basis for further study.  
Thus, although the English Minister did not plan a reform of degrees, the German Minister 
started introducing bachelor and master’s degrees and the French and Italian governments were 
deliberating on the subject in national commissions in the wake of the Sorbonne deliberations. 
Three countries had the same idea, to reform their curricula, but the formulae considered were 
very different before the Sorbonne declaration: The Italian Minister envisioned the two-year 
extension of the undergraduate degree in two years. The German Minister wanted to set up an 
undergraduate degree in three years and France an undergraduate degree in four years as the next 
paragraph will show. Yet, on the 25th of May 1998, the four ministers agreed on the Sorbonne 
declaration which focused mostly on a reorganisation of degrees into a bachelor and postgraduate 
level, including a master of two years and a doctorate of three years; with an undergraduate degree 
preferably in three years102.  
The role of deliberations in the Sorbonne declaration 
How did ministers manage to agree on the creation of the European higher education area? 
Why did the four Ministers choose to harmonise their systems into an undergraduate and a 
postgraduate level, the undergraduate degree taking three years? Other formulae could have 
included a first level in four years for example.. But deliberating led to a convergence on the 
design of degrees towards an undergraduate degree in three years.  
                                               
102 Although the Bologna declaration mentions that undergraduate degrees should take a minimum of three years, 
there is no mention of the length of degrees in the Sorbonne declaration. Interviews revealed that Ministers actually 
had agreed on the length of degrees of three years (interview FM1, 02 April 2007; IT3, 06 September 2008). But 
ministers did not wrote down this length of degrees in the final version of the declaration to minimise domestic 
opposition.  
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Learning in various deliberations  
The four ministers learnt from each other and converged on what should be the desirable 
structure of degrees during various deliberations prior to the official preparation of the Sorbonne 
declaration.   
Several ministers or representatives remembered that the meetings of the Carnegie group 
provided an opportunity for the French, Italian and German ministers to discuss common higher 
education issues and potential solutions in July and December 1997 (interviews FM1, 02 April 
2007; FCM1, 28 April 2007; IT1, 05 September 2007). The meetings at that period covered 
particular topics such as international mobility and perceived brain drain in education (Bromley, 
1996). The Carnegie group emerged as an initiative of the Carnegie corporation, and more 
particularly the Carnegie commission on science, technology and government. It originally 
gathered ministers and science advisors from the G7 countries, the European Union and the 
former Soviet Union. It then enlarged to include other officials including the European 
Commission. Meetings were held every six months to a year and the location rotated from 
country to country (Bromley, 1996) 103.  
It is easy to understand why those meetings would have led to informal deliberations. The 
Carnegie group meetings took place within a think tank and not an intergovernmental context 
where there were therefore fewer stakes at play and they were held behind closed doors which 
favoured an open exchange of arguments.  
Both the French and Italian Ministers changed their attitudes toward the length of the 
undergraduate degree during those meetings. Because the Ministers were principals (or near 
principals since they only had their Prime Minister who respectively supported them in their 
                                               
103 Moreover, the ministers would have had other opportunities to meet during the European Council or OECD 
meetings and were already collaborating on projects in the field of research, such as the European Space Agency 
(ESA) or the European organisation for nuclear research (CERN) (interview, IT1, 05 September 2007). For example, 
in December 1997, the French and Italian ministers set up a working group on the development of a type of nuclear 
reactor called Rubbiatron (Meynadier, 1997). 
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enterprise - and depending on the system their presidents - to defer to), their newly acquired 
attitude quickly became the official attitude. Firstly, the French Minister, who originally planned 
an undergraduate degree in four years, claimed that he was convinced by the German Jürgen 
Rüttgers to shorten the length of undergraduate degrees:  
 “What led to the decision was that the German Minister who is today Minister President for 
Nordhrein-Westphalie called Jürgen Rüttgers said that he had a very important argument, which 
was, American studies are much shorter than in France. We have in Germany but also France in 
particular high school students who come out much younger and in addition to it we say that they are 
not always very good. And if we do the undergraduate degree in four years, it means that our students 
are stupid and that they need more training than the Americans. So we considered that part of the 
training given in the US in the undergraduate was provided in secondary education, and thus we 
decided to move to three years. We then decided to include the master at two years, plus the doctorate. 
It gave something which was called 3-5-8. Now it’s changed and it’s called LMD, but it is the same 
thing: license-master-doctorat.” (Interview FM1, 2 April 2007; also in Allègre, 2000: 260). 
 
This quote shows that the French Minister changed his representational attitude regarding 
four-year degrees (as meaning that European students need more training than Americans) as well 
as his motivational attitudes on the length of degrees, coming to prefer three year to four year 
degrees. Shorter degrees indeed provided a competitive advantage in comparison to the American 
system and were also cost efficient for the Government in the sense that shortening the length of 
studies reduced the necessary funding for studies.  
 Jürgen Rüttgers was the only one in the group to actively support a degree in three years. 
However, various proposals supporting the idea of a reform towards three years encouraged this 
change in attitudes of the French Minister. Alain Touraine, member of the Attali commission, was 
also an advocate of a three years undergraduate degree (interview FM1, 02 April 2008). Adrian 
Schmidt, who was representing the French Conference of University Presidents (CPU) in 
Brussels, was influenced by the German talk concerning reforms. He sent a similar proposal to 
Claude Allègre on the 4th of February 1998 (interview FPA1, 23 May 2007; Soulas, 1998).  
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Once convinced by the Germans and additional proposals, the French Minister shared his 
thoughts with the Italian Minister:  
‘We [the French and Italians] talked about the necessity to do something which was more 
European, bringing an academic approach to students throughout the courses, but not in the content 
of courses. It didn’t have the name, but the length and the idea of the nature of university titles which 
were generally the license in France and the laurea in Italy. Generally there was a single title at the 
end of ordinary courses, except for the doctorate. In this time we discussed personally, almost privately 
to see if it was possible to set up a common approach and common degrees’ (Interview IT3, 06 
September 2007). 
The Italian Minister paid great attention to Claude Allègre’s proposal, all the more so as he 
was also inspired by the similar English example: ‘We had accepted the idea that the English had found 
the modern solution to the necessity of a plurality of successive titles’. (Interview IT3, 06 September 2007).  
Luigi Berlinguer, who had already agreed in principle to a two-year undergraduate degree in 
December 1997, gradually changed his mind in favour of an undergraduate degree in three years. 
This change of opinion forced him to change the orientation of national talks for reforms:  
‘I remember that when I decided to go for it, I had the problem of the Martinotti commission which 
was before that, and I ordered to change direction by 180 degrees. I gathered the commission, went to 
see them, and said: listen, up until now you’ve done a very good work, but you have to erase 
everything and change it, and it was a very heavy moment. Because it could have been a decision with 
critical consequences for academics, universities, culture, politics and newspapers. In any case, I 
decided to go for it convinced that European primacy in European politics should be preserved’ 
(Interview IT3, 06 September 2007).  
The Italian Minister therefore changed his mind from a reform of the first degree into two 
years to a reform with a first degree in three years.  (The strategic reasons for such change are 
underlined later in this chapter).  
During talks with the German and Italian ministers, the French Minister had the idea of 
combining the signature of a declaration on European degrees reforms with the 800th anniversary 
of the Sorbonne declaration in early 1998. Claude Allègre had at that time acquired a certain 
awareness of the importance and role of the international dimension of higher education through 
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a member of his cabinet Catherine Bizot, who was also working for the DRIC, the ministerial 
department in charge of the recognition of diplomas (Allègre, 2000; interview FCM5, 13 June 
2007). Claude Allègre had in mind to use the Sorbonne anniversary as an occasion to sign the 
agreement on the common degree levels (interview FCM1, 28 April 2007).  
Once France, Germany and Italy had agreed on the principle of a degree reform 
establishing an undergraduate degree in three years, and two postgraduate levels in two and three 
years, the three countries contacted the British Minister (interview UKCM1 28 April 2007; 
Dauvin, 1998). The UK had fewer links with France than Germany and Italy. As junior minister, 
not in charge of research, Tessa Blackstone did not attend meetings of the Carnegie group where 
the other ministers got to know each other (Ravinet, 2005b). And David Blunkett having the 
portfolio of education and employment would have had less time to attend specific research and 
higher education gatherings. But Claude Allègre convinced Tessa Blackstone to join them. He 
travelled to London, accompanied by advisor Laure Meynadier, to talk to David Blunkett, 
Baroness Blackstone, John Battle, Minister of State at the Department of Trade and Industry, 
responsible for Science, Energy and Industry, and Peter Mandelson, Minister without portfolio 
coordinating the tasks of the Government, on the 12th of March 1998 (Dauvin, 1998). 
During this meeting, Claude Allègre discussed the possibility of harmonising higher 
education study patterns and facilitating diploma recognition. Claude Allègre originally invited the 
Prime Minister, followed by David Blunkett to sign the Sorbonne declaration. But David Blunkett 
sent Tessa Blackstone, who had the portfolio of higher education, to Paris on the 24 th and 25th of 
May 1998 (Allègre, 1998). Tessa Blackstone did not see any obstacle to the content of the reform, 
since she interpreted it mostly as the continental countries coming closer to the English model. 
But according to an advisor, she was initially resistant to engage in such reforms, because she was 
afraid of trespassing on the responsibilities of the Department for Education and Employment 
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(DfEE). The DfEE did not have much say in higher education policy at the time and higher 
education institutions were responsible for agreeing to such an initiative104. To solve this matter, 
Claude Allègre proposed that the agreement be signed in the form of a “declaration” and not as a 
more binding “treaty” (interview, FCM1 28 April 2007). As a result, all ministers agreed in 
principle to take part in a European degree reform and were willing to come to the Sorbonne by 
the end of April 1998.  
Rapid drafting process 
The deliberations that followed on the draft of the declaration were relatively quick (in 
comparison to the deliberations on the draft of the Bologna declaration), and started only a 
couple of weeks before the Sorbonne meeting. Vincent Courtillot, Special Advisor of Claude 
Allègre in charge of higher education, research and technology for France, contacted Tony Clarke, 
Director of Higher Education at the DfEE for Britain, Michelangelo Pipan, Diplomatic advisor at 
the Higher Education Ministry for Italy, and Volker Rieke, Personal advisor to Minister Jürgen 
Rüttgers as well as Wolfgang Moenikes, Director of Higher Education at the Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research (BMBF) from Germany. He circulated a first draft on the 7th of May 
1998, two weeks before the Sorbonne meeting was due (Courtillot, 1998). The draft deliberations 
could have been rather difficult, because the declaration had to take into account each country’s 
perspective and be agreed by consensus, so that no country would appear as dominating the 
others (interview FCM7, 10 July 2007). But a final draft circulated on the  21st of May 1998, only 
seven days after the first circulation, which was discussed for the first and only time in person 
between the five advisors on the morning of the 14th of May in London (Clark, 1998b).  
                                               
104 The DfEE did not have the power to regulate degrees. Higher education institutions had the right to award their 
own degrees through the Privy Council by virtue of a royal charter, an act of Parliament or under the provisions of 
the Further and Higher Education Act of the 6th of March 1992.  And higher education was a devolved competency 
of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland since the referendum on devolution took place only a few months before in 
December 1997. 
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The representatives had a relatively consensual discussion during the deliberations on the 
draft, facilitated by the preliminary agreement on the reform of degrees between ministers. 
Relatively few modifications were made between the original and the final drafts of the 
declaration (see comparison in appendix). Interviewees claimed that the declaration was 
deliberated upon without major disagreements for not more than ‘two hours’ (interviews 
UKCM1, 24 April 2007; FCM7, 10 July 2007; IT1 05 September 2007; D3 19 September 2007).  
Fears of domestic opposition led to a few modifications between the original and the final 
drafts. For example, the final draft deleted the sentence: ‘we must prepare them for the jobs of the future, 
with a spirit of enterprise, and open mind towards international experience, in a system that allows for progress of 
knowledge through commitment to research’. Michelangelo Pipan suggested this deletion because he was 
afraid that Italian student representatives would fight any explicit reference to the labour market 
or competitiveness (interview IT1, 05 September 2007). Tony Clark supported this deletion since 
he did not want the declaration extended to research (Clark, 1998). 
Not all issues could be decided via consensus. Vincent Courtillot, who drafted the 
document, kept the terms ‘encouraging’ and ‘harmonisation’ in the declaration despite the disapproval 
of the British and German representatives.  Tony Clark did not approve of the use of such terms 
since he did not want the British university sector to feel that the Department for Education and 
Employment (DfEE) had overstepped its competencies (Clark, 1998). The German 
representative also feared a reaction from the Länder, who were the main regulators for higher 
education degrees (interview, D3 19 September 2007). The French representative did not see as 
many problems in such terms since he came from a state with a relatively centralist tradition, 
where the Government could regulate higher education (interview FCM7, 10 July 2007). 
 The Ministers therefore directly learnt from each other during informal deliberations, a 
learning process facilitated by interests in similar reforms in favour of less state control of 
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universities. Such learning at the level of ministers made the drafting of the declaration by the 
ministerial representatives relatively consensual, the main disagreements emerging from the need 
to adjust the declaration to the domestic constraints faced by each actor.  
The strategic motivations behind the Sorbonne declaration 
Strategic motivations played an important role in the Sorbonne declaration. They aimed at 
increasing ministers’ political reputation or acting as a lever for reform versus domestic 
constraints.  
The Ministers agreed to the Sorbonne enterprise because they saw it as a way to increase 
their political reputation at a convenient time. In Italy, it was the first time in fifty years that a 
communist Minister got the higher education portfolio, and Berlinguer wanted to establish the 
reform potential of his party. In Germany, the Minister was approaching the end of his term, and 
welcomed the benefits of exposure from such an international event (Ravinet, 2005b). The UK 
had the European Council presidency between January and June 1998, and needed to show 
European achievements in this context (Interview D3, 19 September 2007).  
But the strongest factor for Italy, Germany and France was the perception that signing the 
Sorbonne declaration could be used to help domestic reforms. As mentioned earlier, the Ministers 
of those three countries were already or potentially facing intense domestic opposition from 
students and the academic community. They for that reason all decided to keep the preparation of 
the Sorbonne declaration quiet until the day of the Sorbonne conference (Clark, 1998b; interview, 
IT3, 06 September 2007).  
The intuition that using the European level would help to diminish domestic opposition 
was very consistent among interviewees from those three countries (interviews IT4, 10 September 
2007; FF4 07 June 2007; IT8 September 2008; EU1, 02 July 2007; email communication IT7 
September 2007).  
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An Italian interviewee claimed:  
‘We were both convinced that the linking of the reform with a process of innovation involving Italy, 
together with other European countries (France, Germany and the United Kingdom), would have 
been a decisive factor in favour of the reform itself, enough to surmount the widespread, paralysing 
conservative oppositions’ (Email communication IT5, September 2007). 
In Germany, a representative explained:  
 ‘For many people like me, the Bologna process was welcome because we hoped that unavoidable 
structural reforms that had been unavoidable for decades could now be implemented, hence the 
symbolic importance of the Bologna process. I knew from earlier on that it was not legally binding, 
but in the public view. It was binding. That was very helpful. (…) The European and the worldwide 
perspective was the only chance to put structural reforms on the table’ (interview G1, 17 
September 2007).  
Once the declaration was signed, the Ministers hoped that it would contribute to the 
implementation of reform plans. Even if the declaration was not binding, domestic actors were 
more likely to want to show their ability to commit and comply with other member states by fear 
of ‘blaming and shaming’. Ministers could also reduce opposition of domestic actors by shifting 
the blame for the reforms to the European level. Finally, ministers could show to domestic 
opponents that the reforms were not conducted in isolation. They were instead endorsed and 
undertaken in many other countries, bringing legitimacy to their own domestic reforms.  The 
decision to use the Sorbonne declaration for domestic reforms perhaps led to the heaviest 
strategic calculation in Italy: Luigi Berlinguer judged that the costs of changing his public attitude 
to support a three year undergraduate degree instead of the already announced two year degree 
were outweighed by the benefits of being part of the Sorbonne declaration.  
In France, Claude Allègre described the Sorbonne declaration and the subsequent process 
of European harmonisation as ‘the breadcrumb trail to help build Europe, but also to renovate French higher 
education’ (Allègre, 2000: 263). He also explained that it was the ‘principal point of attack for the reforms’ 
(Allègre, 2000: 259).  Disagreement with the proposed levels of qualifications was not as 
entrenched as some of the most contentious reforms the Ministers had in mind and would be 
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easier to present to domestic actors than an agreement bearing more wide-ranging 
consequences105. But Ministers knew that such an agreement would encourage domestic actors to 
start a broader process of reform.  
The text of the declaration contains references to the ministerial ambitions for domestic 
reforms. The reference to the universities of the Middle Ages aimed at accentuating the central 
role of universities in higher education throughout history. Through this reference, the French 
actually made a political statement against the French division between grandes écoles and 
universities (interview FCM7, 10 July 2007).  Moreover, the term a ‘higher education system in which 
they are given the best opportunities to seek and find their own area of excellence’ matched the Italian 
Government’s ambition to increase the employability of university graduates (interview IT1, 05 
September 2007).  
Tessa Blackstone did not have the same need to reduce domestic opposition.  Although 
Tessa Blackstone did not have the formal competency to commit the higher education sector to 
changing its degrees, she thought that presenting the declaration as the continental system 
adopting the features of the Anglo-Saxon system would convince domestic actors that the 
declaration did not require any changes from them and prevent opposition from domestic non-
state actors (Jagus, 1998; Clark, 1998b, interview UKCM1, 24 April 2007). Such a plan worked 
since British domestic actors took up this argument in official statements. In its first official 
position in 2003, the higher education representative UniversitiesUK106 explained that:  
“The UK supports moves in European higher education sectors to adopt a system of two main cycles 
at undergraduate and postgraduate level (and if agreed at Berlin, three, with the inclusion of the 
doctoral level). This is a system which is well-entrenched across the UK”. (EuropeUnit, 2003) 
 
                                               
105 For example an agreement which would harmonise higher student fees would have neither possible nor desirable 
given domestic reactions on the subject.  
106
 UniversitiesUK was created on 1 December 2000 (UniversitiesUK, 2008). It is the former Committee of Vice-
Chancellors and Principals (CVCP).  
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Tessa Blackstone also wanted to anticipate the potential losses for the UK if the European 
higher education area was to take off without her country, particularly on the postgraduate 
masters’ market and in terms of research collaboration (interview UKM1, 06 February 2007).  
Thus, the Ministers’ similar interests in reform facilitated them learning from each other 
during informal deliberations and consensually agreeing on the Sorbonne declaration. This in turn 
led to a rapid drafting process by advisors. But such learning also corresponded to self-interested 
motives. The ministers hoped that the declaration would help overcome domestic oppositions 
and/or raise their political profiles.   
Strategic motivations in the Bologna deliberations 
The deliberations preceding the Bologna declarations took longer than the preparation of 
the Sorbonne declaration. They started on the 15th of December 1998 and ended during the 
ministerial conference of 18th-19th of June 1999. Those deliberations did not have the informal 
structure of the Sorbonne deliberations. Moreover, divisions and strategic motivations were more 
prominent.  
More member states joined the process after the invitation made to them during the 
Sorbonne conference107. But the thirty one signatory countries had only one opportunity to 
deliberate in a plenary session the day before the signature on the 19th of June 1999. A smaller-
sized and more structured decision-making body was created to do most of the drafting work on 
the declaration. This body was called the Working group/steering committee on the Sorbonne 
follow-up. It was modelled on the Council of the European Union. A troika of representatives 
                                               
107 This invitation to other member states originated from a way for the original signatory countries to compensate 
for the diplomatic offence of not having consulted other European countries. In addition, the invitation aimed at 
limiting the influence of EU institutions on the process, since non-EU countries were also invited to join.  
Chapter 6 Learning and strategies in the Sorbonne and Bologna declarations 
 
 160 
from current, previous and future presidents of the Council of the European Union - Austria, 
Germany and Finland – managed the working group108.  
Non-state actors also started taking part in deliberations. A representative from the 
European Commission obtained the status of observer. Angelika Verli, the Deputy Head of the 
unit for Higher Education assisted by Ginette Nabavi from directorate general XXII – Education, 
Training and Youth - attended the deliberations109. She acted on the mandate of the Director 
General for Higher Education, Domenico Lenarduzzi. Although they officially only had the status 
of observer, the European Commission representatives, and in particular Angelika Verli, were 
very active in the Bologna deliberations.  
Angelika Verli actively contributed to the expansion of the European Commission 
competencies in the European higher education area (Hackl, 2001). During those deliberations, 
she intervened to promote the integration of the Bologna process with the European Community 
framework, stressing the need to discuss what should be the scope of European Community 
competencies in the Bologna process, and proposing scheduling informal EU Council meetings to 
discuss the Bologna process. She also underlined the European Commission competencies in 
mobility, raised institutional issues, such as the question of the institutional role of the working 
group and proposed the chair for the follow-up group (see Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft 
und Verkehr, 1998/99).  
This active participation of Angelika Verli despite her official observer status was accepted 
given that as a representative of an EU institution, she also represented the EU member states 
which were not originally part of the Sorbonne declaration (interview EF3, 12 September 2007). 
Moreover, the European Commission provided material support to the follow-up group. Indeed, 
                                               
108 Sigurd Höllinger, who was Director General for Higher Education at the Austrian Bunderministerium für 
Wissenschaft und Verkehr (BMWV), chaired the working group assisted by Barbara Weitgruber from the same 
Ministry. Anita Lehikoinen, Counsellor for education, represented Finland. 
109 Directorate general XXII became Directorate general education and culture in 1999 (Commission, 2006: 107).  
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the European Commission financed the meetings of the group, as well as having commissioned a 
stocktaking report on higher education in European countries and an interpretation of the 
Sorbonne declaration by Guy Haug and Jette Kerstein, independent affiliate experts from the 
CRE and the Confederation of European Union Rectors’ conferences (Erichsen, 1998)110. 
Additional participants finally included Andris Barblan from the Association of European 
Universities (CRE) and Inge Knudsen from the Confederation of European Union Rectors’ 
Conferences (Confederation)111.   
The original partnership between the four Ministers of the Sorbonne deliberations did not 
exist anymore. Representatives from France and the UK were not included in the early 
deliberations of the 15th of December 1998. And changes in ministers modified political priorities 
in Italy and Germany.  
Italian representatives Michelangelo Pipan and Antonella Cammisa, from the Ministry of 
Universities, Scientific Research and Technology attended the working group meetings, since Italy 
was going to host the conference. But those representatives did not benefit from the personal 
involvement of Luigi Berlinguer anymore. Christian democrat Ortensio Zecchino replaced Luigi 
Berlinguer after the fall of the Prodi Government in October 1998. Ortensio Zecchino did not 
have the same personal relationship with the other European Ministers as Luigi Berlinguer. And 
although he supported the Sorbonne declaration and Bologna preparations, Ortensio Zecchino 
was less preoccupied by the European dimension and the facilitation of the mobility of students 
in higher education (interviews IT2, 06 September 2007; IT1 05 September 2007; D2, 19 
September 2007).  
                                               
110 The interpretation of the Sorbonne declaration, called ‘the Sorbonne declaration, what it says what it doesn’t say’ 
read as an attempt to promote adhesion to the process by minimising the scope of the Sorbonne declaration to calm 
the concerns of heads of states regarding the implications of their adhesion (interview EU1, 02 July 2007). The report 
indeed refuted that the declaration promoted a ‘3-5-8’ structure, or that it was a process. Instead the report read that 
the Sorbonne declaration merely took ‘stock of changes initiated or proposed in a series of national reports 
completed within the previous year’ (Haug, 1999). The report also promoted existing European Commission actions.  
111 The CRE and the Confederation became the European University Association in 2001.  
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Despite not seeing it as a priority, Ortensio Zecchino continued to support Italy’s participation in 
the process and left a lot of freedom of negotiations to the team who covered the Sorbonne 
conference. Luciano Guerzoni, the Deputy Minister for University Affairs who concentrated on 
the implementation of the reforms to the qualifications framework also worked with and 
supported Michelangelo Pipan (interview IT1, 05 September 2007).  
Hans Reiner Friedrich, Director General for Higher Education, represented Germany. But 
he did not receive much support from his Minister in the preparation of the Bologna declaration. 
Edelgard Buhlmann replaced Jürgen Rüttgers after the general elections in September 1998. 
Edelgard Buhlmann, just like Ortensio Zecchino in Italy, saw the Bologna process as less of a 
priority in comparison to domestic reforms (interviews IT1, 05 September 2007; IT2, 06 
September 2007; D2, 19 September 2007). The representatives in charge of the preparation of the 
Bologna deliberations were therefore different from the original ones.  
Different attitudes of the representatives  
In addition, representatives in the Bologna deliberations started off with different 
alignments of attitudes than during the Sorbonne deliberations.  
Participants of the Bologna preparations deliberated extensively on the level of delegation 
to the European Union in addition to the level of state control on higher education112. During the 
Sorbonne deliberations, the four Ministers did not want to delegate powers to the European 
Union and did not extensively deliberate on the issue of its involvement. Delegation according to 
them would have meant a loss of national sovereignty in the area of higher education with a risk 
of agency drift, involving other member states of the European Union and going through the EU 
                                               
112 Attitudes on delegation to the European Union were not related to attitudes on state intervention in higher 
education. The European Union generally adopted an economically liberal perspective. But a representative with an 
economically liberal official position did not necessarily favour European delegation for that reason (for example 
such as British representatives).  
Chapter 6 Learning and strategies in the Sorbonne and Bologna declarations 
 
 163 
institutional process. This integration with the EU implied longer negotiations which could result 
in non-adoption (interviews FM1, 02 April 2007; UKM1 02 February 2007). The increase in the 
number of participatory states reopened the debate on delegation to the European Union.  
Certain participants were clearly in favour of delegation to the European Union. Those 
participants included the staff from the Commission, who saw the Bologna process as a 
continuation of their integrationist efforts of the 1990s (interview, EF3, 12 September 2007).  The 
Human resources, education, training and youth task force of the European Commission113 
indeed published a memorandum in 1991. This memorandum encouraged member states to 
promote student and staff mobility across Europe and the world, a greater cross-national 
recognition of diplomas and a system of external quality assurance. It also urged member states to 
reform higher education, in the area of funding and management. Using their competencies on 
internal market, European Union institutions initiated a series of directives aiming at promoting 
the recognition of qualifications (for example directive 93/96/EEC and directive 89/48/EEC). 
In addition, the European Commission restated those views in a Green paper Obstacles to 
transnational mobility on the 2nd of October 1996. The Sorbonne declaration promoted this 
objective and cohered with to the interests of the representatives of the European Commission.  
The German representative Hans Reiner Friedrich appeared very supportive of the 
European Commission during the Sorbonne follow-up group. For example, during the meeting 
of the 5th of February 1999, Hans Reiner Friedrich suggested taking the issues derived from the 
Sorbonne declaration to the Community level. And during the meeting of the 26th of March 1999, 
Hans Reiner Friedrich supported the use of the EU initiative ECTS as a credit system of 
                                               
113 This task force became the Directorate general for Education and Culture – DG EAC - in January 1995 
(European Commission, 2006). For member states’ responses to the memorandum, see Human resources education 
training and youth task force (1993).  
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reference for the Bologna process (BMWV, 1999)114. This marked a contrast with the agreement 
made by Jürgen Rüttgers, Volker Rieke and Wolfgang Moenikes for the Sorbonne declaration to 
keep the process outside the remit of European institutions.  
Hans Reiner Friedrich also had different attitudes from the German representative who attended 
the ministerial conference of the 18th-19th of June and signed the declaration, Wolf-Michael 
Catenhusen, Parliamentary State Secretary. Wolf-Michael Catenhusen declared himself to be fully 
supportive of Claude Allègre, knowing that Claude Allègre’s stance during the deliberation of the 
18th -19th of June was to have the Bologna declaration adopted as an intergovernmental process 
(interview, D3 19 September 2007).  
Michelangelo Pipan, who wrote a draft of the Bologna declaration on the 26th of March 
and revised it for the 5th of May 1999, also appeared very pro-delegation to the European Union 
(see evidence in next section on ‘Elements of compromise in the Bologna declaration’). Here 
again, this seems to be a shift of attitude from the Sorbonne declaration, that Michelangelo Pipan 
negotiated for Luigi Berlinguer on the basis that the declaration would remain outside the remit of 
the European Union.  
Yet, the Italian representatives Michelangelo Pipan and Antonella Cammisa, backed by the 
Deputy Minister for University Affairs Luciano Guerzoni, also requested the attendance of 
French and British representatives (who opposed EU integration) to the meetings of the working 
group during the first meeting of the 15th of December 1998 (BMWV, 1998). They hoped that the 
French, UK and German representatives would side with them to promote the Bologna 
declaration. They hosted a dinner on the 14th of February 1999 with Catherine Bizot and Michel 
Guyot from France, in addition to Imogen Wilde from the UK Higher education funding and 
                                               
114 ECTS stands for European Credit Transfer System. It was proposed in the Andonnino report on a people’s 
Europe, adopted by the Milan European Council of June 1985 (Ad hoc committee on a people’s Europe, 1985). 
ECTS made the transfer of study credits between higher education establishments within the European Community 
possible (Commission, 2006: 100-119).  
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organisation division of the Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) (Wilde, 1999) 
115. This dinner concluded with a moderate success for the Italians with no apparent coalition 
emerging between the four original signatories. Claude Allègre’s representatives, in particular 
Catherine Bizot from his cabinet, carried on his wishes not to integrate the Sorbonne declaration 
into the remit of the European Union. Participants therefore had different attitudes regarding EU 
delegation at the beginning of the preparations for the Bologna declaration. 
Elements of compromise in the Bologna deliberations 
Participants did not confess to having changed their attitudes as a reaction to other 
participants’ arguments as they did during the Sorbonne deliberations or during the interviews 
conducted for this research. In a way confessing attitude change may have been difficult for the 
representatives in the Bologna deliberations. Those representatives were different in profile from 
the ones who negotiated the Sorbonne deliberations. Instead of being principals, i.e. ministers or 
their close political advisors, many were civil servants from ministries’ administrations or other 
organisations. They were tied to representing the official attitudes of their organisation. And 
although they may have changed their attitudes privately, a public admission would have meant 
that this change would have become the official government position, something which was 
outside their mandate to decide.  
Some representatives however polarised their official attitudes. For example, the British 
Minister and her team strengthened her anti-European Union attitude as a reaction to the first 
Italian draft. At the beginning of the Bologna deliberations, Tessa Blackstone had the intention of 
getting other ministers (implicitly including herself) to sign the Bologna declaration (Dee, 1999). 
                                               
115 Tony Clark, the Director of Higher Education who prepared the Sorbonne declaration, did not follow-up on the 
preparation of the Bologna declaration. The UK team who joined the deliberations was different from the one from 
the Sorbonne declaration. A team of civil servants from the Higher education funding and organisation division, 
including Imogen Wilde, Roger Smith and from the International students team, i.e. Andy Walls, at the DfEE 
represented the UK under the direction of Tessa Blackstone. The note by Wilde (1999) also explains that the German 
representative Hans Reiner Friedrich could not attend because of travel difficulties although he was invited. 
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However, she then distanced herself from the Bologna declaration, considering the option of not 
signing, upon several recommendations from Andy Walls from the International Students Team 
from the 7th of May 1999 (Blackstone, 1999; Walls, 1999/1999b/1999c/1999d)116.  
Overall, the Bologna declaration was more the result of a compromise in the sense that it 
aimed at accommodating as many different attitudes as possible than a consensus on harmonised 
attitudes. This compromise is inferred mostly from a comparison between the drafts which 
appeared at several stages of the deliberations (on the 26th of  March, the 5th of May and the 19th of 
June 1999), in addition to the minutes from the follow-up group meetings and interviews of 
participants.  
Two drafts were deliberated on the 26th of March 1999, one by Italian Michelangelo Pipan, 
the other one by Guy Haug, the expert from the CRE/Confederation funded by the European 
Commission. Michelangelo Pipan then merged those two drafts into a third one issued on the 5th 
of May 1999, which was sent to all participants served as the basis for the final declaration of the 
19th of June 1999117. Although the draft of the 5th of May 1999 was similar in shape to the one of 
the 19th of June 1999, the final draft was the result of some key compromises, especially regarding 
European integration, the design of degrees and competition between universities (see appendix 
for a full comparison between those drafts including other objects).  
                                               
116 The Dutch also considered not sending a minister (Walls, 1999c).  
117 The comparison between those drafts complements the minutes, interviews and archives on the deliberations 
which took place in the working group. Minutes of the Bologna deliberations of the 18th -19th of June are not 
available. And since the deliberation of 18 June took place behind closed doors, there are no written accounts of the 
input of the countries which did not take part in working group deliberations. For example, Spain was reported to 
have been one of the most vocal countries in its opposition to the Bologna declaration (Meynadier, 1998b/1998c; 
interviews FM1, 02 April 2007; D3, 19 September 2007; IT3, 6 September 2007; FPA4, 09 September 2007). 
However, the Spanish opposition was not about the content of the reform, which they were planning on adopting, 
but rather about the diplomatic offense created by the exclusion of Spain from the Sorbonne declaration (Meynadier, 
1998c). Ireland, Portugal, Sweden and the Netherlands were also reported to have been concerned about the wording 
of the declaration on the 17th of June 1999 (Walls, 1999d). Countries which required adhesion to the European Union 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Hungary and the Czech Republic) generally 
followed the European Commission’s trends, in the hope of gaining points toward adhesion (interview IT5, 05 
September 2007). But this research has not been able to access any record of the contributions of these countries to 
the final declaration.  
Chapter 6 Learning and strategies in the Sorbonne and Bologna declarations 
 
 167 
Table 14: Compromise regarding European integration 
 
Pro-integrationists Anti-integrationists Final declaration 
‘single European currency’ No reference to single 
European currency 
No reference to single 
European currency 
 ‘ECTS system’ No reference to ECTS ‘such as the ECTS system’ 
‘also through the Diploma 
supplement’ 
We, ministers in charge of higher 
education in the Member states of 
the European Union and other 
European countries’ 
 ‘Several European countries’ 
Treaty of Amsterdam an 
important instrument 
No reference to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam 
No reference 
Resort to the Commission that has 
played an important role in 
promoting the Europe of knowledge’ 
No reference to the European 
Commission 
No reference 
‘In the framework of the European 
Union’ 
No reference to the European 
Union 
‘ways of intergovernmental 
cooperation, together with those of 
non governmental European 
organisations with competence on 
higher education’ 
European dimension of higher 
education 
 European dimension of higher 
education 
Development of common criteria and 
methodologies in quality assurance 
Cooperation in quality assurance Cooperation in quality assurance 
 
The question of delegation to the European Union constituted an example of such 
compromise. Table 14 compares the arguments of two opposite sides during deliberations on the 
final declaration. Those two sides included: pro-integrationists, such as Michelangelo Pipan, the 
expert Guy Haug, the German representative Hans Reiner Friedrich, and naturally Angelika Verli 
from the European Commission, who supported references to the European Union. Anti-
integrationists included the British, French and Austrian representatives.  
Both drafts of the 26th of March 1999 were much more pro-delegation than the final 
version, acknowledging the key role of European Union institutions and the EU member states, 
and incorporating the policy instruments developed by the European Commission in the 
declaration. The draft by Guy Haug stressed the European Union by starting with: ‘We, ministers in 
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charge of higher education in the Member states of the European Union and other European countries’. The 
Italian draft mentioned the Treaty of Amsterdam as an ‘important instrument’ and recommended to 
‘resort to the Commission that has played an important role in promoting the Europe of knowledge’. This draft 
also compared the reform of degrees to the creation of a ‘single European higher education currency’. 
Finally, it referred to the European dimension of higher education as a directly related to the 
European Union programme Socrates118.  
The draft of the 5th of May 1999, from the Italian representatives, remained pro-delegation 
as mentioned earlier.  It suggested: ‘we will pursue the ways of intergovernmental cooperation and those in the 
framework of the European Union.’ It also recommended the use of the European Commission tool 
ECTS as the credit system to measure the content of degrees and the inclusion of quality 
assurance, which had been on the Commission’s agenda since the Socrates programme of 
1993/1994 raised the question of the evaluation of teaching (Commission, 2006: 194)119.  
But the question of the extent to which the declaration should integrate with the European 
Union divided participants. The Austrian, British and French representatives requested the 
elimination of the term ‘single European currency’ (Walls, 1999). There were also many rumours 
regarding the distance that Claude Allègre imposed on the European Commission on the day of 
the Bologna meeting (interview, EU2, 12 September 2007; EF3, 12 September 2007). The British 
Minister and her team consistently refused that the Bologna process should be integrated with the 
European Union framework, contesting the references listed above (Blackstone, 1999; Dee, 1999; 
Smith, 1999/1999b; Walls, 1999/99b/99c/99d; Wilde, 1999).  
                                               
118 Socrates aimed at promoting the European dimension of education, improving the knowledge of European 
languages, promoted mobility and co-operation, innovation and equal opportunities. Socrates I took place between 
1994 and the 31st of December 1999 and Socrates II replaced it on the 24th of January 2000 until 2006 (Commission, 
2006). 
119 References to quality assurance emerged in particular in Action III.3.1 of Socrates I ‘Questions of common 
interest in education policy’ and Action 6.1 of Socrates II on the observation of education systems and policies. In its 
resolution of 17th of December 1999, the Council of education ministers identified the quality of education as one of 
the priority issues to be examined (Commission, 2006: 194).  
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The final version of the declaration took into account the objections of these countries. It 
still supported the European Union’s existing programmes, with references to the European 
dimension of higher education and quality assurance.  But it toned down some political 
statements. Instead of starting with a reference to member states of the European Union, as the 
draft by Guy Haug of the 26th of March 1999 did, the final declaration only alluded to: ‘several 
European countries’, which ‘have accepted the invitation to commit themselves to achieving the objectives set out in 
the declaration’. Finally, the statement ‘in the framework of the European Union’ became the ‘ways of 
intergovernmental cooperation, together with those of non governmental European organisations with competence on 
higher education’.  
The final version of the declaration also toned down the use of ECTS as the recommended 
credit system referring to it as an example rather than the sole credit measurement instrument: 
‘Establishment of a system of credits – such as in the ECTS system – as a proper means of promoting the most 
widespread student mobility’. On the other hand, the final declaration included a recommendation for 
another instrument: the Diploma supplement120. The Diploma supplement counterbalanced the 
weight of the European Commission and ECTS, since the Council of Europe and 
UNESCO/CEPES were involved in the development of the Diploma supplement. 
 
Table 15: Compromise regarding the design of degrees 
 
Proponents Opponents  Final declaration 
‘the first (cycle) of three years’ No specification on the length of degrees ‘A minimum of three years’ 
 
                                               
120 The Diploma supplement was an initiative of the European Commission, the Council of Europe and 
UNESCO/CEPES, which started in 1997/98. It consisted of an administrative annex to the diploma that described 
the studies undertaken (Commission, 2006: 135).  
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Other examples of compromise included the length of degrees (Table 15121). On the one 
hand, some participants favoured the insertion of a minimal length of degrees. Michelangelo 
Pipan inserted a minimal length in his drafts. The Italian draft of the 26th of March 1999 indeed 
mentioned: ‘the first (cycle) of three years’. A specification of the length of degrees added legitimacy 
to the reforms which were taking place in Italy at the time (Wilde, 1999).  
But the specification of the length of degrees did not suit all countries. The more precise 
the declaration was going to be, the more resistant ministers would be. Guy Haug had gained 
awareness of the sensitivity of ministers since he conducted his research for his report on the 
Sorbonne declaration. He therefore did not specify a length of degree in his draft, not to create 
disagreements with various countries with different systems (see also Haug, 1999; Haug and 
Kerstein 1999).  
The French and British representatives opposed the insertion of a length for degrees (Walls, 
1999b). Claude Allègre agreed with the principle of a three years’ degree since he was reforming 
his undergraduate degree in a similar way, as appeared in the Attali report (1998). But he also 
wanted to remain general with regard to the length of degrees (Meynadier, 1999). This was 
probably because it would guarantee more adhesion to the declaration. Three years’ 
undergraduate degrees were common practice in England. But the British representatives feared 
that a specification of the lengths of degrees would be incompatible with two-year accelerated 
degrees, i.e. fast-tracked undergraduate degrees (Walls, 1999b). The Finnish and Austrian 
                                               
121 Table 15 does not refer to proponents or opponents of European delegation or state control, because participants 
favoured or opposed the inclusion of a length for the undergraduate degree for different reasons. For example, 
Michelangelo Pipan aimed at pushing for economically liberal reforms in his country and favoured the inclusion of a 
three year degree. But the British and French representatives, who had the same reform objectives, did not want a 
minimal length of degrees to be included. And Hans Reiner Friedrich, although he was pro EU-delegation, was more 
moderate regarding the length of degrees than Michelangelo Pipan. These different reasons for supporting or not the 
inclusion of the length of degrees do not question the relationship between willingness to shorten degrees and the 
university-centred perspective. This relationship however can become more blurred in a context where domestic or 
self-interests need to be maintained.  
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representatives also appeared to have both refused the inclusion of the length of degrees and the 
reference to ‘two cycles’ because of the clash with their own system (Wilde, 1999/BMWV: 1999).   
Hans Reiner Friedrich solved this opposition by proposing a compromise with the 
inclusion of a ‘minimum of three years’ (BMVW: 1999). The final version adopted this suggestion. 
This suited many representatives who were worried about the fit of their countries’ longer 
degrees, such as representatives from Germany, Austria and Finland at the same time as 
accommodating the representatives from countries who wanted to have a specification of the 
length of degrees such as Italy, although it admittedly did not suit a minority of participants, i.e. 
those in favour of shorter degrees such as British representatives.  
 
Table 16: Compromise regarding competition 
 
Proponents Opponents Final agreement 
Competitiveness a key 
theme of the process 
Recognition of the cultural 
role of higher education 
‘We must look with special attention at the 
objective to increase the international 
competitiveness of the European system of 
higher education. (…)  We need to ensure 
that the European system of higher education 
acquires in the world a degree of attraction 
equal to our extraordinary cultural and 
scientific tradition’ 
 
Compromises were also reached on more entrenched objects, although those objects, 
precisely because they are more entrenched and hence more implicit, were the subject of fewer 
deliberations and led to mostly general statements of principles as opposed to setting out a 
particular instrument. The topic of competition between universities led to many disagreements 
(Table 16). The British representatives and the expert commissioned by the European 
Commission were in favour of making competitiveness a key theme of the Bologna declaration 
(BMWV, 1999). No participant criticised a reference to the competivitity of higher education, 
aware that the declaration was promoting a university-centred perspective. But representatives 
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from states with a tradition of state control, such as Austria, wanted to add the cultural role of 
higher education (interview AT2, 12th of September 2007). Such inclusion broadened the appeal 
of the declaration to individuals from other perspectives without suppressing its university-
centred tendency.  The original draft presented by Italy on the 26th of March 1999 made no 
allusion to the cultural dimension of higher education. But the draft of the 5th of May 1999 
balanced references to international competitiveness with references to the cultural role of higher 
education, a version which was adopted nearly without revisions on the 19th of June 1999.  
To sum up, the Bologna declaration was the result of a compromise rather than a 
consensus. Participants did not admit to having changed their attitudes. Besides, the final 
declaration comprised a mixture between the preceding drafts and the representatives’ suggestions 
aiming at being as all-encompassing as possible.  
The preponderance of strategic motivations 
Strategic motivations dominated the Bologna deliberations. Such motivations aimed at 
preserving one’s political profile domestically or internationally and/or promoting domestic 
reforms.  
Tessa Blackstone and her staff strengthened their positions against delegation to the 
European Union because they had to manage domestic actors. On the one hand, she was aware 
that a delegation of the Bologna declaration to the European Union institutions could increase 
pressure to implement EU recommendations and make the UK higher education sector unhappy 
(Interview UKCM1, 24 April 2007). Accepting the delegation of the process to the European 
Union would have implied that the UK agreed to have its universities implement European 
Community actions in higher education, such as ECTS. But as mentioned earlier, Tessa 
Blackstone convinced higher education institutions that she was right to sign the Sorbonne 
declaration (without consulting them a priori) because it would not lead to any need for changes 
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in the UK. By agreeing to insert the Bologna process in the EU, Tessa Blackstone would risk 
losing credibility vis-à-vis national higher education institutions.  
A failure to sign the declaration, as suggested during the deliberations (Walls, 1999) was not 
very costly in the domestic sphere, since the UK did not rely on referring to the European 
dimension to facilitate any national reforms, unlike Italy, France or Germany. Moreover, she 
could limit the reputational costs of not signing  so long as she adopted the consistent view that 
there was no need for the UK to sign because the process aimed at making continental countries 
adopt the Anglo-Saxon model (Walls, 1999).  
On the other hand, Tessa Blackstone probably wanted the Bologna declaration to be signed 
and do well. Since she was part of the original signatories to the process, the Bologna declaration 
being taken up by many more countries would increase her political reputation. Moreover, not 
signing could have diplomatic consequences and leave the country relatively isolated. In this 
context, it was important for Tessa Blackstone to endorse the declaration, but also to make sure 
that the declaration would not go much further and promote more European integration than 
agreed in the Sorbonne declaration. That is why her representatives suggested many modifications 
to the drafts and sometimes threatened to retract Tessa Blackstone’s adhesion while at the same 
time investing resources to make persuasive proposals and supporting the process.  
The Italian representatives had a strategic motivation in being in favour of delegation to the 
European Union. Interviewees put forward several reasons for Italy’s pro-delegation stance. One 
of them was the Europeanist attitude of the diplomat Michelangelo Pipan (interview IT1, 05 
September 2007). A second one was the friendship between Luigi Berlinguer and the Director 
General for Higher Education at the then DG XXII of the European Commission, Domenico 
Lenarduzzi, who was also Italian (interview EF3, 12 September 2007; IT3, 06 September 2007). 
But those were not the only reasons. Massimo D’Alema, the Italian Prime Minister of the time, 
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was looking into placing Romano Prodi as President of the European Commission and probably 
wanted to gain credit for Italy vis-à-vis the European Union122.  
In Germany, Hans Reiner Friedrich understood that Germany had an interest in being 
actively pro-EU delegation. The country had the presidency of the Council from January to July 
1999. Inserting the Bologna deliberations within the European Union would constitute an 
achievement to mark the presidency of the country and Hans Reiner Friedrich was therefore pro-
European in his behaviour during the deliberations of the follow-up group. At the same time, 
Wolf-Michael Catenhusen had an interest in supporting Claude Allègre against delegation to the 
European Union. The reputation of Germany would have been damaged were the Bologna 
declaration to fail. It would have shown that the original Sorbonne signatories could not obtain 
the support of other European member states.   
Claude Allègre entertained the same strategic motivation of wanting the Bologna 
declaration to be taken on board by a variety of member states to increase his political reputation. 
He possessed a lot of leverage to convince member states, since he hosted the Sorbonne 
declaration, and was described as campaigning hard to convince member states to sign the 
declaration in the final deliberations of the 18th-19th of June 1999, which were described as 
‘difficult’ (interview IT5, 05 September 2007). Wolf-Michael Catenhusen thus needed to show 
cohesion with the French to get the declaration adopted.  
Explaining the absence of convergence induced by learning in the Bologna deliberations  
The Bologna deliberations took place under different conditions than the Sorbonne 
deliberations, preventing a convergence of attitudes based on learning.  
In the Sorbonne deliberations, convergence occurred because it fitted the pursuit of 
strategic motivations. Strategic motivations also played a very significant role in the Bologna 
                                               
122 Romano Prodi became President of the European Commission in September 1999.  
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deliberations. But in the Sorbonne deliberations, the French, Italian and German ministers had 
similar strategic motivations, aiming at domestic reforms in the same economically liberal 
direction. In the Bologna deliberations, strategic motivations differed between participants, with 
some actors wanting to integrate the declaration with the European Community while others did 
not for example. Those differences in strategic motivations prevented learning and convergence.  
Deliberations for declarations involved innovative minorities: Jürgen Rüttgers suggested the three 
year degree in the Sorbonne preparations and Guy Haug in addition to Angelika Verli suggested 
the insertion of Community instruments in the declaration. While Rüttgers’ idea suited the 
strategies of his colleagues who therefore converged toward his attitude, the latter participants 
took longer to convince others of their ideas. And the insertion of Community instruments could 
have been more due to the power exercised by the Commission on the funding of the Bologna 
process than to a genuine learning process where other participants came to converge in their 
views.  
Moreover, trust facilitated convergence induced by learning. In the Sorbonne deliberations, 
Claude Allègre, Luigi Berlinguer and Jürgen Rüttgers knew each other from various meetings and 
had similar interests in reforming their respective countries. This promoted a climate of trust, 
where the Ministers felt that they could be open to each other’s arguments in an informal way 
which speeded up the deliberations. In the Bologna deliberations, the different participants did 
not know each other as much and did not have the same informal relationships.  
Thirdly, the profession of participants also affected the visibility of changes in attitudes. 
Ministers in the Sorbonne deliberations were principals. The decisions they made had more 
consequences politically and were more traceable. Hence their changes of attitudes were more 
perceptible. In Italy, Luigi Berlinguer had to reverse the process of reforms which had already 
started after he changed his attitude, facing the opposition of various domestic actors and he 
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encountered the risk of being perceived as inconsistent and lacking credibility. The implication of 
this change of mind at the ministerial level is very powerful in the context of deliberative 
governance. It shows that the force of the better argument can lead to the sacrifice of consistency 
and to political confrontation with other domestic actors, raising uncertainty regarding one’s 
political future. The agents who deliberated on the Bologna deliberation may have changed their 
private attitudes, but those changes wee not visible, because they were tied to representing their 
ministry or organisation and only public changes of attitudes are traceable. 
Finally, convergence occurred more easily in the Sorbonne deliberations because it included 
mostly one object, i.e. the reform of university degrees, and this object was relatively less 
entrenched. In the Bologna deliberations, participants had to deliberate on more objects, 
including more entrenched ones such as competition.  
 
In conclusion, deliberations to prepare for the Sorbonne and Bologna declarations allowed 
participants to agree on particular outcomes, namely the creation of a European higher education 
area, articulated around a reform of degrees and since Bologna of quality assurance. Two 
deliberative mechanisms led to the achievement of these agreements.  First, strategic motivations 
acted as the main mechanism promoting political agreement in deliberations preceding the 
Sorbonne declaration of the 25th of May 1998 and Bologna declaration of the 19th of June 1999.  
Second, Ministers also confessed that they learnt from each other and made their attitudes 
converge in the Sorbonne deliberations toward a consensual decision (hypothesis 1). This 
convergence depended on the level of entrenchment and number of objects deliberated on 
(hypothesis 3), the trust between participants, and the profession of those participants in addition 
to strategic motivations. The Bologna declaration took longer because of different levels of trust 
among participants, different professions and the number of objects deliberated on in addition to 
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a greater diversity of attitudes, and the agreement resulted in a compromise reflecting diverse 
strategic positions. The next chapter explores how those changes in attitudes and actors’ strategies 
relate to domestic decisions and policy changes.  
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The third lens of analysis underlines the impact of the Sorbonne and Bologna deliberations 
on the content of domestic policies in France and England. To understand the impact of 
deliberations, it compares the period immediately before the Bologna process (mid 1980s-1997) to 
the period following the beginning of the process (1998-2007). This chapter continues the critical 
assessment of the constructivist hypothesis, which predicts that after participants harmonise their 
attitudes during meetings and agree on a common outcome, they make consistent policy decisions 
in their home countries, which results in overall policy convergence. Chapter 6 showed that 
policy-makers agreed on a deliberative outcome.  
But transferring this agreement into a convergence of policy contents is not necessarily 
automatic. For policy contents to converge, participants from different countries need to have a 
similar commitment to reforms in addition to similar goals, something which does not 
automatically happen as the previous chapter showed. The British, French, Italian and German 
Ministers shared the same goal of creating a European higher education area when signing the 
Sorbonne declaration. But the British Minister had less commitment to subsequently launch 
domestic reforms than the French, Italian and German Ministers by arguing that she already had 
the system in place and not publicising it to domestic actors. And some actors, such as the French 
Minister were more interested in using the Sorbonne and Bologna declarations as a justification 
for domestic reforms than others, such as the British Minister. Following this logic, the French 
Minister should refer to the Sorbonne and Bologna declarations in connection to reform plans 
more than the British Minister. 
Moreover, changes in individual attitudes and goal convergence occurred mostly in qualifications 
frameworks and quality control, i.e. less entrenched areas, and less in other areas such as financial 
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contributions and to some extent institutional management (chapters 5 and 6). Hence the 
Bologna process should result in policy content convergence firstly in the areas of qualifications 
framework and quality control.  
Policy convergence, if it occurred at all, would have resulted in more policy changes in 
some countries than others. The recommendations made by the Sorbonne and Bologna 
declarations, in their general form, contained some similarities with the higher education system in 
place in England. For example the harmonisation of higher education qualifications into 
undergraduate and postgraduate levels, with the first cycle lasting a minimum of three years was 
already the norm in England. Hence France’s general policy content will become more similar to 
England (β-convergence). This means that for such a change of policy content to occur, French 
officials may have to adapt their policy styles as well, to manage the expectations of non-state 
actors.  
This chapter adds that the Bologna process has deeper implications for higher education in 
France than the literature on the Bologna process generally foresees. The literature tends to 
concentrate on changes in qualifications frameworks (Witte, 2006). But changes in qualifications 
frameworks facilitate cross-national comparison and competition between higher education 
institutions, in turn questioning existing paradigms on how to best equip universities’ 
management and finances in a competitive environment. The Bologna process, at least in France, 
stimulates cognitive changes facilitating the reform of policy contents on more entrenched policy 
objects.  
This chapter first analyses to what extent a convergence of policy contents has occurred 
between France and England from the mid-1980s, on the design of degrees, quality control, 
institutional management and financial contribution, which are the objects of the network 
structure of attitudes constructed in chapter 3. Second, the chapter assesses the mechanisms 
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through which Bologna process deliberations influenced any changes. Such an investigation 
concludes that the deliberative governance was, especially in the case of France, not the sole 
stimulus for reforms. But deliberations had a more subtle role as a facilitator of reforms at the 
cognitive level. They complemented other domestic factors promoting change, such as political 
commitment, by diffusing a paradigm to other domestic actors,123 improving the relationship 
between the Government and trade unions and facilitating the adoption of previously impossible 
reforms.   
Changes in policy content in France and England mid-1980s-2007  
France had more changes in policy content related to the Bologna process than England. 
Table 17: Direction and intensity of reforms in England and France over four policy 
objects 
 
 Design of degrees Quality control 
 England France England France 
From mid 1980s -3 0 3 2 
From late1990s 0 3 3 2 
From mid 2000s 0 3 3 3 
 
 Financial contribution Institutional management 
 England France England France 
From mid 1980s 3 1 3 3 
From late 1990s 3 1 0 1 
From mid 2000s 3 2 0 3 
Coding 
3 Reforms, i.e. new regulation or body created   
2 Proposals to reform 
1 Attempts to reform but nothing adopted 
0 No attempt to reform 
A positive sign denotes a movement toward a university-centred perspective. A negative sign denotes a 
movement toward a state-centred perspective  
 
Table 17 summarises the directions of reforms which have taken place in France and 
England since the mid-1980s. Table 17 is more normative than factual in the sense that it frames 
                                               
123 See chapter 3 for a definition of paradigm.  
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the description of domestic reforms within the framework of state versus university-centred 
perspectives detailed in chapter 3124. The table indicates that most changes were university-centred 
(since most numbers are positive). Moreover, the changes in England appeared to be independent 
from the beginning of the Bologna process in the late 1990s. Reforms in the late 1990s continued 
trends established in the 1980s or diminished in pace, going from adopting reforms (-3) to no 
attempt to reform (0) in the design of degrees or being maintained at the level of reforms (3) in 
financial contribution and quality control. In France, the reforms were more synchronous with 
the beginning of the Bologna process. Reforms started particularly in the area of design of 
degrees, moving from 0 to 3. In other areas, actual reforms replaced the many failed attempts and 
proposals of the earlier period (moving from 1 or 2 to 2 or 3).    
Reforms in the design of degrees 
English and French reforms have occurred at a different pace regarding the design of 
degrees but the countries have ultimately converged in the general structure of their degrees as 
expected by the theoretical predictions made in chapter 3.  
                                               
124 For a summary of reforms corresponding to this classification, see development below and tables 18 to 21.   
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Table 18: Reforms in the design of degrees in England and France 
 
 England  France 
1985 Government encouraged the development of vocational first 
degrees. 
  
1989   10 th of July: loi d’orientation sur l’éducation, also called loi Jospin 
creates the Instituts Universitaires de Formation de Maîtres 
(IUFMs).  
1992  Introduction of experimental two-year degrees.   26th of May: order regarding first and second cycle degrees  
1998  Creation of EducationUK. November: creation of Edufrance 
October to December: Government documents on 
European harmonisation 
1999   January: beginning of consultations in CNESER. 
20th of August: adoption of decree on the  creation of the 
grade de mastaire (decree n 99-747)   
17th of November: order creating a vocational three-year 
undergraduate degree called license professionnelle 
2001   Lang publishes report Construction of the European higher 
education area: orientations for a new stage  
2002   April: framework decrees and orders  
14th of November: implementation circular  
2003 UniversitiesUK creates a Europe unit and a High level policy 
forum 
3rd of September: implementation circular  
2004   12th of May: implementation circular  
2005   Inspection générale report on the implementation of the 'LMD' 
reform 
2007 May: London hosts ministerial meeting/ 
Parliamentary inquiry into the Bologna process. 
Comité de suivi license recognises the need for 
professionalisation in all undegraduate degrees in document 
Pour une License qualifiante: recommandations des comités de suivi de 
la license et de la license professionnelle 
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Degree reforms in France 
Table 18 compares the reforms having taken place in England and France in the area of 
design of degrees. It shows that the reforms related to degrees were more frequent and related to 
European integration in France than in England from 1998. French Government officials took 
advantage of the impulse provided by the Sorbonne declaration of the 25th of May 1998 to reform 
domestic higher education policy. During the first academic term after the Sorbonne declaration 
was signed, they proposed an extensive reform of degrees entitled ‘3-5-8’ after the denomination 
used in the Attali report (1998) and later on LMD (for license master doctorat). But the relationship 
between Government and institutions changed as a result of the Government’s style of 
implementation.  
No overarching reform to reorganise the diverse landscape of degrees occurred between the 
mid-1980s and 1998. On the 10th of July 1989, Lionel Jospin issued a Blueprint law on education 
(loi d’orientation sur l’éducation, also called ‘loi Jospin’), which stressed mostly primary and secondary 
education125. And in 1992, an order of the 26th of May reformed university degrees up to the level 
of the maîtrise, introducing more guidance and information for students, creating modules, and 
confirming the centralised habilitation process, whereby the Ministry had to approve the right for 
higher education institutions to deliver a particular diploma.  
A much more comprehensive reform of degrees occurred after the Sorbonne declaration. 
Claude Allègre chose a relatively deliberative mode of implementation following the informal 
character of the Sorbonne deliberations. This mode of implementation consisted of consultation 
with domestic non-state actors followed by a circular instating the principle of voluntary 
participation. The consultation which started the reforms insisted on the link with European 
                                               
125 The only provision relevant to tertiary education was article 17, which created institutes aiming at training primary 
and secondary school teachers, called IUFMs.   
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developments. The reforms started with a broad consultation in the Comité National de 
l’Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche (CNESER)126 of the 25th and 26th of January 1999 entitled 
‘European harmonisation’ to convince representatives of the French trade unions of the new for 
the reforms127. A document was then circulated on the 28th of October 1998 called 
‘implementation of European harmonisation of higher education’ (Pearly, 1999). And a circular 
letter of the 17th of December 1998 recommended universities to design their contractual policy 
to facilitate ‘European harmonisation’ (Demichel and Garden, 1998).  
Consultations lasted from January until the autumn of 1999. They led to a decree on the 
creation of the grade de mastaire on the 20th of August 1999 (decree n° 99-747) and the order of 17th 
of November 1999 creating a vocational three-year undergraduate degree called license 
professionnelle. The creation of grades came as an alternative to the suppression of the national 
diplomas, an option faced with significant opposition from the student movement (interview 
FCM2, 22 May 2007)128.   
Those reforms went beyond a mere change in the structure of degrees into three levels and 
the length of degrees into three, five and eight years. They stimulated debate on a large number of 
topics, such as selection for universities (Ferry, 2002; interviews FTUS 2, 04 June 2007; FF2, 21 
May 2007 and FF3, 16 May 2007) and the value of higher education degrees for the job market 
(CNESER, 1999; Comité de suivi license, 2007; interview FF3, 16 May 2007).  
                                               
126 The CNESER was created by law n° 46-1084 of 18th of May 1946. 
127 The trade unions landscape in France was fragmented. There were many trade unions: for higher education staff, 
the main union was the left-wing SNESUP, but there was also the FSU (now merged with the SNESUP), the SGEN, 
the FEN, and the CGT. For students, the main trade union was the left-wing UNEF, but there were also the more 
moderate FAGE, UNI, and PDE. For company owners, the main trade union was the MEDEF.  
128 The creation of the grade de mastaire was largely the undertaking of Francine Demichel, the Director General of 
Higher Education. Francine Demichel found a Napoleonian decree which underlined three grades in French higher 
education (interviews FM1, 02 April 2007; FMC2, 22 May 2007; FF4, 7 June 2007 and FPA3, 7 June 2007). She used 
this text to give legal legitimacy to the transformation of the French degree structure to include bachelor, master and 
doctorate degrees. 
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One of the most significant changes brought forward by this reform concerned the 
relationship between the Government and higher education institutions in the definition of 
curricula. Before this reform, the Government decided on the content of degrees in the maquettes 
nationales. The maquettes nationales corresponded to an example of a priori control requiring rule 
enforcement which assumed a strong role for the Sate129.  
Claude Allègre also chose to implement changes in degrees on a voluntary basis through the 
contractual policy130 (Demichel and Garner, 1998). This led universities to think about their 
course content to fit the three level structure without direction from the Government. This mode 
of implementation favoured diversification and competition across the offer of courses between 
universities, which broke up with the homogenising tradition of the maquettes nationales (interviews 
FCM2, 22 May 2007; FF4, 7 June 2007; FCM4, 19 June 2007). And it forced higher education 
institutions to become more autonomous in their offer of courses, stepping away from the 
maquettes nationales. But some trade union members were not in favour of such autonomy in 
implementation, estimating that it increased the workload for university staff members (interview 
FTUA1, 05 May 2007).  
Jack Lang, reputed for being closer to the trade unions than Claude Allègre (Garrick, 2000; 
Interview, FCM2, 22  May 2007)131, allegedly bowed to their requests for more regulation after 
consultations in early 2001 (MEN, 2001/2001b). He recognised the need for the Government to 
provide more orientation to universities and the need for a framework text (Lang, 2001). And he 
                                               
129 To some extent, one could argue that this form of control did not impinge much on the autonomy of higher 
education institutions. Indeed, the higher education sector had a role to play in determining the maquettes nationales, 
since those maquettes were defined by expert academics; and provided mostly general areas to cover instead of a very 
precise content. However, only a small group of academics commissioned by the Minister contributed to the design 
of those maquettes, as opposed to each academic choosing the content of his courses. Moreover, however imprecise 
the guidelines of the maquettes were, they still remained prescriptive and required compliance. 
130 See definition of the contractual policy in the discussion of institutional management later on in this chapter.  
131 Jack Lang already knew trade unions from his previous mandate as a minister between April 1992 and March 1993 
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issued such a framework in a series of decrees in April 2002 (interview FCM2, 22 May 2007)132. 
Those decrees transformed the grades into actual levels of diplomas133. In addition to decrees, Jack 
Lang issued some orders which gave more details regarding the reforms to implement134. Those 
orders created two deliberative councils, the Comité de suivi License and the Comité de suivi Master, 
which aimed at facilitating implementation through deliberation.  
Although he was more prescriptive, Jack Lang did not abandon the idea of autonomous 
implementation. In decree 2002-482, he allowed each higher education institution to create new 
degree programmes (art. 1). He also explained that each higher education institution would have 
the choice, at the point of the renewal of their quadriennal contractual policy, of either adopting 
the LMD reform or not (Lang, 2001). Moreover, Jack Lang added that the diplomas would not 
need to fit the maquettes nationales anymore but would be ratified after a course proposal made by 
the higher education institution.  
Luc Ferry, the following Minister, continued the implementation by relying on the freedom 
of universities to define the content of their curricula (Descamps et al., 2005:7). Luc Ferry’s main 
regulatory tool was a series of administrative circulars issued by the Director of Higher Education, 
Jean-Marc Monteil135. Those circulars planned the implementation in four successive waves. By 
the academic year 2002/2003, three universities of the North of France (Artois, Lille2 and 
Valenciennes) converted to the LMD structure on an experimental basis, a year ahead of the first 
group scheduled to do so (Witte, 2006: 292). In 2005, a report from the general inspectorate 
                                               
132 Decree of the 26th of November 2001, decrees n 2002-480, 2002-481,2002-482, 2002-590, orders of the 23rd of 
April 2002, 25th of April 2002 and 26th of May 1992. 
133 The decrees provided intermediary levels with the denomination of titres. The first decree (2002-480) also changed 
the spelling of mastaire to the one of master after intense debates. The spelling of master was originally rejected by the 
direction of legal affairs of the ministry and was even the object of a decision in the high administrative court Conseil 
d’Etat (Conseil d’Etat (2003) Association avenir de la langue française). The decree was therefore entitled ‘mastaire’ before 
being changed once more to ‘master’ in April 2002 (interviews FMC2, 22 May 2007; FF1 02 May 2007).  
134 Orders of the 23rd and 25th of April 2002.  
135 Circulars of the 14th  of November 2002, 3rd of September 2003 and 12th of May 2004 (Monteil, 2002/03/04). 
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explained that the curricular reform met much support in French higher education institutions 
(Descamps et al., 2005). 
No adaptation in England  
Table 18 shows that there was less, if any, adaptation in England than in France. Many 
English degrees broadly fitted the two tiered structure recommended by the Sorbonne and 
Bologna declarations, and as the previous chapter indicated, Tessa Blackstone used this as 
justification for the absence of implementation of the declarations. In that respect, the reform of 
degrees had little appeal to domestic actors.   
Degrees in England before 1998 mostly had a uniform two tiered structure, divided 
between an undergraduate and a postgraduate degree, even if universities enjoyed a lot of freedom 
in determining the content of their curricula136. The undergraduate degree was three years long, 
although some degrees, such as honour’s degrees, took longer. The postgraduate degree was 
either a master’s course of at least a year, or a doctorate degree of three years or more.  
Certain degrees and diplomas, such as accelerated degrees created on a pilot basis in 1992, 
and sub-degree diplomas, e.g. higher national diplomas and higher national certificates, normally 
lasted two years, but they did not constitute the norm. The option of an integrated master’s 
course in four years was available in some science and engineering disciplines. In 1985, the 
Government encouraged the development of vocational first degrees (HMSO, 1985). This 
recommendation was followed by the higher education sector, and in 1994, vocational studies 
were the fastest growing area of higher education (Eurydice, 2000: 503). But longer undergraduate 
degrees remained the norm.  
                                               
136 The Department did not provide general guidelines on the content of courses as the French ministry did in the 
maquettes nationales for example.  
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The policies post-1998 were not explicitly related to the Bologna process. For example, the 
official documents setting up foundation degrees from HEFCE for the academic year 2001-2002 
made no link to the Bologna process. These foundation degrees, aiming at continuing the effort 
to promote vocational education, started in the mid-1980s (HEFCE, 2000).  
Domestic actors did not have any official position on the Bologna process until the Berlin 
conference of 2003. From that year, the higher education sector slowly woke up to the process 
and concentrated on information gathering and lobbying activities despite the absence of Bologna 
process related reforms. It created a Europe unit through UniversitiesUK in 2003. The Europe 
Unit was responsible for the coordination of the sector on European matters. It also created a 
High Level Policy Forum and a European Coordinating group, to gather together higher 
education stakeholders and inform the Europe Unit’s policy positioning (EuropeUnit, 2007).  
London’s hosting of one of the interministerial meetings in May 2007 brought more 
awareness of the Bologna process. The Select Committee for Education and Skills of the British 
Parliament launched an inquiry into the Bologna process in the spring of 2007137. Trade unions 
such as the University and College Union (UCU) and the National Union of Students (NUS), 
concerned by the potential costs of compliance, started to demand that they be more involved in 
the negotiations and to show concerns about the Bologna process138. But no actual reform ensued 
(e-mail communication, National Union of Students representative, 07 June 2007; oral position of 
Hunt, S., Joint General Secretary of the University and College Union, in the Learning Curve, 11 
May 2007).  
 To sum up, France, unlike England, underwent considerable reform in its degree structure 
from 1998, which confirms the relationship between attitude change and policy change - notably 
                                               
137 The report underlined the Bologna process mostly in terms of threat - to the internationally competitive one-year 
master’s degree for example, rather than an opportunity for reform. Nevertheless, it created a certain, but yet 
moderate, level of interest in the Bologna process in England. 
138 See UCU (2006) or NUS (2007). 
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of Claude Allègre who agreed to a three year undergraduate degree (chapter 6). French reforms 
explicitly invoked European developments as a justification. The reforms however went beyond 
the prediction of simply touching upon the less entrenched area of the qualifications framework. 
They led to changes not only in the design of degrees but also to changes in the style of regulation 
used to implement the change in degree structure, relying on voluntary implementation as 
opposed to a priori enforcement. As a result, the reform increased the autonomy of French 
universities in the definition of course contents and levels. And the simplification of graduation 
into just two levels brought French higher education closer to English higher education.  
Reforms in quality control 
In quality control as well, France also reformed more intensively after the beginning of the 
Bologna process, while England continued on pre-established tracks. But both England and 
France adjusted their accreditation, i.e. a priori control, and evaluation, i.e. a posteriori control 
mechanisms, ultimately resulting in convergence as predicted.  
 
Chapter 7 Impact on policy changes in France and England 
 
 190 
Table 19: Summary of reforms in quality control in England and France 
 
 England  France  
1984 Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals (CVCP) report 
recommends an increase in quality control. 
26 th of January : creation of the Comité National d’Evaluation 
des établissements d’enseignement supérieur (CNE) 
1985  21st of February: decree n 85-258 regulating the functioning 
and organisation of the CNE 
1986 First Research Assessment Exercise (RAE)  
1988 29th of July: education reform act establishes new universities as 
higher education corporations 
 
1989 Enquiry into quality by the Academic Audit Unit  
Second RAE 
  
1991 2nd of May: white paper Higher education: a new framework   
1992 6th of March: further and higher education act: regulation of pre- 
and post- 1992 universities.  
HEFCE assumes quality assessment and Higher Education 
Quality Council assumes quality audit. 
Times higher education supplement begins the 'quality debate' 
Third RAE 
  
1996 CVCP suggests the simplification of quality control mechanisms. 
Fourth RAE 
 
1997 27th of March: creation of the Quality Assurance Agency 
Dearing report recommends 'light touch' quality regulation 
  
2001 March 2001: several academics rebel against the quality assurance 
system.   
21st of March: David Blunkett, announced a 40 percent reduction 
in the volume of external quality review activity  
Fifth RAE 
  
2002 Cabinet office’s Better regulation task force Higher education; easing 
the burden.  
 
2003 January: white paper The Future of higher education  suggests 
renewability of degree awarding capacity  
March: creation of the Better regulation review group 
April: CNE annual report restates ambition to link 
evaluation to contractual policy  
November: CNE publishes the Livre des références 
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May: Roberts’ report suggests changes to RAE. 
2004 16th of March: Government agrees with renewability of degree 
awarding capacity  
  
2006   18 th of April: law creates the Agence d'évaluation de la recherche 
et de l'enseignement supérieur, 
3rd of November: decree specifying AERES’ criteria and 
functioning. 
2007 1st of April: education and inspection act: Office for standards in 
education (Ofsted) incorporates further education, teacher 
training providers and training providers for international 
students in its inspections.  
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The move towards a posteriori quality evaluation in France 
The French Government originally had a large influence in accreditation mechanisms. A 
national decree fixed the name of degrees and the Mission Scientifique Technique et Pédagogique 
(MSTP) of the Ministry gave public universities the right to award degrees in a procedure called 
habilitation139. The procedure of habilitation consisted in checking that degrees proposed by 
universities corresponded to some general criteria and rules defined by the MSTP. This right was 
renewed every four years within the framework of the contractual policy, during which changes in 
the internal structure of the institutions had to be approved by the Minister in charge of higher 
education. According to Chevaillier (2007:170), the habilitation process served as a kind of 
overarching control over universities; since if a university could not deliver degrees, it could as a 
matter of fact hardly exist in the French system140. And this habilitation process made universities 
very dependent on the Ministry, a relationship criticised by some (Debouzie, 2004).  
A posteriori evaluation was much weaker than a priori control. An independent agency, 
called the Comité National d’Evaluation des établissements d’enseignement supérieur (CNE) aimed at 
conducting institutional evaluations of French universities through external peer reviews, in 
addition to comparatively evaluating disciplines and advising the Government in its annual report 
to the President of the Republic141.   
                                               
139 For other higher education institutions different bodies presided over the content of degrees, such as the 
independent body Commission des Titres d’Ingénieurs for engineering schools created by the law of the 10th of July 1934. 
Private institutions also had to apply for the right to award degrees with the Ministry, and could gain a status close to 
the one of public organisations if they were granted State recognition (reconnaissance par l’Etat).   
140 However, once created, there were no clear regular checks on the right to be called university. Most public French 
universities were created by the Government after consultation with the National council for higher education and 
research (CNESER) as EPSCP (Etablissements Public à Caractère Scientifique, Culturel et Professionnel). The law on higher 
education 84-52 of the 26th of January 1984 defined and organised these institutions. 
141 The CNE obtained legal status in law 84-52 of the 26th of January 1984 (art. 65). The idea of the CNE actually 
originated from the Conférence des Présidents d’Universités (CPU) that the Minister presided over. They suggested the 
setting up of an independent evaluation institution made of members nominated by the CPU (one third), by the 
Académie of Sciences, the Consultative committee of universities, the National council of higher education and research 
(one third) and the Ministry (one third) (CNE, 2006). The Central Government maintained a large influence over the 
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However, the CNE did not have much impact in practice. According to decree n 85-258 of 
the 21st of February 1985 (art. 5), the CNE had to evaluate each institution every four years. 
However, this was without taking into account the average duration of the CNE evaluation, 
which lasted for about one year, and the proportionally small staff available of around 30 
members (interview FF7, 12 June 2007; CNE, 2007/2007b). The evaluations produced by the 
CNE were actually infrequent and irregular. On average, the space between external quality 
evaluations varied from 4 to 17 years (CNE, 2007b). And some institutions, including the grandes 
écoles (such as the IEP de Paris, Institut de physique du globe, EHESS, EPHE, Observatoire de Paris, ENS 
de Cachan, and the Collège de France) had never been checked for quality142. Moreover, CNE 
evaluations did not have any consequences for the funding of higher education institutions, 
despite original ambitions to relate the CNE to contractual policy. 
The CNE also did not actually give out an opinion on contracts to advise the Ministry on 
contractual policy (which allocated funds to universities) as it should have according to decree n 
85-258 of the 21st of February 1985 (art. 1) (Interview FF7, 12 June 2007). The most 
consequential quality control mechanisms remained the contractual policy and a priori 
accreditation processes.  
France has extensively changed its quality control landscape since the beginning of the 
Bologna process through a shift from a priori to a posteriori control. The reform of quality 
control did not occur at the same time as the reform of degrees, i.e. right after the Sorbonne 
                                                                                                                                                   
CNE, through the funding associated with its status as an independent administrative authority, and determining the 
rules for the nomination of its members by decree (see also decree 88-1107 of the 7th of December 1988, article 5). 
142 The CNE covered universities, but other agencies monitored other types of higher education institutions. For 
example, the CTI (Commission des titres d’ingénieurs for engineering) conducted periodic surveys and follow-up on 
engineering schools in addition to evaluations. It monitored the quality of private schools to know if those schools 
were capable of delivering engineering diplomas. Other evaluation institutions included the MSTP (Mission Scientifique 
Technique et Pédagogique). This part of the Ministry was responsible for the evaluation of contractual policies of higher 
education institutions. The CNER (Comité National d’Evaluation de la Recherche) evaluated research in higher education 
institutions. Research centres, such as the CNRS, evaluated their own research.  
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declaration, but as a second step a few years later. This started with the CNE publishing a Livre des 
références in November 2003 after the Berlin conference of the 19th of September 2003 (CNE, 
2003b)143. This document provided guidelines for institutional internal evaluation. Although the 
actual procedures and details of the Livre des Références were different from the QAA’s (2001) Code 
of Practice, the general preference for objective-based evaluation in the Livre des Références recalled 
the British approach:  
‘Evaluation, it’s an evidence-based process, (…). The British rely on this just like the CNE has 
tried to do this conversion with the Livre des Références.’ (Interview FF7, 12 June 2007). 
The law of the 18th of April 2006 created a potentially major development in the landscape 
of a posteriori quality control in France with the creation of a new independent administrative 
authority to replace the CNE called the Agence d’Evaluation de la Recherche et de l’Enseignement 
Supérieur (AERES). The AERES was created a year after the Bergen communiqué of 20th of May 
2005 concentrated on quality assurance. The Bergen communiqué adopted the Standards and 
guidelines for quality assurance written by the European Association for Quality Assurance in higher 
education (ENQA), recommending that member states set up a quality assurance agency 
conducting regular a posteriori evaluations of higher education institutions and that these agencies 
be included in a European register of quality assurance agencies144. 
The creation of the AERES was strongly supported by the CPU (CPU, 2006). Other non 
domestic actors, such as the student trade union UNEF and the staff representatives, the 
Permanent conference of the national council of universities (CP-CNU), were more critical, but 
                                               
143 The Berlin communiqué contained recommendations regarding quality assurance, encouraging the evaluation of 
programmes and institutions, through both internal assessment and external review. In its 2002 annual report, the 
CNE also attempted to make its evaluation more consequential. It suggested that its institutional evaluations should 
be synchronised with the development plans of higher education institutions and the contracts they signed with the 
ministry (CNE, 2003: 3).  
144 European recommendations, such as recommendations 98/561/EC and 2006/143/EC complemented the 
recommendations on quality assurance made during the Bologna process. The Chief Executive of the English QAA 
Peter Williams and Danish Christian Thune, Executive Director of the Danish Evaluation institute and President of 
ENQA wrote ENQA’s Standards and guidelines.  
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more regarding the rules of functioning of the AERES than the principle of evaluation (CP-CNU, 
2006; UNEF, 2006). The law and decree 2006-1334 of the 3rd of November 2006 fixed AERES’ 
organisation and functioning.  
The AERES intended to give evaluation more weight, by linking it to contractual policy and 
making it count for funding decisions (Ministère délègué à l’Enseignement supérieur et la 
Recherche, 2007b). It also wanted AERES to evaluate both research and the content of teaching 
(law of the 18th April 2006, section 2, Art. L. 114-3-1, par. 1). The AERES’ additional innovations 
included the evaluation of institutional management as opposed to conducting subject reviews, 
the integration of the many pre-existing evaluation agencies145, and the introduction of the idea of 
staff evaluation, with the AERES giving its opinion on the conditions in which staff evaluation 
procedures were set up (law of the 18th April 2006, section 2, Art. L. 114-3-1, par. 4). Although it 
was too soon to evaluate the implementation of the AERES at the time of writing, its creation 
was a clear step toward more rigorous a posteriori evaluation in France, complying with European 
recommendations included in the Bologna process.  
The emergence of sector-wide quality control in England  
Quality control in England followed an ‘audit explosion’ (Power, 1997) from the 1990s. 
Until then, England relied on a strong principle of universities’ autonomy and had very few 
quality control mechanisms. The Privy Council, one of the oldest parts of the Government, only 
had mild powers of accreditation. Once a university received the right to award degrees (which 
most of them had obtained a long time ago), the Privy Council could only reassess this right by 
changing the regulation which awarded the right, i.e. via an instrument of government or articles 
of government. But this required a special act of Parliament. The Privy Council also monitored 
                                               
145 The AERES integrated the Comité National d’Evaluation (CNE), the Comité National d’Evaluation de la Recherche 
(CNER) and the Mission Scientifique, Technique et Pédagogique (MSTP). But the Commission des Titres d’Ingénieurs (CTI) 
remained independent.  
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applications for the right to be called universities, but this was of limited use, since most 
universities had obtained their title a long time ago (QAA, 2008)146.  
With the Further and higher education act of the 6th of March 1992, the Government 
acquired more a priori control over post-1992 universities than it had on pre-1992 universities147. 
This act stipulated that the articles of government of post-1992 institutions had to be approved by 
the Secretary of State, and that the membership and constitution of a university’s governing body 
had to be approved by the Privy council. New universities were established as higher education 
corporations by the Education reform act of the 29th of July 1988 as opposed to by a royal charter 
which required a more difficult parliamentary process to be adopted for pre-1992 universities.  
There was also little evaluation until 1992.  A type of national network for quality control, 
the Council for National Academic Awards (CNAA), was founded in 1964, but only covered 
polytechnics and colleges (Silver, 1990; Brown, 2004: 36). Her Majesty’s inspectorate broadly 
carried out formal inspection at institution or subject level, and informal consultation and advice. 
But universities had no evaluation of the quality and standards of their management or degrees.  
The Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (CVCP) recommended an increase in 
quality control, with for example the use of performance indicators (CVCP, 1984). The CVCP 
also introduced the Academic audit unit in 1989 to look at efficiency in university institutions 
(Jackson, 1996). And the research assessment exercise, also called RAE, was introduced as a 
performance indicator on research output in 1986 (HERO, 1995)148. 
                                               
146 More recent applications were however often turned down, as the example of the Bolton institute showed. 
Institutions which were not universities relied on partnerships with other academic organisations with awarding 
degree powers.  
147 The Further and higher education act gave polytechnics the status of universities. 
148 The RAE assessed research through peer review and subject experts. Each researcher had to submit up to four 
pieces of research or they were classified as ‘research inactive’ (unless they were a junior member of staff). Panels 
examined this research and allocated it a grade, which was then used to determine the amount of funding an 
institution would receive. 
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The Further and higher education act of 1992 also supported the allocation of audit and 
assessment activities to specialised bodies. Assessment became one of the functions of the Higher 
Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE)149. Audit became attributed to a non-
departmental public body, the Higher Education Quality Council (HEQC) established in 1992 
(HEQC/HEFCE, 1994)150. Those quality controls were consequential, since they were taken into 
account for the allocation of funds.  
Parts of the academic sector denounced the creation of quality control mechanisms. Some 
academics saw it as a ‘violation of academic autonomy’, creating a culture of ‘hard managerialism’ and a 
‘regulatory burden’ (Watson, 1995). The Times higher education supplement reported this 
dissatisfaction, beginning what it called the quality debate in 1992. In December of that year, it 
declared: “quality control arrangements are going wrong”. On the 22nd of January 1993 it published the 
results of a survey of vice-chancellors in which 82% of respondents condemned the new 
arrangements as ‘too bureaucratic’.  
Vice-chancellors responded to this resentment by suggesting a simplification of quality 
control into one system (Joint Planning Group, 1996). The single system of quality control came 
out on the 27th of March 1997 with the creation of the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA). The 
QAA was an independent body, partly funded by subscriptions from universities and colleges of 
higher education, and partly funded by contracts with the main higher education funding bodies 
(QAA, 1997).  
The QAA conducted regular a posteriori subject and institutional reviews. It aimed at 
controlling to what extent the higher education institutions had the tools and structures in place 
                                               
149 Section 70 (1) (a) of the Further and Higher Education Act (1992). Audit looks at the quality mechanisms in higher 
education.  
150 Quality assessment meant assessing the quality of teaching and learning. Audit included a review of a 
comprehensive set of documents, while assessment relied on a peer review of self-assessment reports (CVCP, 1992 
and HEFCE, 1993). 
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to fulfil its objectives. Its reports were published and taken into account for decisions on funding, 
awarding of the university title and also informally for assessing the reputation of universities. 
According to Lewis (2007: 3), the Quality Assurance Agency recalled the CNAA prior to 1992. 
But its establishment definitely marked an increase in quality assurance over higher education in 
England: the QAA monitored all higher education institutions, not only polytechnics.  
Part of the higher education sector progressively started to accept the need for more quality 
control after 1997. The Times higher education supplement supported the principle of quality 
control mechanisms after this date, to respond to the growing demands of employers and 
students in a mass higher education industry (see for example Times higher education 
supplement, 1997; Jenkins, 1997). But another large part of the sector still thought that higher 
education was being over-regulated. On the 21st of March 2001, Lord Norton of Louth, a 
Professor of Government at the University of Hull, made a general attack on the ‘over-bureaucratic 
and over-complex’ regulation of teaching in higher education. A number of other lords, including 
Baroness Warwick, the Association of University Teachers and universities such as the London 
School of Economics as well as other elite universities of the Russell group supported him (Baty, 
2001; Hansard, 2001).  According to the Chief Executive of the QAA John Randall, this rebellion 
led to his resignation in August 2001 (O’Leary, 2001).  
In response, David Blunkett, the Secretary of State for Education and Employment,  
announced a 40 percent reduction in the volume of external review activity to match the Dearing 
report (1997)‘s recommendation of ‘light touch regulation’ apparently without any warning to the 
Agency (Baty, 2001). In 2002, the Cabinet office’s Better regulation task force published a report 
Higher Education; easing the burden, where it agreed that the sector was over-regulated, especially in 
the area of quality control. The Government accepted this, and announced the creation of a task 
force called the Better regulation review group chaired by Prof. David VandeLinde, vice-
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chancellor of the university of Warwick, to ‘cut back bureaucracy whenever possible’ (Dfes, 2003). This 
political commitment got translated into the simplification of quality assurance procedures, for 
example with the integration of subject and institutional reviews into one single assessment 
(Brown, 2004: 126). The Roberts report of 2003 commissioned by the funding councils 
influenced changes to the RAE, for example introducing metric measurements (Roberts, 2003; 
RAE, 2008)151. But this attempt to minimise the costs of quality control did not suppress a 
posteriori evaluation. In post-secondary education, the Office for Standards in Education, 
children’s services and skills (Ofsted) extended its inspections from primary and secondary 
schools to aspects of post-secondary education, including further education and training provided 
to international students in April 2007. 
Finally, the Government increased its a priori control. The Privy Council started to grant 
the right to award degrees on a renewable basis of six years to privately funded organisations on 
the recommendation of the 2003 white paper152.  
Overall, both countries saw a change in government influence in quality control. In 
England this change started in the 1990s before the Bologna process and many assimilated it with 
an increase in governmental influence, going from a quasi-absence of sector-wide quality control 
to the reforms of the 1990s, which increased a posteriori evaluation and a priori control. In 
France, changes in quality control occurred mostly after the beginning of the Bologna process, 
with efforts to promote a posteriori evaluation over a priori government guidelines. Since quality 
control, like the design of degrees, is a less entrenched policy object, those changes would have 
been predicted by the preceding analysis for the period starting in 1998.  
                                               
151 More metric elements, for example statistical indicators such as the number of times research was cited by other 
researchers or the amount of research income a department earns, would play a role in the attribution of research 
funding (HEFCE, 2007). 
152 Publicly funded institutions kept the right to award degrees indefinitely. The Government originally set out to 
extend the fixed and renewable right to award degrees to all institutions, but backtracked after a sector-wide 
consultation revealed widespread opposition to that option (Johnson, 2004 and DfES, 2004/2004b).  
Chapter 7 Impact on policy changes in France and England 
 
 200 
Reforms in institutional management 
Government control over institutional management included the content of curricula and 
the monitoring of research and teaching outcomes already covered in earlier paragraphs. But it 
also encompasses other aspects, for example concerning the ownership of property and the 
management of staff, assets and finances. Despite being a rather entrenched policy object where 
continuity is expected to prevail over reform, such aspects actually changed after the Bologna 
process in France, while England continued along existing trends.  
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Table 20: Summary of reforms in institutional management 
 
 England France 
1985 CVCP recommendation on using corporate managerial 
tools 
 
1986  Devaquet law proposal withdrawn on the 6th of 
December after large scale demonstrations 
1988  Reintroduction of Savary provisions 
1989  24th of March: circular extending contractual policy 
1992 6th of March: Further and higher education act ends 
polytechnics 
 
1993  Creation of the San Remo formula 
2003   15th of May: law project on the autonomy of higher 
education institutions proposed by Luc Ferry, 
parliamentary vote postponed 
Nov/Dec: protests against the law project  
2004   March: resignation of Luc Ferry, President takes the law 
project off the agenda  
2007   May: beginning of consultation on the ‘law on the 
freedoms and responsibilities of universities’             
July: presentation of the project in Parliament                   
11th of August: adoption of the law on the freedoms and 
responsibilities of universities by the Parliament.  
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The many attempts to reform institutional management in France 
In France, the changes in institutional management did not occur right after the beginning 
of the Bologna process in the late 1990s, but as a second wave of reforms from the mid-2000s as 
Table 20 illustrates. The French Government traditionally played a directive role in the a priori 
institutional management of French universities153. The Faure law of the 12th of November 1968 
gave universities legal personality at a relatively late stage in comparison to England and instituted 
the principle of autonomy, at least on paper (art. 3 and titles III, IV and V of the Faure law) 154. 
Henceforth, universities had governing deliberative bodies and they could put forward proposals 
to the Ministry corresponding to their needs (Musselin, 2004: 34).  
But the autonomy conferred to universities for institutional management remained only 
formal according to Eurydice (2000, p. 316): law governed university organisation. Although the 
interpretation of national regulations left a margin for discretionary interpretation, university 
management bodies were appointed in accordance with a uniform set of regulations. The 
Government (central or territorial authority) validated the internal structure of universities, and 
owned the buildings in addition to deciding about the management of buildings and equipment 
and employment of permanent staff. The Government also set priorities for the general 
management of funds through a funding formula updated in 1993 (San Remo method)155.  
An important feature of French higher education policy which emerged in the late 1980s 
was the ‘contractual policy’. The Savary law of 1984 (art. 20) originally laid out the contractual 
                                               
153 At the same time, the small number of a posteriori accountability mechanisms could be interpreted as a way to 
offset this higher level of government control and to enjoy relative freedom regarding their output obligations. 
154 The Faure law created the UERs (Unités d’Enseignement et de Recherche). Higher education was organised by faculties, 
grandes écoles and research centres such as the CNRS prior to the Faure law (Musselin, 2004: 1). 
155 The funding formula was set up in 1976. In contrast to the calculation method in England, which took into 
account research evaluations (RAE), the San Remo method focused exclusively on teaching aspects, such as the 
number of students enrolled (to determine the need for additional staff), the level and type of programmes, and other 
variables such as the amount of floor surface and compensation for non-academic support staff.   
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policy, which became implemented in 1988 and 1989 (MEN, 1989). Contractual policy meant, for 
some, that higher education institutions would acquire autonomy from the Central Government 
in the management of funds originally in academic research and later on of teaching (MEN, 1989; 
Chevaillier, 1998; Merrien and Musselin, 1999: 221-238; Musselin, 2004). In the framework of 
these four-year contracts, each establishment drew up a four-year development plan 
corresponding both to national objectives and to local training needs. The plan covered all the 
activities in the establishment, i.e. teaching, research, internationalisation, management, etc., 
regarding all actors, i.e. students, staff, public authorities, and external parties. The Ministry 
received the plan and then negotiated it with the university.  
All the successive Ministers since the end of the 1980s have manifested their attachment to 
this form of relationship. Universities, via the CPU, regularly reported how much they appreciated 
the freedom of negotiation associated with the contractual policy (Eurydice, 2000: 319). But 
contracts actually covered only a minority of the allocated funds, i.e. 16% (Witte, 2006). 
Moreover, the contract had no legal value and was not recognised as legally binding by specialised 
courts. Moreover, according to Eurydice (2000: 319), the commitments undertaken by the 
Government with respect to the creation of staff posts for the initial contracts was not honoured 
in many cases.  
Several Ministers tried to give more autonomy to universities in their institutional 
management. The Devaquet project of 1986 wanted to grant greater autonomy to universities, 
allowing them to freely fix student enrolment fees and the admission criteria for their different 
degree courses (Eurydice, 2000: 315).  But large-scale protests led to the resignation of the 
responsible Minister and the withdrawal of the proposal on the 6th of December 1986 (INA, 
1986).   
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On the 15th of May 2003, Luc Ferry and his advisor Josy Reiffers introduced a project of 
law on the autonomy of higher education institutions. This project aimed at increasing the 
autonomy of universities in the management of staff and finances (Musselin, 2003). The project 
foresaw: the introduction of a global budget for higher education institutions (as opposed to set 
budget lines for different functions) which would give universities the freedom to allocate funds 
internally, managed by the President of the university, and the ability for the Government to 
transfer the ownership of assets to universities. It also promoted increased flexibility for 
universities to define the tasks of their academics, facilitated cooperation and mergers of adjacent 
higher education institutions and of higher education institutions and regional authorities. The 
project finally proposed increasing the accountability of universities, requiring that an institutional 
evaluation be held before the agreement on quadrennial contracts be finalised.  
Although fully supported by the CPU, this project met strong opposition from staff and the 
academic trade unions UNEF and SNESUP. When hearing about the 2003 law proposal, 17 
universities went on strike and 30,000 students demonstrated according to Langan (2004). Trade 
unions started connecting this project to curricular reforms, and ended up opposing both, seeing 
them as ‘an extremely dangerous project aiming at establishing competition between institutions according to a very 
liberal concept’ (see also Fichtali, 2003; UNEF, 2003; SNESUP, 2003; Witte, 2006: 295; interviews 
FTUS2, 4 June 2007, FTUS3, 24 May 2007). Demonstrations took place in November and 
December 2003. This opposition led to the postponement of parliamentary votes over the law. 
The Minister Luc Ferry resigned in March 2004; and the President took the law project off the 
agenda.  
In the summer of 2007, the Government finally pushed through a reform of the 
institutional management of universities. It started consultations on a law project in May, 
presented the project in July and the Parliament adopted the law regarding the freedoms and 
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responsibilities of universities (loi relative aux libertés et responsabilités des universités) on the 10th of 
August 2007. This law included the transfer of assets to institutions upon request, more autonomy 
for universities to manage funds by being able to create foundations, and an increase in the 
powers of the university administration, and in particular of the President, in the management of 
staff. Henceforth, the President could veto the allocation of staff, allocate bonuses, and recruit 
new staff via contracts156. A comité technique paritaire would be consulted on the management of 
human resources157. Institutional management therefore made a leap toward providing more 
responsibilities to higher education institutions in France with this 2007 reform.  
Minimal changes in institutional management in England  
England traditionally enjoyed ‘soft managerialism’ (Trow, 1993) before the mid-1980s. Its 
relatively high level of autonomy in institutional management was a result of the period preceding 
the First World War, when universities were private and had not yet needed to resort to public 
funds to solve financial problems and related inflation induced by the war. The governing bodies, 
called university councils in pre-1992 institutions and boards of governors in post-1992 
institutions, made of senior staff and a majority of independent members or students, decided the 
management and administrative structure of universities. Universities recruited their own staff and 
managed their assets (Eurydice, 2000: 404). Although they received most of their funds from the 
Government, universities also managed the allocation of funding internally because grants were 
received in block (HEFCE, 1997; House of Commons, 2007b). 
                                               
156 As opposed to via civil servant status. 
157 An implication of this law was to involve universities more in research and to reform national research centres, 
such as the CNRS, which so far were the main bodies for research in France. The President Nicolas Sarkozy 
announced his ambition to transform national research centres into a funding agency, and options for the reform 
were discussed by a mission of reflection on partnerships between research centres and universities, which started in 
October 2007 under the direction of François Aubert. Those options included a reorganisation of CNRS into several 
national centres (Le Hir, 2008/2008b).  
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Yet, this tradition of ‘soft managerialism’ was replaced by ‘hard managerialism’ from the 
mid-1980s. The CVCP (1985) started recommending that universities use more managerial 
techniques from the corporate world, echoing the Government’s attitude toward other public 
services158. Such recommendations were taken up university by university. But no sector-wide 
reform took place in institutional management after 1998 in England, most policies at that time 
only continued trends, which started in the previous period. 
Thus, the autonomy of French universities increased after many attempts after the 
beginning of the Bologna process, while England did not pass any significant reforms in this 
respect. This increasing autonomy of French universities suggests deeper changes than predicted 
in chapter 3.  
Reforms in financial contribution 
 This in-depth change also affected financial contribution. Both countries also diversified 
their sources of funding over the period studied, France appealing to businesses and public bodies 
and becoming more open to discussing students’ participation and England choosing to increase 
students’ participation. 
                                               
158 According to Deer (2002:84), the sector published such recommendations to initiate changes internally in an 
attempt to pre-empt the Government’s moves. 
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Table 21: Summary of reforms in financial contribution 
 
 England France 
1986  Devaquet proposal, dropped on the 6th of December 1986 
after large scale demonstrations 
1988 29th of July: Education reform act separates the budget for 
teaching and research 
Diversification of student fees by type of study 
 
1990 26th of April: Education (student loans) act creates mortgage-
style student loans 
Student social plan foresees increase in student grants and 
student loans 
1991  17th of July: circular 91-214 implementing student loans 
May: Université 2000 plan 
1995  20th of January: Laurent report stresses the importance of 
student loans 
1998 16th of July: Teaching and higher education act: reintroduction 
of tuition fees.  
The Government increases public funding for higher 
education 
June: Université du troisième millénaire (U3M) plan             
2003 January: white paper the Future of higher education   
2004 1st of July: higher education act introduced deferred flexible 
fees of up to £3,060 for undergraduate degrees                               
Standardisation of tuition fees within the framework of the 
LMD reform    
2005   30 th of December : finance law creates business taxes called 
contribution au développement de l'apprentissage and taxe 
d’apprentissage 
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Diversification of financial contribution toward other public bodies in France  
The French system of higher education was mostly publicly funded. Changes in financial 
contribution after the late 1990s were hardly perceptible in terms of content as illustrated in Table 
21. But an openness towards the possibility of reforms progressively took place, suggesting an 
institutional softening going deeper than the theoretical prediction made in chapter 3.  
The French Government also attempted to rely increasingly on student participation toward 
the costs of their own degrees prior 1998159. The first Student Social Plan of June 1990, a result of 
the debate started by the Domenach Commission in 1982, set up a loan at the same time as 
increasing the number of grants, guaranteed at 70% by the state and provided by commercial 
banks (Aulagnon, 1991)160.  
This system however did not reach the level of contribution of commercial banks that the 
French Government had hoped for. Only four banks showed any interest in the scheme161 and 
only 36,000 out of the 120,000 loans that the state proposed were taken up. The banks set interest 
rates which were actually higher than for traditional loans162. Universities did not take to the loans 
enthusiastically either. Out of seventy five French universities, and around thirty had set up the 
necessary commission to authorise student loans three months after the circular was released 
                                               
159 The French Government paid for the functioning of universities, tuition fees (students only paid for 
administrative costs rarely exceeding 300 euros per year at university) and some financial help to students in the form 
of aid in kind and a minority of grants for third cycle students or tax alleviation for parents with children in higher 
education from 1990. Universities also received money from different bodies, for research from the National centre 
for scientific research or the Ministry of Research. (Grandes écoles could receive funding from the Ministry they were 
attached to, for example the Ministry of Defence for the Ecole polytechnique). (Interview, FF9, July 2008)             
160 The loan was implemented through circular 91-214 of the 17th of July 1991, and the Laurent report of 1995 
restated its importance.  
161 Participating banks were the Banque Nationale de Paris, the Crédit lyonnais, the Caisse nationale du crédit agricole and the 
Crédit municipal. 
162 Those interest rates were between 9.9% and 10.95%. The Government considered a state subsidy on interest rates 
but rejected it in March 1991 (Courtois, 1991). 
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(Aulagnon, 1991)163. The use of student loans therefore never became widespread (Eurydice, 
2000:331). 
The French Government also proposed allowing universities to set their tuition fees in 1986 
with the Devaquet law proposal, but the proposal did not get adopted. Lionel Jospin, at the time 
Minister of Education, diversified fees depending on the type of studies undertaken in 1988. And 
growth in centrally regulated tuition fees took off again during that period, although they 
remained relatively low, the principle of free access to education being guaranteed in the preamble 
of the constitution of the 4th of October 1958164. In 1996, fees totalled 190 euros for second cycle 
technological branches of study and 286 euros for engineering courses, but they could become 
higher for grandes écoles, especially business ones. Since then, attempts by universities to impose 
extra fees for admission to certain very popular courses or concerning certain student services 
have regularly been judged illegal by the competent courts (Eurydice, 2000: 323). 
As a result, the French Government turned to various public bodies, and more particularly 
the regions, for additional financing. The Minister increased the participation of regions with 
Université 2000 (U2000) in 1990 and U3M (Université du troisième millénaire) in 1998 (Aust, 2007)165. 
The involvement of the regions became a major part of higher education funding. Planning 
contracts between the state and the regions (Contrats de plan État-régions) covered 80% of the 7.25 
billion euros budget of higher education institutions for 2000-2006 (Kaiser, 2007:54)166.  
The French Government also appealed to private contributors. From 2005, businesses had 
to finance initial vocational training by paying 0.5% of their wage bill either to the Government, 
                                               
163 The Commission gathered representatives from the Government, universities, student insurance bodies and the 
social body Centre Régional des Oeuvres Universitaires et Scolaires (CNOUS). 
164 This part of the preamble was long established and similar to the preamble of the constitution of the 27th of 
October 1946.  
165 Regions had gained more power a few years before with the decentralisation acts of 1982, 1983 and 1985. But they 
had been involved in the development of universities since the end of the IIIrd republic (1870-1940). 
166 The Ministry of Education contributed 2.5 billion euros to these planning contracts. 
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or to vocational education bodies of their choice, or else by hosting apprentices167. Part of this tax 
on salaries, called apprenticeship tax (taxe d’apprentissage) went to higher education institutions (61 
million euros). The Government created another contribution in 2005, called the Contribution au 
développement de l’apprentissage on the same basis as the apprenticeship tax (loi de finances, 2005)168.  
The idea of having businesses participating in the costs of higher education is motivated by 
the intuition that since businesses benefit from higher education, they should contribute to it. 
However, the division of the burden of the costs of higher education did not appear to be 
proportional to the benefits from higher education. Indeed, the graduate tax was compulsory for 
all businesses, and also affected those wages which did not benefit from a higher education 
premium. A business could have had employees without higher education degrees, and not 
benefited from the premium of higher education, but still have had to pay for this tax.  
The financial contribution of French students did not significantly increase after 1998. The 
reform of the LMD led to a standardisation of fees, paid upfront at 150 euros for a license, 190 
euros for a master and 290 euros for a doctorate. But this standardisation did not constitute a 
major reform, since the amount of tuition fees remained rather low, equal to not much than 
administrative charges169 (MEN, 2004).  
 
Table 22: Repartition of funding sources from higher education in France (2005-2006) 
 
Sources of funding 2006 
State 76 
Including MEN and MESR [1] 85.5 
Territorial collectivities 6.5 
Other public administrations 1.7 
Businesses 6.5 
Households 9.4 
                                               
167 The principle of participation of business to training originally stems from the ‘Delors law’ of 16 July 1971 title V 
(Le Monde, 2008).  
168 Businesses also contributed to the resources of these institutions by buying their services in the form of research 
contracts (20.9 million euros) and continuing training contracts (19.6 million euros).  
169 This scheme did not apply to gandes écoles and para-medical schools.  
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Note: MEN = Ministère de l’Education nationale; MESR = Ministère de l’Enseignement supérieur  
et de la Recherche, results in percentages.  
Source: Ministère de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche, 2007. 
 
The Central Government continued to be the main investor in higher education. In 2006, 
85.5% of the funding for higher education came from the ministries (Table 22). And the 
diversification of funding in France did not raise as much money in France as it did in the UK: 
the UK sector benefited from twice as much private resources as France (see Table 24 later in this 
chapter).  
The suggestion of a drastic increase in tuition fees remained somehow unmentionable in 
1998-2000. Academic trade unions as well as the CPU repeatedly asked for additional funds from 
the Central Government to finance improvements in teaching and curricular reforms. But the 
Ministry refused, holding that the LMD reforms would lead to efficiency gains from reduced 
drop-out rates, the avoidance of programmes with insufficient student numbers, and a better 
coherence of the overall course offering which would fund additional costs (Witte, 2006: 310). 
Since the failure of the Devaquet project, the question of student fees had become 
somewhat of a taboo subject in France. The question of tuition fees was guaranteed to set social 
unrest in motion as soon as students thought the Government had touched upon the subject 
(INA, 1986; UNEF, 2003). The fear of civil unrest led the Government to avoid talking about 
increasing tuition fees. One Government official recalled from her time in the Ministry between 
1998 and 2000 that concerning: “Tuition fees and selection at the entry of universities, we were totally 
forbidden to pose the problem”. (Interview FCM2, 22 May 2007). Another interviewee explained: 
“Tuition fees (…) everyone talks about them, but no one dares to attack them”. (Interview FF3, 16 May 
2006).  
Despite this fear of social unrest, the issue of student participation seemed increasingly 
debated from the second half of the Bologna process. Some politicians took an official stand in 
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favour of an increase in student participation (De Robien et al., 2006). And according to one 
interviewee, institutional softening occurred and a debate on tuition fees became possible:    
 “A: The question of the financing will be posed. I mean, which part of the financing will be assured 
by families. 
Q: Is it a question which has already been posed in France?  
A: It has been during the electoral campaign.  
Q: Yes, but are there talks in the Ministry about questions of financing and family contributions?  
A: The question of the augmentation of tuition fees is not a taboo question anymore. There, we’ll say 
it that way. 
Q: Are these mostly talks or would it be possible for you to indicate to me some references that I 
could look at on the subject? 
A: Every year the amount of tuition fees is published in the Official Journal. In general it’s in July 
or August. The question which will be raised… there will not be any revolution. I don’t think 
there’ll be a revolution. But whether we increase by 3% or 6%”.  (Interview FF2, 21 May 2007)  
This quote denies the possibility of a major reform of tuition fee systems in France (‘there 
will not be any revolution’) and illustrates the sensitivity of the issue. But it also shows that there was a 
potential institutional softening, with the debate on tuition fees being less of a ‘taboo’. This 
institutional softening, if attributable to the Bologna process, suggests that the deliberative 
governance of the process had a deeper effect than originally predicted.  
Growing financial contribution of students in England  
The financial contribution of students gradually grew in England after the beginning of the 
Bologna process. But this development appeared unrelated to the process, limiting the impact of 
deliberative governance on financial contribution in England.  
Much of England’s financial policy toward higher education institutions was the result of 
the restrictive budgetary policy of the Thatcher years (Gombrich, 2000; Pollitt, 1993; Schreiterer 
and Witte, 2001:6; Taylor, 2003).  The Government adopted budgetary cuts in the early 1980s, 
and separated the budgets for research and teaching in the Education reform act of 1988 (Deer 
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2002:88)170. From the mid-1980s, the Government started efforts to diversify the sources of 
funding, which traditionally came from the Government171 through the HEFCE172 , and to 
encourage students’ contribution toward the costs of a degree. 
One of the main instruments to diversify the source of private contribution was an increase 
in mortgage-style student loans with the Education (student loans) act of 26th of April 1990173. 
The value of loans increased in parallel to the decrease in maintenance grants, although Local 
education authorities still had to provide mandatory grants to pay for higher education fees. The 
Government wanted loans, administered by the independent agency Student Loans Company, to 
become a significant source of income for students to supplement maintenance grants to lighten 
the public financial contribution toward the costs of an individual degree (Witte, 2006: 326). And 
the take up of student loans for academic years 1994/95 indeed was 2.5 times higher in 
comparison to the number of students taking up a loan for the academic year 1990/91, with 
517,200 loans (Student Loans Company, 2008). 
Tessa Blackstone continued to encourage the financial participation of students after 1998. 
A first increase in tuition fees took place with the Teaching and higher education act of the 16th of 
July 1998, which was planned prior the Sorbonne declaration (Interview UKM1, 06 02 2007).  
                                               
170 The act ended ‘pluri annual funding’ where universities received a block grant for research and teaching and 
introduced contractual arrangements.  
171 The Government paid for the operating costs of universities, but also for tuition fees. Universities set up 
unregulated fees, but a considerable share of the costs of the undergraduate degrees was paid by the Department of 
Education and Employment and local education authorities in England. The Government did not pay for 
postgraduate degrees.  
172 A multitude of other public bodies allocated additional funding. The research councils, whose funding was 
provided by the Office of Science and Technology, supported research projects in individual institutions and also 
provided financial support for some postgraduate students. The Teacher Training Agency (TTA) financed initial 
teacher training using similar procedures to the higher education funding councils. The Department of Health funded 
substantial core support for teaching and research in medicine, dentistry and other health care subjects but also many 
clinical medical and dental academic staff through the National health service (NHS) (Eurydice, 2000).  
173 This loan guaranteed a low interest rate of 2.3% (Student Loans Company, 2008).  
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The Higher education act of the 1st of July 2004 introduced a second increase in fees. It set 
up deferred flexible fees of up to 3, 892 euros (£ 3, 070) 174 a year for undergraduate degrees 
financed through an income-contingent loan. The value of the fee was capped, but it is due for 
review and a possible removal of the cap (House of Commons, 2007). The 2003 White Paper 
presented this reform as progressive and promoting access. The repayment of the fee did not rely 
on students available funds prior commencing their studies,  but was contingent on the student 
earning more than 18, 973 euros (£15, 000) a year upon graduation (DfES, 2003: 83). 
Table 23: Repartition of funding sources for higher education in England (2005-2006) 
 
Source of funding Percentages 
Funding council grants 38.68 
Higher education provision(a) 
Tuition fees, education grants and contracts 23.79 
Research grants and contracts 16.00 
Other income - other services rendered 6.21 
Other income – other 13.54 
Endowment & investment income 1.75 
Note (a): The funding council grants for higher education provision include the Scottish Further and Higher 
Education Funding Council (SFC) grants for all provisions.  
Source: HESA, 2007. 
 
This Act led to a private contribution of 23.79% of funding for courses in higher education 
in England between 2005 and 2006 as Table 23 on the sources of funding for courses for higher 
education shows. But it also had the effect of increasing governmental contribution into higher 
education. Loans were subsidised because they had no real interest rate to cover for the costs of 
their tuition fees, and the Government also financed a maintenance grant175.  Moreover, the 
Government bore the risks associated with this loan system, because not all students would be 
                                               
174 Conversions at exchange rate £1 for 1.267 euros. 
175 The value of the grant was between 63.38 euros (GBP 50) and 3, 505 euros (£ 2, 765) per year depending on 
household income so that the grant and loans at their maximum threshold could cover all the costs of the academic 
year.  
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able to repay their loans in full (for example because of insufficient incomes and early deaths) and 
the debt was written off after 25 years.  
According to Government estimates in 2005, the overall student debt had increased to 
22.94 billion euros (House of Parliament, 2008)176.   
 
 
Table 24: Relative proportions of public and private expenditure (1995, 2004) 
 
1995 2004 
Country Public  private 1 Public  Private  
    Household 
Other 
private 
entities 
All 
private 
France m m 83.9 9.8 6.4 16.1 
UK 80 20 69.6 19.4 11.1 30.4 
OECD av. x x 75.7 x x 24.3 
EU19 av. x x 84 x x 16 
Note 1: Including subsidies attributable to payments to educational institutions received from  
public sources, results as percentages.  
Note 2: m stands for data not available and x for average not comparable with other levels of 
education and removed by OECD. 
Source: OECD, 2007: 221. 
 
In parallel to this diversification of funding, the Government increased funding for higher 
education by 5.51% for the academic year 1999/00.  But this increase was lower than the increase 
in the number of students; hence a relative reduction in public expenditure. As Table 24 shows, 
the relative proportion of public expenditure on educational institutions fell from 80% to 69.6% 
between 1995 and 2004 in the UK177.  
                                               
176 The net cost of the maintenance grant to the government was 1, 128 million euros a year, the maintenance loans 
938 million euros and the fee loans 1, 052 million euros. Those costs were of two types: cash flow costs, i.e. upfront 
costs; and fiscal costs, i.e. the costs of non-repayment. Those figures assume a RAB charge of 29% for maintenance 
loans and 42% for fee loans, under a 3.5% discount rate (Hansard, 2005). The RAB charge is the Resource 
Accounting Budgeting charge. It includes provisions for non-repayment and interest subsidies (Hodge, 2002; see also 
HM Treasury, 2004). 
177
 Table 24 uses data for the UK although this chapter concentrates on England because no international 
comparison could be found using England.  
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Thus, most of the policy changes after 1998 attributable to the Bologna process occurred in 
France. England continued the trends it had already started before 1998: reintroducing tuition 
fees and shifting toward ‘hard managerialism’ with more developed quality evaluations and 
accreditation mechanisms. France, on its side, significantly changed the structure of its degrees 
and modified its quality control system, which led, as previous literature has argued (Witte, 2006) 
to a convergence in general policy trends between both countries.  But changes were not limited 
to the objects that this study defined as less entrenched, i.e. qualifications framework and quality 
assurance. France also reformed its institutional management in 2006, giving more autonomy to 
universities after many failed attempts, and progressively opened up to consider the financial 
participation of private actors, fulfilling an ambition which had started prior to 1998. This 
suggests deeper changes in higher education policy than originally predicted in France.  
However, this chapter has so far described reforms referring to parallel developments in 
European deliberations. But this chronological coincidence is not sufficient to establish causality 
between European deliberative governance and domestic reforms. Other factors, notably 
domestic, may have influenced those reforms more than European deliberations. Besides, the 
mechanism through which European deliberative governance contributed, if at all, to those 
domestic reforms needs to be specified.  
The strategic impact of deliberation on domestic reforms 
European deliberations were indeed significant for domestic reforms, especially in the case 
of France. Because it acted mostly at the cognitive level, deliberative governance was significant in 
a more diffuse, indirect and non palpable way than some more tangible domestic factors, such as 
trade union opposition, parliamentary veto or political commitment. Deliberations did, 
nonetheless, trigger reforms. Deliberations facilitated the achievement of those reforms, by 
diffusing and crystallising arguments articulated around changes in socio-economic structures and 
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European integration which had been circulating among international meetings since the late 
1970s. When transferred to the domestic sphere, those arguments shifted domestic paradigms and 
reduced non-state actors’ opposition to domestic reforms. Importantly, this in turn made p 
changes in more entrenched policy areas easier to achieve over the long term.  
The literature partly acknowledges that changes in domestic paradigms facilitated domestic 
reforms. For example, Witte (2006: 459) explains that the reform of qualifications resulted in a 
‘national consensus’ for reforms in France despite original domestic opposition. Witte (2006: 296), 
like other authors (for example Ravinet, 2007), acknowledges that French governmental 
authorities used arguments from the Bologna process to back up their domestic reforms. She 
attributes the growth of this consensus to the strategy of Ministers, which consisted firstly in 
creating an umbrella level of qualifications before reforming the actual diplomas. The text below 
contributes to the literature by specifying how several Ministers used the Bologna process to shift 
domestic paradigms and more importantly how those new paradigms facilitate deeper reforms in 
other objects than the initial reform of qualifications framework.  
The new paradigm concurrent to domestic reforms  
 French and English officials, similarly to other signatories of the Sorbonne deliberations, 
actually used similar justifications to start the reforms of degrees and tuition fees in the late 1990s. 
Those justifications were extensively voiced during the Sorbonne conference and repeated in 
subsequent national deliberations (see for example CNESER, 1999). They articulated around 
socio-economic changes related to the increase in the number of students, i.e. the massification of 
higher education, international competition and changing needs of the labour market (Dearing, 
1997; Attali, 1998; MEN, 1998; Simone, 1993; Moscati, 2006; Witte, 2006; interview IT1, 05 
September 2007). In France and England, those justifications were also extensively explained in 
the national reports written in the wake of the Sorbonne declaration by Attali and Dearing.  
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Much data on the massification of higher education, and in particular on its costs, emerged 
in England in the late 1990s with the Dearing report. The Dearing report explained that the 
fivefold increase in the number of students from 1960 to 1995 resulted in a shortfall in capital 
expenditure estimated at 316.9 million euros (GBP 250 million) for equipment (Dearing, 1997: 3.4 
and 17.20)178. The report recommended that students provide a financial contribution toward the 
costs of their degrees to compensate for the financial shortfall of higher education, since they 
were the main beneficiaries of higher education (Dearing, 1997: 18.2)179.   
In France, the Attali report on European harmonisation (1998: 1.a and annex 7) underlined 
that the number of students increased from 310, 000 in 1960 to 1.2 million in 1980, leading to a 
growth of the student population far superior to the growth in public contributions. The Attali 
report (annex 16) subsequently concentrated on a criticism of the performance of higher 
education related to this massification, i.e. high failure rates, rather than on the costs of higher 
education as the Dearing failure rates for the academic year 1996-1997 ranged from 44.27% in 
sports to 90.53% in medicine after the first year of studies. And the access rate to the second 
cycle suggested that between 36% and 50% of the student population did not complete their first 
degrees in France in 1996/97 (CNESER, 1999).  
Government officials in both countries also justified domestic reforms in relation to the 
internationalisation of higher education. Students were becoming more and more willing to travel 
to receive a degree. And knowledge became a comparative advantage in a global economy. The 
Dearing report (1997: 17) saw a financial investment in higher education as necessary for 
universities to remain internationally competitive: ‘The UK will need to invest more in education and 
                                               
178 From 200, 000 to 1 million students. 
179 Further research on the financing of higher education came out after the Dearing report, with extensive cost-
benefit analysis studies in England (see for example Blundell et al, 1999 or Greenaway and Haynes, 2002). The 
government approved the Dearing plans for reform in its response (Department for Education and Employment 
(DfEE, 1998). 
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training to meet the international challenge’. The international market of higher education was 
particularly important to England, because universities could charge international students 
unregulated fees180.  
In France, Claude Allègre explained that he became concerned about the growing influence 
of India, China, Brazil and Australia in the economy and higher education (Allègre, 1993; 
interviews FF1, 02 May 2007, FCM1 28 April 2007). In his letter to request that Jacques Attali set 
up an investigative commission, he wrote that he aimed at “preparing France for the brain competition 
that the 21st century will constitute”. The Attali report (1998: annex 8) condemned the declining 
proportion of foreign students in French higher education from 12% in 1976-77 to 8.6% in 1996-
97.  
Later on, in a report from the influential think tank Institut Montaigne, Mérieux (2001:11) 
wrote: ‘Our higher education system is not fit to face international competition, i.e. to attract and train the best 
students’. The report advised increasing the managerial autonomy of universities, in order to give 
those institutions the tools to become more competitive internationally. And Aghion and Cohen 
(2004:63) from the French Council of economic analysis reported that: ‘the common discourse used to 
depict French universities is one of crisis, impossible reforms, even decline’. The French law proposal of 2007 
in France also used international competition as a justification: “Putting higher education and research 
at the level of the best in the world” was a key priority in the programme of the President for the 
elections (Sarkozy, 2007; see also Fillon and Pécresse, 2007).  
Another socio-economic change put forward by politicians was the transformation of 
labour market demands. Dearing (1997: 6.12) explained that the needs of the labour market were 
changing, requiring more rounded and pluri-disciplinary graduates. Attali (1998: I.B) also 
                                               
180 Some universities, such as the London School of Economics and Political Science, started a conscious strategy to increase 
their offer of postgraduate degrees which would be attractive to foreign students, at the same time increasing fees for 
overseas students, which jumped from around £5,000 for a master of science course in 1989/1990 to £9,000 in 
1999/2000 (LSE finance office, 2008; interviews, UKP1 09 February 2007; UKP2 13 February 2007).  
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underlined the changing needs of the labour market, in particular regarding the revolution in 
science and technology, and the demand for more business oriented degrees.  Attali 
recommended the creation of the European higher education area as an answer to those socio-
economic changes. A harmonised European higher education system would be more competitive 
and flexible according to this report.  
A paradigm emerging from earlier European deliberations but crystallised from 1998 
Since the Attali and Dearing enquiries took place at relatively the same time and before the 
Sorbonne deliberations, it would be tempting to think that the French and British ministers jointly 
influenced the arguments of the report. There was indeed some knowledge of the enquiries at 
least on the French side (Annex 3, Attali, 1998). In France, staff members attended the Attali 
enquiry as well as the Sorbonne and subsequently Bologna deliberations (interview FCM1, 28 
April 2007).  
Besides, the data was part of a constructed rhetoric. Many academics admittedly 
acknowledged the strain put on the welfare state over the past two decades (Castles et al; 2008: 
975) and socio-economic changes in the higher education landscape were undeniable. The 
number of students increased. Students were becoming more and more mobile. Businesses 
adopted a growing culture of risk and enterprise in Europe, in addition to becoming indissociable 
with new technologies and business. However, these socio-economic changes were cumulative, 
and started well before the end of the 1990s, sometimes as early as the 1960s (Neave, 1976).   
But to other academics, the use of data is always subjective, and corresponds to a political rhetoric 
with managerial aims (Grek and Lawn, forthcoming; Pollitt, 1993, Thatcher, 2007). Grek and 
Lawn (forthcoming: 3) explain how European ministers have used indicators to move European 
higher education policy away from a traditional perception of education as an aspect of culture to 
a paradigm on education which is more managerial and outcome oriented. The data presented 
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above on the massification of higher education, failure rates, international competitiveness and 
ability to match the needs of the labour market, by setting up subjective performance targets, 
helped to fulfil this aim.  
The socio-economic arguments presented in France and England can easily be 
deconstructed as subjective rhetorical tools rather than objective statistical data. Both 
Governments actually encouraged registration in higher education (Deer, 2002). Instead of a 
constraint, the figures on the growth of university students could also have been interpreted as 
the achievement of earlier political objectives.   
Moreover, the massification of higher education only became a problem because funding did not 
increase proportionally to the increase in the number of students. From 1993 until 1998, England 
increased its funding for higher education by 24% while the student population grew by 65% 
between 1990 and 1998 (National statistics, 2002; HESA, 2006). Real funding per student 
decreased by nearly one third between 1980 and 1990 (Greenaway and Haynes, 2002:152). The 
growth of the student population was also far superior to the growth in public contributions in 
France. France’s investment in higher education was below the OCDE mean and average by 0.1 
percentage points in 1995 (OECD, 2007). Hence, restrictive government policies, and not the 
increase in the number of students as such, led to the higher education system working over its 
capacity.  
Furthermore, France and England’s higher education and economic systems actually ranked 
comparatively well internationally. England, and more precisely the UK, constituted the second 
most attractive country in the world to attract foreign students, especially students from Asia but 
also numerous other countries (BBC, 2007) and the first in Europe (UUK, 2006:1). And England 
was becoming more – and not less – attractive internationally. In 1962–63 there were 28, 000 
overseas students in the UK. By 2001–02 there were about 225, 000 (Dfes, 2003:11). France was 
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the fourth most attractive country for international students, particularly those from Africa and 
was the country with the fifth highest number of world citations of scientific publications (UUK, 
2006).   
France and the UK ranked among the top half countries in the world regarding the percentage of 
the labour force with a tertiary education degree in 1998, according to World Bank indicators, a 
testimony to the ability of graduates to integrate into the labour force contradicting the worries 
underlined in the Attali and Dearing reports (ESDS, 2008).  
Those arguments articulated around socio-economic changes were therefore constructed 
and did not date from 1998. In fact, they emerged prior to the Sorbonne deliberations and had 
been circulating in epistemic communities181 and amongst policy-makers in international 
organisations since the late 1970s. At that time, amid continuing ideological and philosophical 
debates about the nature and applicability of performance indicators to education, the Centre for 
Educational Research and Innovation (CERI) of the OECD explored issues of educational 
reform in normative terms. International comparisons became more important with OECD 
indicators published from 1992 (Grek and Lingard, forthcoming: 11; interview FF7, 12 June 
2007). Those comparative indicators raised awareness about the performance of students by 
country, the progression in the number of students and their movements. According to Grek 
(2008:215), the introduction of those standards marked the emergence of a new paradigm among 
                                               
181 An epistemic community is ‘a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area. Epistemic 
communities have: 1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the 
social action of community members; 2) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices 
leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating 
multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; 3) shared notions of validity, that is, 
intersubjective internally defined, weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and 4) a 
common policy enterprise – that is a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their 
professional competence is directed, presumably out of conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a 
consequence’ (Haas, 1992: 3). 
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the international community of a ‘‘new’ European identity of competitive advantage and responsible 
individualism’.  
Even if the Sorbonne and Bologna deliberations were not the place where ministers 
discovered socio-economic arguments to justify reforms, those deliberations constituted the first 
time during which Ministers agreed to take a particular course of action regarding those socio-
economic changes at the European level. They decided on a common policy goal for Europe to 
tackle such changes. This common policy goal did not exist before and consisted in creating a 
European area of higher education and diffusing this paradigm to facilitate domestic reforms.  
Changing state-trade union relations  
The Bologna process diffused arguments which were previously circulating mostly among 
decision-makers and epistemic communities to other domestic actors, particularly non-state actors 
who were traditionally hostile to reform. Doing so, the Bologna process helped those actors 
accept the Government’s plans for reforms. This diffusion took place through domestic 
deliberations, but also through the direct participation of domestic non-state actors in European 
deliberations182. The relationships between Government officials and some staff and trade union 
representatives changed as a result, particularly in France, where most of the reforms explicitly 
related to the Bologna process occurred.  
Relationships with trade union representatives, with their strong ‘culture of confrontation’ 
(Boulin, 2000: 227) were the main obstacle to reforms in this country. Other domestic factors, 
such as parliamentary votes, were less significant. Many higher education projects did not adopt 
                                               
182 A large number of domestic conferences and deliberations organised by the Ministry or various other non-state 
actors such as universities and the CPU gathering different types of actors took place in addition to the European 
ministerial deliberations, follow-up meetings, conferences, seminars and working groups.   
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the legislative track. And a parliamentary majority did not automatically lead to the adoption of 
reform projects. For example, the conservatives enjoyed a large majority in France in 2003183:  
‘It’s true that at the start when we had just arrived we were saying: there’s a consensus on this law, 
we have 400 deputies in Parliament, there’s no real problem’. (Interview FCM3, 15 June 2007)  
 
Yet, the French law proposal was deferred until being taken out by the President despite its large 
majority (interview FCM3, 15 June 2007)184.  
Trade unions played a more significant role in the withdrawal of this project and they in 
general systematically opposed reforms. They conducted mass demonstrations against all the 
significant reform proposals in France, be it the Devaquet proposal of 1986 or the 2003 project 
by Luc Ferry. As mentioned earlier, the fear of an increase in insurrections was partly a reason for 
the rejection of the 2003 law proposal.  
Some trade unions even started off by opposing the reform of degrees in 1999. UNEF 
originally rejected the Attali report when presented in 1998 and even pushed for the resignation 
of Claude Allègre (UNEF, 1998). And SNESUP and UNEF perceived all aspects of the Bologna 
process as inextricably linked to a threat to equality in public service provision, leading to 
autonomous universities and an introduction of tuition fees (CNESER, 1999; Duharcourt, 2002; 
Monteux and Hérin, 1999; SNESUP, 1998b/1998c/2001, UNEF, 2002/2003b; interviews 
FTUA1, 5 May 2007; FUTS3, 24 May 2007)185. 
                                               
183 The main party UMP obtained a large majority of 309 seats out of 577 at the 2002 legislative elections, 344 
including all the right wing parties (UMP, UDF, RPF, FN and diverse right wing parties) (Assemblée nationale, 2002). 
184 In England, the Labour Government enjoyed a large majority of 160+ at the House of Commons to pass the 2004 
Higher education bill. Despite its large majority, the Labour influenced British bill got through with only a tight 
majority of 5 votes, at 316 vs. 311 votes, 71 Labour MPs voting against (House of Commons, 2004). 
185 Other non-state actors had a more moderate interpretation. They understood that the Bologna process was related 
to the Lisbon strategy, which aimed at liberalising higher education, but questioned the extent to which the private 
sector was gaining influence through the Process (interview FTUS4, 23 May 2007). Finally, a last category of actors, 
mostly from the more moderate students’ associations, preferred a literal interpretation of the Bologna process as 
facilitating students’ mobility through the elaboration of comparable criteria, without according any significance to 
any relationship with a potential liberalisation of higher education (Interviews FTUS1, 22 May 2007; FTUS2, 04 June 
2007).  
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Such opposition led to ‘impossible reforms’ (Aghion and Cohen, 2004: 63; Dearing, 1997, 
2.43). This resistance from French trade union representatives came from a long-lasting historical 
resistance to empowering higher education institutions:  
‘Interviewee: There are many people, student and staff trade unions especially student trade unions, 
who believe that equality equals uniformity. We are equal when we are the same. (…) Allègre’s logic, 
it’s differentiation. He fundamentally believes that equality must respect difference and that if there is 
uniformity, there is always one who dominates the other. (…)  
Interviewer: Don’t you think it’s a bit paradoxical, since academics normally like to have 
autonomy? 
Interviewee: You know, at university there are two things. There is the autonomy of the university 
and the autonomy of the academic. It’s not the same thing. Academics like to have autonomy for their 
own person (…) but when you talk to academics, the main part of academics does not want 
autonomy for the university. The majority prefers to have to deal with the State and Government ‘s 
rules rather than its own institution. They do not trust their own presidents for example. (…) They 
always play on the two fronts. For themselves, independence but for the institution they trust the 
state.”  (Interview FCM2, 22  May 2007) 
According to Musselin (2004), given that the creation of universities only dated from 1968, 
academics kept a sense of corporatism with more allegiance to their own faculty, which preceded 
universities, than to the university president.  Higher education academics preferred all 
universities to be equal and hence governmental regulation, not to give away power to the 
university presidents.  
Admittedly, reforms could go through despite trade union opposition in other countries. In 
the 2004 reform in England, representatives from student and staff trade union NUS, AUT and 
NATFHE opposed the introduction of variable fees as a matter of principle (NUS, 2004, 2004b, 
2004c, and 2007)186.  The demonstrations at the end of October 2003 attracted a turnout of 
31,000 according to NUS (BBC, 2003).  
But trade unions had more influence in France because they had more formal fora for 
representation and communication with the Government than in England. Trade union 
                                               
186 Heads of universities were generally in favour of the legislative proposals of 2004 in England and 2003 and 2007 
proposals in France (For England, see Standing Conference of Principals, 2003 and UUK, 2003; for France, see CPU, 
2003 and 20 minutes, 2007). 
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representatives were elected in the CNESER, the consultative body where all the projects for 
higher education were deliberated on before adoption187. Since many projects were decrees and 
hence not discussed in Parliament, the CNESER debates in a way replaced parliamentary debates 
and gave an indication of the level of opposition of trade unions to a given project188. In contrast, 
trade unions had limited bargaining and formal mobilisation capacity in England since the 
Thatcher era and distanciation with the Labour Government (Waddington, 2000: 601-603).  
Despite opposing reforms as a matter of principle and seeing them as linked to a 
‘threatening’ neo-liberal plan, French trade union representatives hardly contradicted the rhetoric 
of socio-economic changes and European integration put forward by the Government with the 
Bologna process and sometimes changed their positions as a result (Lauton et al., 1998 and 
SNESUP, 1998; UNEF, 2000/2003). For example, UNEF representatives, who originally rejected 
the proposals of the Attali report (UNEF, 1998), agreed in principle with the European 
recognition of diplomas in three levels and the promotion of students’ mobility after the national 
deliberations on the Bologna process - propositions which were contained in the Attali report in 
the first place (UNEF, 2000). 
Many actors recognise the role of the Bologna process in changing the attitudes of trade 
union representatives. Those actors explain:  
“The fact that we started off an important movement on the LMD, behind there are a lot of things 
which are typically French in the decrees but we took advantage of it. There are many things, which 
allowed us to get things that were not moving move. I saw CFDT189 (a major French staff trade 
union) for example, which was rather against, when we signed Bologna and they saw that it was not 
only the story of the Sorbonne, they accepted to sign things. It served as a lever, that’s clear. For 
example, the decree on the “grade de master”, it’s really… This one philosophy has been accepted by 
                                               
187 Trade unions also had positions in other bodies such as the CNOUS. CNOUS stands for Centre National des Oeuvres 
Universitaires et Scolaires. The CNOUS obtained legal status with the law 55-425 of 16 April 1955 and managed the 
students’ financial support system. 
188 Avoiding the legislative track eliminated the risk of an intense publicisation of debates on the sensitive topic of 
higher education.  
189 SGEN-CFDT was a trade union federation.  
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the CFDT after the signature of Bologna. The initiative of Claude Allègre was useful for 
something”. (Interview FCM1, 28 April 2004).  
“They [trade unions] couldn’t resist the reforms because it was Europe. They didn’t want to look 
ridiculous. There were many other countries which had signed in and they didn’t want to look 
ridiculous” .(Interview FCM2, 22 May 2004). 
 
An actor perceived that the argument of European integration helped Claude Allègre 
reform the maquettes nationales.  
“Allègre realised that if we had questioned the content of maquettes nationales directly in France; we 
would have been knocked down, while by taking the way of Europe, you see, we did two in one. On 
the one hand open up to Europe, on the other we do the maquettes nationales. We could have done the 
European opening without the maquettes nationales, but Allègre did not want to. It’s a bit like 
contouring what could have been an opposition”. (Interview FCM 2, 22 May 2007)  
Trade union representatives therefore adapted their attitudes to consent to the reforms. 
This change of attitudes from trade union representatives was admittedly strategic, and not only 
arose based on learning on its own. The quotes suggested that trade union representatives did not 
want to have to face ‘blaming and shaming’ by European counterparts: ‘They didn’t want to look 
ridiculous’ (interview, FCM2, 22 may 2004). But European deliberations, by exposing actors to the 
threat of ‘blaming and shaming’ and diffusing a new paradigm of socio-economic changes and 
European integration in domestic deliberations that actors did not contradict, contributed to this 
change.  
Direct participation in European deliberations and changes in civil society 
The transfer of arguments and the acquisition of a new paradigm among non-state actors 
did not only occur through a transfer from European deliberations between government officials 
to domestic deliberations between government officials and trade union representatives. The 
direct participation of trade unions representatives in deliberations also contributed to the shift in 
paradigm.  
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For example, student representatives gained gradual recognition as participants in Bologna 
process deliberations through the European representation of national trade unions formerly 
known as ESIB190. The Prague communiqué of the 19th of May 2001 welcomed the involvement 
of student representatives191. The Berlin communiqué of the 19th of September 2003 recognised 
them as full members of the process, sitting in the Bologna Follow-Up Group (BFUG). At the 
same time as the participation of students in European deliberations increased, UNEF members 
started questioning their strategy of systematic opposition to governmental reforms. A 
communication from its national colloquium of February 2003 wrote:  
‘We must formalise our project and adapt our trade union method not to fall in caricatural dissenting 
positions of what a student trade union (the first trade union in the student environment) must be. By 
opposing, contesting and using sterile trade union methodologies, UNEF is getting stuck on the 
LMD file’. (UNEF, 2003b:6).  
This adjustment was not only the result of learning, but also corresponded to strategic 
motivations. An interviewee explained:  “our aim is to defend students’ rights, so we had to be in it [the 
Bologna process] to resist as much as possible and limit the breakage” (Interview FTUS3, 24 May 2007). 
The Bologna process, because it was in the making, had relatively loose formal structures and 
presented opportunities for trade unions to be at the same level as state actors. For example, 
French students’ trade unions made the ministerial representative modify the Berlin communiqué 
to include a statement on higher education being ‘a public good and a public responsibility’ in a bargain 
where the ministerial representative hoped that students would limit their opposition to the 2003 
legislative proposal as a result (Interview FCM3, 15 June 2007). This participation of trade union 
representatives in Bologna process supranational deliberations may not have entirely distracted 
them from the national sphere, as the opposition to the law project on the autonomy of 
universities of spring 2003 showed. But it made some non-state actors realise that they needed a 
                                               
190 ESIB, the National Union of Students in Europe, became the European Union of Students (ESU) in 2007.  
191 The Prague communiqué also recognised the declaration that the universities and students’ representatives signed 
regarding the Bologna process in Salamanca on 29-30 March 2001 and Göteborg on 24-25 March 2001.  
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certain amount of collaboration with government officials to be chosen as part of the national 
delegation and to be taken seriously at the European level.  
Facilitating deeper reforms 
The paradigm shift started by supranational deliberations contributed to stimulate a 
willingness to address the issue of financial contribution as well as a certain openness toward the 
2007 law on the freedom and responsibilities of universities in France.  
France started introducing measurements of the costs of higher education, thereby 
stimulating a debate on the financing of higher education and student contribution after 
European deliberations urged countries to do so. This effort corresponded to the European 
Council (2001) recommendation to produce comparative data on education efficiency, including 
the costs of higher education, advice endorsed by the Berlin communiqué of the 19th of 
September 2003.  
In the late 1990s, financial data was largely absent in France, be it in international studies 
such as the OECD or in governmental publications. The French Ministry used to publish some 
general statistics through its annual Repères et références statistiques, but those statistics merged higher 
education with primary and secondary education. Two official reasons were put forward to 
explain this lack of data. First, it was difficult to know what the overall budget of universities was, 
because funding came from different ministries. Second, even if the Ministry had this data, it was 
not willing to make it public: ‘we look at those numbers everyday in the Ministry but they are not made 
available to the public’ (interview FF9, 12 June 2007).  
An awareness of the need for financial data increased in the mid-2000s (Aghion and Cohen, 
2004: 83; Witte, 2006: 269). According to an interviewee:  
“Those are figures [on financing] on which we work all the time. But they are not public. They are not 
public institution by institution. They are not public. We do not say to Lyon I what Lyon II has received 
as financing, and the same with evaluations. But the set up of the AERES starts from the principle of 
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transparency, because on this principle, those are public funds which go to public institutions. Public funds 
come from taxes from all citizens so there is no reason for not having a minimum of transparency on this 
subject. It was not the case until now.” (Interview FF9, 12 June 2007) 
 
In 2007, the Direction de l’Evaluation de la Prospective et de la Performance (DEPP) of the Ministry 
prepared and published l’Etat de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche, the first publicly available 
summary of how much money went into higher education as a whole. Providing information on 
the costs of higher education was the first step to publicly addressing the issue of the financial 
contribution of different actors including students192.  
Following on, a connection between European deliberations and the 2007 law exists. 
According to an interviewee, the reforms related to the qualifications frameworks which were 
directly related to the Sorbonne declaration and the reforms of institutional management in 
France were inseparable: ‘The LMD and the LRU [Loi relative aux libertés et responsabilités des 
universités], they are indistinguishable. We cannot separate them. We cannot change the governance of universities 
without changing their pedagogy and their offer of courses at the same time’. (Interview FCM8, 24 and 25 
September 2009).  
This quote underlines the relationship between the contents of a reform on qualifications 
framework and on institutional management which follows the network structure of attitudes in 
chapter 3: a reform of qualifications framework (shortening degrees), leads actors to think more 
broadly about who should decide on those qualifications and hence to deliberate on the 
management and autonomy of universities.  
It also stresses the similarities in style of implementation between the two reforms. The 
2007 law was implemented through the principle of voluntary application that Claude Allègre 
                                               
192 Although beyond the timeframe of this research, it is worth mentioning that in 2009, the Direction générale de 
l’enseignement supérieur et de l’insertion professionnelle (DGSIP) published the global budget received by each French 
university for teaching and research.  
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originally foresaw for the reform of degrees ‘LMD’ in 1999. Universities applied to the Ministry 
themselves to ask for a transfer to increased competencies and autonomy. Twenty universities 
after 85 became autonomous from the 1st of January 2009 (Le Monde, 2009). Unlike the reform 
of degrees, the Ministry did not adopt a series of framework circulars and decrees to satisfy the 
request from central regulation from non-state actors. Its main concession was to set a deadline, 
i.e. 2012, for implementation following the request from the CPU (interview FCM8, 24 and 25 
September 2009). France therefore continued to adopt a more university-centred policy style 
based on higher education institutions’ voluntary involvement as opposed to central regulation.  
The development of comparative indicators played a key role in this new policy style, 
motivating institutional involvement in reforms through benchmarking and competition. The use 
of indicators was a fairly recent government tool in higher education policy in France, which 
started with the Bologna process. Those indicators started with figures on failure rates from 1998, 
and extended to comparing universities on their budget and professional insertion figures 
(interview, FCM8, 24 and 25 September 2009). This mode of governance reflected the European 
Council (2001: 14) and the European Commission (2003:3) recommendations and more generally 
the techniques used in the open method of coordination and the Bologna process.  
Admittedly other factors contributed much more directly to the adoption of this law, such 
as timing and a strong political commitment. According to some, scheduling the discussion in 
Parliament over the summer month of August guaranteed that students would not be around 
universities to coordinate demonstrations (interviews FTUS4, 23 May 2007 and FCM8, 24 and 25 
September 2009). When students came back to university in October, the law was already 
adopted193. Timing however does not fully explain the adoption of the reforms: consultations on 
the 2007 law proposal actually began on the 24th of May 2007 just after the election of President 
                                               
193 In contrast, the 2003 law project was announced in May, giving enough time for stakeholders to mobilise against 
the law before the holiday period. 
Chapter 7 Impact on policy changes in France and England 
 
 232 
Sarkozy (Le Monde, 2007). Trade unions would have had time to oppose the law at that 
consultation stage.  
A strong political commitment with a new President had a more direct impact on the 
adoption of this law. Higher education was a priority area of reform during the presidential 
campaign and extensively discussed by the president (Sarkozy, 2007). Topics such as the 
autonomy of universities became key during the presidential elections of 2007 (see Débat.fr, 2007; 
interview FF2, 21 May 2007). And the reform of universities was one of the very first projects 
that Nicolas Sarkozy undertook at the beginning of his presidential mandate. The commitment 
from the President was shared by other members of his Government. Nicolas Sarkozy chose a 
former Minister of Education and Research as his Prime Minister, François Fillon194, who 
promised a large budget for higher education reforms. Some of François Fillon’s colleagues from 
the Ministry of Education and Research such as Jean-Marc Monteil, the former Director General 
for Higher Education195, followed him to his cabinet, accentuating the stress on higher education 
reforms (interviews FCM 6, 24 September 2009; and FCM8, 24 and 25 September 2009). 
Demonstrations started on the 25th of October 2007, but the Government continued the reforms 
(Le Monde, 2007b).  
As a comparison, the project of law on the autonomy of higher education institutions of 
2003 did not benefit from the same political commitment. It created internal splits within the  
governing party. Francois Bayrou, from the same party as Luc Ferry, nonetheless took a public 
stand against Ferry’s project for the autonomy of universities (Interview FCM3, 15 June 2007). In 
contrast to England where Tony Blair actively pushed for the 2004 higher education act at the 
same time, the French President and Prime Minister did not strongly support the 2003 law project 
for two reasons. The first one was that the “boat was full” (interview FCM 3, 15 June 2007): the 
                                               
194 François Fillon was minister of education and research from 31 March 2004 until 2 June 2005.  
195 Jean-Marc Monteil was Director General for Higher Education from 2002 until 2007.  
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Government was already pushing for pensions reforms (Musselin, 2003). The second reason was 
the memory of the 1986 unrest created by the previous attempt to give more autonomy and 
freedom for universities to diversify their sources of finances remained. Alain Devaquet was 
presidential advisor for higher education in 2003, and, fearful of a repetition of the upheavals that 
his project had created seven years before, advised not to support the reforms:  
Interviewee: ‘Luc Ferry (…) wasn’t a politician himself. He came from civil society so he didn’t 
have a core of deputies to put pressure on the Government. He didn’t have much political support. 
[…] And may I add to that a reason according to me important is that close to Jacques Chirac, the 
higher education Advisor, do you know who he was?  
Interviewer: No, not at all.  
Interviewee: It was Alain Devaquet. He was State Minister to universities and had himself been 
subject to some unrest and very important student demonstrations in 1986. Someone died during 
those demonstrations. So there was from the Elysée… as soon as we had demonstrations, we were 
begged, saying are you really sure? Universities look upside down. Isn’t it going to spread? So there 
was always a kind of … fear of an insurrectional climate which means we have not been supported. 
We were told go for it, but if it blows never mind, we’ll get rid of the Minister. That was never said 
like this, but overall that’s what we felt. And at the end we finally heard the speech”. (Interview 
FCM3, 15 June 2007) 
 
Moreover, the 2003 legislative project may also not have been passed through because the 
new paradigm had not crystallised yet in the domestic arena:  
“There were two electroshocks, which were firstly the Shanghai ranking, and secondly the report of the 
Economic Analysis Council (….) which showed that the economic future of a country was a function 
of the training level of its children, and that in particular if we were not able to have at least 50% of 
a generation at the level of a bachelor we would not pass the technological barrier and we would be 
reduced to an economy of imitation, but without being able to cross the barrier to become an economy 
of innovation. (…) I think that after that minds matured and mentalities have changed and everyone 
was aware over all the territory that if we do not agree on what we should do, in any case we cannot 
leave the system like this.’ (Interview FCM 3, 15 June 2007)  
According to this interviewee, the paradigm shift on institutional management occurred 
after the 2003 legislative project. This shift started to have an effect on domestic actors from 2004 
according to him, with the report from Aghion and Cohen (2004) and the first Shanghai ranking. 
The Shanghai ranking classified the first 500 universities in the world and stressed international 
competition (Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 2004). The first French higher education institution 
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in the ranking came in 65th position, mostly behind American universities, and a few British 
universities (Compagnon, 2004). Aghion and Cohen’s report also referred to international 
competition, but also acknowledged the role of European integration196. The 2007 reforms 
benefited from this paradigm shift, which meant that the public opinion was requesting and was 
supportive of more autonomy (interviews FCM6, 24 September 2009; FCM8, 24 and 25 
September 2009). (Chapter 5 documented those changes in opinions for participants of the 
Bologna process). The opposition to the law, leading to demonstrations from November 2007, 
was actually led by the most radical leftwing trade unions such as the Ligue Communiste 
Révolutionnaire LCR, the Confédération Nationale du Travail CNT, SUD-Etudiants and was not 
supported by students, who actually voted against blockages (Cédelle et al., 2009; interviews 
FCM6, 24 September 2009; FCM8, 24 and 25 September 2009; Jacqué, 2009).  
In addition, the Bologna process, by tackling the least entrenched topics first, encouraged 
progressively deeper reforms. These cumulative reforms followed a conscious governmental 
strategy in France. An interviewee explains:  
 “The Bologna process reform was rather clever. When we want to reform in France, there are two 
solutions; either we have a strong political commitment which helps to make reforms go through. For 
example, during the preceding Government, there was the reform of pensions. There were people on 
the street, but well, the Government had a strong political commitment so it went through. But you 
also need the political situation which makes it possible to go for it. Or you set up a softer process 
which enables actors to progressively implement the reform”.  (Interview FF4, 7 June 2007) 
Aghion and Cohen (2004: 113) presented a similar logic for progressive reform. They 
argued that using curricular reforms justified by European declarations would facilitate the 
differentiation between universities and their concentration in excellence centres which would 
force universities to adopt further reforms. The potential of the Bologna process to justify 
                                               
196 The Shanghai ranking got a larger public coverage in France than in England, which was already used to university 
rankings, for example with the Good University Guide published by The Times since 1992 (Woolcock, 2008). Moreover, 
the British Government and higher education sector was at the time busy debating the reform of tuition fees.  
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reforms and create more in-depth reforms explains why, despite six changes of ministers and four 
changes of prime ministers over 1997-2007 (leftwing from 1997 until 2002, rightwing thereafter), 
the French Government kept on implementing and referring to the Sorbonne declaration, a 
stability characterised by some as unusual and surprising (Witte, 2006: 289).  
 
To sum up, some convergence in general policy content occurred between France and 
England, particularly in the levels of design of degrees and quality control and resulting mostly 
from changes in France after 1998. The chronology of those changes corresponded to the order 
of change predicted in network structures of attitudes in chapter 3. In the first phase (1998-
2002/3003), the French Government implemented the reform of degrees to have two clear levels 
(undergraduate and postgraduate). In a second phase (from 2003), French higher education also 
shifted from accreditation to a posteriori quality control while the English Government 
encouraged a priori accreditation. Finally, in a third phase (from 2007), change occurred in more 
policy objects, the French Government adopting a law on the institutional management of 
universities, being more transparent regarding the costs of higher education and open to a debate 
on student participation in the funding of higher education.  
This convergence was part of a more active governmental strategy than the candid 
constructivist view would lead us to believe. Successive ministers used the Bologna process to 
promote changes in qualifications framework and quality assurance in France. But the influence 
of Bologna process deliberations stretched further than those less entrenched reforms. It 
crystallised the emergence of a new paradigm in the making among the international epistemic 
communities and decision-makers since the 1970s, a paradigm centred around the massification 
and internationalisation of higher education and changes in the labour market. The Bologna 
process set clear policy goals around this paradigm with the need to achieve European integration 
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to survive in a time of globalisation of higher education, massification and labour market changes. 
Such paradigms were then diffused to domestic actors using European integration and the 
Bologna process as an argument for persuasion. This new paradigm came to non-state actors 
through domestic deliberations as well as direct participation at the European sphere. It led to 
changes beyond those of policy content in France, modifying political relationships, with the 
Bologna process acting as a tool to facilitate the relationships between trade unions and the 
Government, softening the resistance to deeper reforms (at the same time as it gave those non-
state actors more bargaining power within the realm of ministerial strategies) and shifting the style 
of implementation toward a less centralist and more voluntary approach. English Government 
used parts of this paradigm to justify its own reforms, but was more distant regarding the use of 
European integration.  
On the other hand, the Bologna process should not be attributed more importance than 
one of a facilitating factor acting mostly at the cognitive and strategic levels and playing an 
indirect role in entrenched objects. Other domestic factors had a more explicit influence on 
entrenched domestic reforms. The French reforms constituted long-lasting ambitions of various 
politicians in France, who actually designed the Bologna process to provide more legitimacy and 
convince other actors of the reforms (chapters 6 and 7). And when the political leadership, 
parliamentary coalition and timing joined to form a window of opportunity, European 
deliberations facilitated the adhesion of non-state actors, by progressively changing their attitudes 
(as seen in chapter 5) leading to an acceptance of changes in policy content on deeper aspects, for 
example raising the issue of the costs of higher education and financial contribution and leading 
to a reform of institutional management in France. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, this research initially set out to explain the chronology of policy changes in 
European higher education over the past decade, in other words investigating why some policy 
objects changed more than others. It matched those changes to a European enterprise of 
deliberative governance, the Bologna process. Deliberative governance was defined in procedural 
terms as involving the direct participation of state and non-state actors, with actors exchanging 
arguments in a particular policy space and reaching an agreement which could be non-binding. 
Consequently, the thesis proceeded to assess how empirically relevant deliberative governance 
was for policy change. It concentrated on assessing the constructivist hypothesis according to 
which deliberation led to a convergence of attitudes, defined as evaluations on a proposition, and 
policies (Eriksen and Neyer, 2003; Wessels, 1998).  
This research showed that the constructivist hypothesis as such did not explain the 
chronology of reforms. Most of the existing assessments of this hypothesis did not offer a 
reflection on the conditions under which deliberation had an impact on different policy objects. 
Instead, existing assessments in the EU deliberation literature took the form of a normative 
defence of deliberation, considered a priori as more desirable than other forms of decision-
making (Eriksen and Neyer, 2003) or of an ‘either/or’ choice in favour of either constructivism or 
rationalism (Lewis, 1998; Jacobsson and Viffell, 2003; Magnette and Nikolaidis, 2004).  
This research drew inspiration from cognitive theories to suggest an alternative way to think 
about the impact of deliberative governance in European integration studies (Quine, 1951; 
Festinger, 1953; Ajzein and Fishbein, 1975; Axelrod, 1976; Moscovici, 1980; Eagly and Chaiken, 
2003; List, 2008; Mackie, 2008). The research relied on the level of entrenchment of objects to 
explain their likelihood to change. More precisely, the thesis tested three hypotheses: H1. 
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Deliberation at the European level leads to participants changing their attitudes. H2. Deliberation 
inspires a new domestic paradigm to facilitate domestic reforms. H3. The level of attitude and 
policy change induced by deliberation is a negative function of the level of entrenchment of the 
relevant propositions.  
In other words, some policies have changed more than others in Europe because they were 
less entrenched and hence more likely to become affected by reform goals defined during 
European deliberations. European deliberations were not the sole factor to explain those reforms. 
But those deliberations significantly contributed to facilitate domestic reforms in a cognitive way 
by unveiling new options and arguments and in a strategic way by readjusting the courses of 
actions of actors given those new options and arguments. More importantly, because all policy 
objects relate to each other to form a consistent cognitive map, European deliberations, by 
facilitating reform in a less entrenched object such as the qualifications framework, contributed to 
further reforms in more entrenched objects, such as institutional management. 
The thesis used three lenses to test those hypotheses, a survey of participants, case studies of 
deliberations and a comparative study of policy changes in chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
Studying the impact of deliberative governance on policy change is informative to 
understand under which conditions deliberation is consequential, i.e. has an impact on policy-
making. Hence this chapter first comes back to those conditions for consequential deliberative 
governance. Doing so, it stresses the relevance of analyses taking into account both micro and 
macro levels especially for the literature on European higher education. It second underlines the 
relevance of cognitive theories for the European integration research programme.  
Achieving a consequential deliberative governance  
Deliberative governance is consequential, depending on certain conditions, not only at the 
level of group decision-making at the European level (Lewis, 1998; Eriksen and Neyer, 2003; 
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Jacobsson and Viffell, 2004; Magnette and Nikolaidis, 2004). The impact of deliberation also 
depends on domestic constraints.  A first contribution of this thesis was to articulate those 
European and domestic constraints.  
European level conditions  
At the level of European decision-making, several factors influence the impact of 
deliberation on attitudes. Deliberation changed attitudes mostly on less entrenched policy objects, 
i.e. the qualifications framework and quality control, as seen in chapters 5, 6 and 7. In addition, 
learning in deliberation only occurred when it suited participants’ interests and it was contingent 
on trust, triggered by prior international exposure, similar interests and professions and could 
come from a conformist majority as well as from an innovative minority (chapters 5 and 6). 
Finally, principals’ changes of attitudes were more visible than these of agents: the attitudinal 
changes of principals turned into policy decisions and bore many policy consequences (chapter 6).  
Domestic conditions  
But the impact of deliberation was not limited to how much it changed the attitudes of its 
participants at the decision-making level. It also depended on domestic constraints. One of those 
constraints was the relationship between state and non-state actors. Non-state actors were the 
main opponents to domestic reforms in higher education policy and state actors used 
deliberations strategically to convince other actors to reform.  
The impact of deliberations on this relationship between state and non-state actors took 
place through a variety of mechanisms. Governmental actors learnt about policy options such as 
shorter degrees which they then used in domestic reforms to convince domestic non-state actors 
of reform plans. They also were inspired to use arguments to convince domestic actors and shift 
existing domestic paradigms. In the Bologna process, those new arguments articulated around 
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socio-economic changes including the massification of higher education, the changing needs of 
the labour market and the internationalisation of higher education which emerged from 
international platforms in the late 1970s (chapter 7).  
Participation itself was also part of actors’ strategies. Participation in European deliberations 
legitimated the subsequent policy decisions taken on the basis of these deliberations, as well as 
raising the political profile of participants if the deliberations concluded with an agreement. In 
addition, the participation of domestic non-state actors directly in European deliberations, or in 
domestic deliberations on a related theme, triggered learning of domestic non-state actors from 
other member state actors, non-state actors becoming more open to domestic reforms as a result. 
On their side, domestic non-state actors were keen to take part in deliberations because they 
perceived it as securing access to an additional sphere to gain political influence, with the 
possibility of gaining close contact with governmental actors and possibly striking bargains.  
Implications 
Incorporating domestic constraints as a condition for deliberative governance to have an 
impact bears several implications. First, the impact of deliberation should not be overestimated. 
Changes triggered by deliberation occur mostly at the cognitive level, altering policy arguments, 
goals and relationships between actors. The influence of deliberation on policy content and style 
depends on many other variables, such as the commitment of decision-makers, governing 
coalitions or the timing of reforms. And deliberative governance is at best a facilitator, but not the 
main trigger, of reforms. Political interests precede deliberation, which provides a way to achieve 
those interests. For example, the polyarchic character of deliberation is a key feature of 
deliberative governance. It stimulates learning as some have argued (Sabel and Zeitlin, 2007). But 
learning does not occur solely as a result of the deliberative institution itself. Instead, learning and 
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the deliberative enterprise itself are triggered by the strategic goals of some actors trying to 
convince others.   
Secondly, this exploration of the strategic motivations of deliberation shows that a 
distinction between learning and strategy is not necessary. Deliberation does not modify 
participants’ interests as most constructivist advocates would argue (Eriksen, 2003: 160). But 
learning is necessary in a world of incomplete information and participants learn if it fits their 
strategic interests.  
The role of strategies explained why representational attitudes changed more than motivational 
attitudes. Participants were more willing to learn about new facts and arguments which reinforced 
their interests than to change their preferences during deliberation. In the Sorbonne deliberation, 
the French and Italian ministers changed their preferences on the length of degrees because this 
satisfied their interests in domestic reforms.  
Thirdly, the significance of interests opens studies on deliberative governance197 to the 
concerns of a broader European integration literature. Political actors’ interests are shaped by 
their positions in the domestic arena, as liberal intergovernmentalists argued (Moravcsik, 1993). 
The domestic context therefore needs to be taken into account in studies on European 
deliberations, as researchers concentrating on discourse do (Radaelli and Schmidt, 2005). 
Finally, taking into account the domestic context in a European decision-making analysis as 
this thesis does, i.e. relating micro and macro levels of analysis, provides an original perspective 
on the Bologna process. Existing studies on the Bologna process either concentrate on decision-
making or on implementation (Racké, 2005; Ravinet, 2007; Witte, 2006). This thesis supports 
some of the implementation studies’ claims of domestic policy convergence (Witte, 2006). This 
convergence occurs more particularly among policy goals, contents and styles and is the result of 
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unequal movements between countries, some reforming more than others. This research 
nevertheless also acknowledges that differences possibly remain on a narrower level of analysis, 
university-wide for example, which was not included in this thesis (Mignaud-Gérard and 
Musselin, 2005).  
This thesis adds to the European higher education literature by going beyond describing the 
extent of this convergence and the domestic constraints on this convergence. It also explains how 
particular institutional features of EU decision-making, and more particularly deliberative 
governance, stimulate domestic convergence.  
Deliberative governance in the Bologna process is part of a feedback loop between attitudes 
of policy-makers at the European level and their domestic context.  Decisions during Bologna 
process deliberations related to domestic constraints. For example, decisions concerning 
institutional design, such as whether to integrate non-state actors like university representatives, 
corresponded to a willingness to facilitate implementation. And domestic implementation was 
influenced by actors’ behaviour in deliberations. The French Minister was very involved in 
Bologna process deliberations, initiating the Sorbonne declaration, and used Bologna 
deliberations extensively for domestic reforms. Conversely, the British Minister was more distant, 
and did not use Bologna deliberations for domestic reforms. To sum up, the domestic context, 
and particularly the relationship with non-state actors, shapes participants’ strategies and attitudes 
in deliberations. At the same time, deliberative governance facilitates the implementation of policy 
goals. And hence both levels of analysis need to be taken into account to fully understand the 
dynamics of change in the Bologna process.  
The role of cognitive theories for European integration studies 
Relying on hierarchies of attitudes from cognitive theories (such as Quine, 1951; 
Festinger, 1953; Ajzein and Fishbein, 1975; Axelrod, 1976; Moscovici, 1980; Eagly and Chaiken, 
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2003; Mackie, 2008; List, 2008) represents a key contribution of this research and generates 
several possibilities for further research.  
Predicting the direction of reforms 
Another contribution of this thesis was to use cognitive theories as a motor to predict the 
direction of reforms in higher education. Existing theories have predicted that changes in ideas 
result in institutional change (Radaelli, 2003; Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999). Other theories perceive 
that different policy objects have a different propensity to change (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999).  
This thesis, using network structures, adds to the existing literature by suggesting that 
because policy objects are related, reforms, when part of a non-binding framework, spread 
progressively toward more and more entrenched objects. In terms of higher education policy, the 
process of change led Europe toward a more economically liberal higher education system, 
starting with the design of degrees and quality control to progressively incorporate elements of 
institutional management and financial contribution. Such analysis of higher education reforms 
puts the Bologna process at the centre of a general reform of European higher education. It 
provides a broader vision than existing partial studies which see the Bologna process as 
concentrating on only one object of higher education policy, such as university degrees (Witte, 
2006). The hierarchy of change in network structures of attitudes and the direction of reforms in 
Europe lead this thesis to make predictions for future reforms in European higher education. 
These reforms are bound to continue the diversification of sources of funding for universities and 
the implementation of institutional autonomy.  
Institutional design 
The connection of policy objects in a network structure bears consequences in terms of 
institutional design. In other words, deliberative modes of governance need to start by tackling 
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less entrenched policy aspects to have an impact. If a deliberative institution concentrates on a 
very entrenched object from the start, it will face more resistance because related and less 
entrenched objects have not changed yet.  
In addition, cognitive theories stressed that voluntary participation was a key feature of 
deliberative governance. Notwithstanding the need to have a central body undertaking the 
material and logistical costs of deliberation, participants need be willing to listen to each other to 
learn about each other’s arguments. The four early signatory states in the Sorbonne had a strong 
motivation to achieve an agreement because they voluntarily agreed on it without external 
coercion and felt that they somewhat ‘owned’ the process in the Sorbonne deliberations. 
Voluntary participation also motivates policy implementation among non-state actors. Non-state 
actors are willing to take on the costs of implementation if they voluntarily engage in deliberations 
and feel that their input is valued. They also feel less threatened by implementation if they have 
the option of opting out.  However, actually opting out and not implementing is less likely given 
the risk of ‘blaming and shaming’ by participants from other member states.  
Awareness of the hierarchy of reforms, in addition to voluntary participation, constitute two 
key aspects to be preserved for deliberative governance to be a consequential policy tool as the 
Bologna process becomes more and more related to the European Community framework  and 
starts a new phase of its development post-2010 (European ministers responsible for higher 
education, 2009).  
However, finding that reforms go more and more in depth may simply be the consequence 
of the unique chronology of reforms in the Bologna process, and not the sign of a general 
principle regarding the impact of deliberation on policy objects which are always interrelated as a 
scheme. Further tests in other policy areas could assess the validity of this claim and aim at 
extending the applicability of network structures to explain policy change. Other policy areas with 
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significant European deliberative platforms and non-binding agreements include the areas where 
the open method of coordination has developed. For example, a comparison could be drawn with 
research or environmental policy, to inform and complement the existing literature on the impact 
of learning on policy change in those areas (Gornitzka, 2005; Knill and Shikano, 2009).  
A cross-sectoral comparison would have the advantage of also systematically analysing how 
the various institutional designs of deliberations affect its impact. This research touched upon a 
comparison of institutional designs, with the Sorbonne and Bologna comparisons. It showed that 
learning was more likely to occur – since it resulted in changes in motivational attitudes - in the 
informal and small-sized setting of the Sorbonne deliberations than in the more formally 
structured and encompassing environment of the Bologna deliberations.  
However, since other factors could have explained differences in learning, mentioned earlier 
as the proximity of interests, type of participants and trust between those participants, this 
comparison does not provide enough evidence to make any conclusions regarding the 
institutional setting.  
A comparison with more policy areas would control for those different intervening 
variables and make suggestions for the design of deliberation. Such institutional designs could 
include the level of openness and number of participants or deliberative fora. Suggesting 
institutional designs would address concerns regarding the feasibility of deliberation which have 
emerged in the political philosophy literature (Estlund, 2008; Chappell, 2008)198 which are 
reflected in the European integration literature by critics of non-binding modes of governance 
such as the open method of coordination (Chalmers and Lodge, 2003). It would also make some 
suggestions on how to balance apparently contradictory objectives of European deliberations, for 
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example the need to combine the fostering of trust, which arises from a similarity of interests, and 
the creation of a polyarchy involving actors of different interests to facilitate domestic reforms.   
Building theoretical bridges 
This thesis also contributes to existing research by stressing the linkage between European 
integration studies and broader fields of social sciences, in particular cognitive theories (such as 
Ajzein and Fishbein, 1975; Axelrod, 1976; Moscovici, 1980; Eagly and Chaiken, 2003). Studies of 
European integration are of relevance to cognitive theories. Cognitive theories tend to 
concentrate on learning and are often tested through experiments and public opinion studies 
(Fazio et al., 1986; Boucher et al. 2007; Fishkin et al., 2007).  
But European deliberations provide a different setting than experiments and public opinion 
studies. Participants in European deliberations generally hold clear and rooted goals, interests and 
strategies, with presumably greater differences between them as their nationalities differ than in 
experimental or public opinion designs. Participants in European deliberations also act under 
particular constraints, above mentioned as domestic and European level constraints. This research 
added to tests on cognitive theories by showing the applicability of those theories to a complex 
policy environment such as European policy-making and by incorporating actors’ strategies to 
deal with policy constraints on deliberative learning.  
At the same time, cognitive theories are of relevance to European integration. 
Understanding cognition led this thesis to theoretically model the reaction of a participant to 
deliberation, his policy decisions and the resulting policy outcome. This thesis also added to 
European integration studies and public policy in general by refining existing efforts to use 
cognitive structures, showing in particular that policy objects do not only obey a hierarchy 
(Sabatier, 1998; Hall, 1993; Majone, 1989; Knill and Lemschow, 1999), but that they can also 
influence each other to create policy change across all objects.  
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Moreover, relying on cognitive theories provided an alternative to the debate between 
rationalists and constructivists of value to European integration studies. The cognitive approach 
of this thesis showed how learning, a priori closer to a constructivist interpretation, was more 
likely for less entrenched objects and could occur in a rationalist framework of self-interest and 
strategic pursuit.  
Finally, European integration studies are not separated from but are a subset of political 
science. Debates in European integration studies often mirror broader questions in political 
science as a whole. In that respect, the contributions that this thesis brought regarding the 
conditions of consequential deliberation, the articulation of policy objects in a scheme, the 
transgression of the constructivist versus rationalist divide as well as the combination of different 
levels of analysis, are also of interest to political science as a whole. Further research should 
continue using input from broader fields of social sciences in European integration studies and 
political science. It should do so particularly to add evidence to the claim according to which 
deliberation matters.  
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Appendix 
Chronology of adoption of reforms regarding the structure of degrees and financial 
management in the EU-27 since the late 1990s 
  Degree structure Financial management   
Austria 1999 2002   
Belgium (Flemish) 2004 2008   
Belgium (French) 2004    
Bulgaria 1995 2008   
Cyprus 2005    
Czech Republic 1998 1998   
Denmark 2006 2006   
Estonia 2002 2009   
Finland 2004 2007 (P) 
France 1999 2007   
Germany 1998 2005   
Greece  2007   
Hungary 2005 2005   
Ireland  1997   
Italy 1999 2008   
Latvia 2000 2006 (P) 
Lithuania 2000 2006   
Luxembourg 2003[1]    
Malta     
Netherlands 2002 2007   
Poland 2005 2005   
Portugal 2005/2006 2007   
Romania 2004 2001   
Slovakia 2002 2002   
Slovenia 2004    
Spain 2005    
Sweden 2007 2009 (P) 
United Kingdom  1998   
Average reform year 2002 2004   
Note: includes years for the adoption of relevant legislation, regulation, governmental strategy or 
proposal (if not adopted yet at the time of redaction of this research and marked with a P) 
Note [1]: Luxembourg has complied with the three level structure of qualifications since the 
creation of the university of Luxembourg with the law of 12 August 2003 (Eurydice, 2007: 208) 
Source: Eurydice (2007) and Eurydice (2009). 
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List of interviews 
Code Date 
AT1 12 September 2007 
AT2 17 September 2007 
D1 18 September 2007 
D2 20 September 2007 
D3 19 September 2007 
EF1 04 July 2007 
EF2 04 July 2007 
EF3 12 September 2007 
EF4 12 September 2007 
EF5 12 September 2007 
EU1 02 July 2007 
EU2 12 September 2007 
FCM1 28 April 2007 
FCM2 22 May 2007 
FCM3 15 June 2007 
FCM4 19 June 2007 
FCM5 13 July 2007 
FCM6 24 September 2009 
FCM7 10 July 2007 
FCM8 24 and 25 September 2009 
FF1 02 May 2007 and August 2006 
FF2 21 May 2007 
FF3 16 May 2007 
FF4 07 June 2007 
FF5 14 June 2007 
FF7 12 June 2007 
FF9 12 June 2007 
FM1 02 April 2007 
FP1 28 April 2007 
FPA1 23 May 2007 
FPA2 25 May 2007 
FPA3 12 June 2007 
FPA4 09 June 2007 
FTUA1 05 May 2007 
FTUS1 22 May 2007 
FTUS2 04 June 2007 
FTUS3 24 May 2007 
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FTUS4 23 May 2007 
FTUS5 07 May 2007 
IT1 05 September 2007 
IT2 05 September 2007 
IT3 06 September 2007 
IT4 September 2007 
IT5 10 September 2007, e-mail communication 
IT6 September 2007, e-mail communication 
IT7 September 2007, e-mail communication 
IT8 02 September 2007 
P1 23 August 2006 
P2 23 August 2006 
P3 20 August 2006 
P4 20 August 2006 
P5 20 August 2006 
SF1 28 February 2007 
SF2 04 April 2007 
STUA1 01 March 2007 
UKA1 20 February 2007 
UKA2 15 March 2007 
UKA3 07 February 2007 
UKA4 18 July 2007 
UKCM1 24 April 2007 
UKF1 27 February 2007 
UKF2 27 February 2007 
UKF3 16 March 2007 
UKF4 12 June 2007 
UKM1 06 February 2007 
UKP1 09 February 2007 
UKP2 13 February 2007 
UKPX 09 February 2007 
UKTUA1 27 March 2007 
UKTUA2 22 February 2007 
UKTUA3 11 June 2007 
UKTUAX 27 March 2007 
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Paper version of online questionnaire 
Welcome 
Welcome to the survey on the Bologna Process. This questionnaire asks about your personal opinions on certain 
aspects of the Bologna Process, and higher education policy more generally. It also asks you how your opinions on 
those issues may have changed. The questionnaire aims at gathering crucial information for my doctoral research, and 
I would be very grateful if you could take a few minutes to fill it in. It should not take more than 15 minutes of your 
time. All the answers are anonymous, confidential, and will have no commercial use. Thank you very much for taking 
the time to do it! 
Note that once you have clicked on the CONTINUE button at the bottom of each page you can not return to review 
or amend that page. 
 
Section 1 Personal details 
 What was your function while involved in the Bologna process? 
Minister or secretary of state 
Representing a minister or secretary of state 
Academic 
BFUG secretariat 
Head of university (i.e. rector or equivalent) 
Civil servant for national government 
Civil servant for European institution 
Diplomat-national representation 
University administrator 
Student 
Other 
If other, please specify 
 
Which organisation were you representing while involved in the Bologna process?  
University 
National government of a country member of the Bologna process 
National government of a country non-member of the Bologna process 
National students' organisation 
European students' organisation 
Rectors' conference 
European Commission 
European Parliament 
Council of Europe 
EUA 
EURASHE 
ENQA 
UNESCO-CEPES 
Other 
If other, please specify 
 
Which country were you representing? Please insert "Europe" if you were not representing a particular country. 
 
Please tick the dates of the start and of the end of your involvement in the Bologna process. 
Start 
Before 1997 
1997 
1998 
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1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Still involved 
End 
Before 1997 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Still involved: 
 
5. Please indicate approximately how many meetings you have attended. 
5.a. Interministerial conference 
0 
1 – 2 
3 – 4 
5 – 6 
7 – 8 
9 – 10 
11 ->11 
All 
5.b. Board (or preparatory group) meeting  
0 
1 – 2 
3 – 4 
5 – 6 
7 – 8 
9 – 10 
11 ->11 
All 
5.c. BFUG members' (or follow-up group) meeting 
0 
1 – 2 
3 – 4 
5 – 6 
7 – 8 
9 – 10 
11 ->11 
All 
5.d. BFUG working group 
0 
1 – 2 
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3 – 4 
5 – 6 
7 – 8 
9 – 10 
11 ->11 
All 
5.e. Bologna follow-up seminar 
0 
1 – 2 
3 – 4 
5 – 6 
7 – 8 
9 – 10 
11 ->11 
All 
5.f. Other European conference, seminar or meeting 
0 
1 – 2 
3 – 4 
5 – 6 
7 – 8 
9 – 10 
11 ->11 
All: 
5.g. National follow-up group meeting 
0 
1 – 2 
3 – 4 
5 – 6 
7 – 8 
9 – 10 
11 ->11 
All 
5.h. National seminar or conference 
0 
1 – 2 
3 – 4 
5 – 6 
7 – 8 
9 – 10 
11 ->11 
All 
5.i. Other national meeting 
0 
1 – 2 
3 – 4 
5 – 6 
7 – 8 
9 – 10 
11 ->11 
All 
5.j. International conference, seminar or meeting 
0 
1 – 2 
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3 – 4 
5 – 6 
7 – 8 
9 – 10 
11 ->11 
All 
 
6. How often did you have one-to-one or smaller group meetings, on a formal or informal basis, with representatives 
from other countries or from European institutions? 
Never 
Hardly ever 
Sometimes 
Often 
Very often 
6.a. How often did you have one-to-one or smaller group meetings, on a formal or informal basis, concerning the 
Bologna process in your own country? 
Never 
Hardly ever 
Sometimes 
Often 
Very often 
 
Section 2: Personal opinion on involvement in the Bologna process 
7. How do you think the meetings referred to at questions 5 and 6 have influenced your opinions on higher education 
related issues? 
They have strengthened my opinions on certain issues 
They have moderated my opinions on certain issues 
They have changed my opinions on certain issues 
They have not influenced my opinions on any issue at all 
I don't know 
 
8. How much do you think you have learnt on higher education policy from those meetings? 
I have learnt a lot 
I have learnt on some aspects 
I have learnt very little 
I have learnt nothing 
I don't know 
 
9. Were you involved in implementation at the national level? 
Yes 
No 
9.bis. If yes, how useful do you think those meetings were in implementing reform at the national level? 
Very useful 
Fairly useful 
Neither useful nor useless 
Fairly useless 
Very useless 
I don't know 
 
Section 3: Opinion on government intervention 
10. To which extent do you agree or disagree with the statement that "everyone has enough to live a fulfilling life in 
this society"? 
Strongly agree 
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Tend to agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Tend to disagree 
Strongly disagree 
I don't know 
 
11. People have different views about the ideal society. Please read each ones of the following alternatives and tick 
the one which comes closest to your ideal.  
A society in which the creation of wealth is more highly regarded 
A society in which the caring for others is more highly rewarded 
I don't know 
 
Section 4: Opinion on competitivity between universities 
12. To which extent do you agree or disagree with the statement that "there is no competition to attract students 
between universities"? 
Strongly agree 
Tend to agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Tend to disagree 
Strongly disagree 
I don't know 
 
13. Would you prefer universities to...  
Compete among each other to attract students? 
Not compete among each other to attract students? 
I don't know 
 
Section 5: Social dimension 
14. According to you, how much does the Government fund higher education in your country? 
0-9% 
10-19% 
20-29% 
30-39% 
40-49% 
50-59% 
60-69% 
70-79% 
80-89% 
90-100% 
I don't know 
 
15. If the full cost of one year of undergraduate study was 15.000 euros (fees and maintenance), and you were the 
government official deciding whether or not to help financing the costs of this year of study, would you prefer to... 
15.a. Decide that the Government pays for the entire 15.000 euros for each student 
First preference 
Second preference 
Third preference 
15.b. Decide that the Government pays for part of the 15.000 euros, either contributing to the maintenance costs or 
university costs of that year of studying 
First preference 
Second preference 
Third preference 
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15.c. Decide that the Government in general does not pay any of the 15.000 euros, but can provide financial 
assistance to students coming from the poorest families 
First preference 
Second preference 
Third preference 
 
16. If you would like to expand on the previous question, please indicate how you would ideally decide to finance this 
full year of studying in the space below. 
 
Section 6: University autonomy 
17. Please indicate to which extent you agree or disagree with the statement that "universities lack autonomy to design 
programmes to teach first cycle students (i.e. undergraduates) in this country". 
Strongly agree 
Tend to agree 
Neither agree nor disagree 
Tend to disagree 
Strongly disagree 
I don't know 
 
18. Please rank the following options as if you had to design a programme for first cycle (i.e. undergraduate) teaching 
for a university in your country. 
18.a. I am happy to let the Government decide on the programme 
First preference 
Second preference 
Third preference 
18.b. I am happy to design the programme and then obtain the Government's approval on it 
First preference 
Second preference 
Third preference 
18.c. I am happy to design the programme without any governmental interference 
First preference 
Second preference 
Third preference 
 
19. If you would like to expand on the previous question, please indicate how you would prefer to supervise the 
design of university programme in the space below. 
 
Section 7: Qualifications framework 
20. To which extent do you agree or disagree with the statement that "the qualifications frameworks across Europe 
are different"? Please indicate your level of agreement on a scale of 1 to 100, with 100 meaning that you fully agree. 
Please write "don't know" if you don't know about the issue. 
 
21. How many years would you ideally like the first cycle (i.e. undergraduate degree) to take?  
Two years 
Three years 
Four years 
I don't know 
Other (please specify) 
21.bis. How many years would you ideally like the second cycle (i.e. masters degree) to take? 
One year 
Two years 
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I don't know 
Other (please specify) 
 
22. What is the length of time that you dislike the most for the first cycle (i.e. undergraduate degree)? 
Two years 
Three years 
Four years 
I don't know 
Other (please specify) 
22..bis What is the length of time that you dislike the most for the second cycle (i.e. masters degree)? 
One year 
Two years 
I don't know 
Other (please specify) 
 
23. Do you think credits toward the degree should be measured according to... 
The learning outcome? 
The number of hours worked? 
I don't know 
 
Section 8: Quality assurance 
24. To which extent do you agree with the statement that "quality assurance systems are very different across 
Europe"? Please indicate a number from 1 to 100 with 100 meaning that you fully agree. Please write "don't know" if 
you don't know about the issue. 
 
25. Please rank the following options by order of preference. 
25.a. Quality assurance should rely on European peer review  
First preference 
Second preference 
Third preference 
25.b. Quality assurance should mostly rely on external peer review  
First preference 
Second preference 
Third preference 
25.c. Quality assurance should mostly rely on internal evaluation  
First preference 
Second preference 
Third preference 
 
26. If you would like to expand on the previous question, please indicate a quality assurance system that you would 
prefer to have. 
Change of opinion on government intervention, competitivity, and social dimension 
If you now try to think of your opinions before your involvement in the Bologna Process, could you tell me 
which of the answers to each of the following questions would have been closest to your position at the time? 
Section 9: State involvement in higher education 
27. Before your involvement in the Bologna process, to which extent would you have agreed or disagreed with the 
statement that "everyone in this society has enough to live on"? 
Strongly agreed 
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Tended to agree 
Neither agreed nor disagreed 
Tended to disagree 
Strongly disagreed 
I don't know 
 
28. Please read each of the following alternatives, and tick the one which would have come closest to your view of the 
ideal society before your involvement in the Bologna process.  
A society in which the creation of wealth is more highly rewarded 
A society in which the caring of others is more highly rewarded 
I did not have an opinion on this matter at the time 
 
Section 10: Competitivity 
29. At the time, to which extent would you have agreed or disagreed with the statement that "universities compete 
among each other to attract students"? 
Strongly agreed 
Tended to agree 
Neither agreed nor disagreed 
Tended to disagree 
Strongly disagreed 
I don't know 
 
30. Would you have preferred universities to...  
Compete among each other to attract students? 
Not compete among each other to attract students? 
I did not have an opinion on this matter at the time 
 
Section 11: Social dimension 
31. According to you, how much did the Government fund higher education in your country at the time?  
0-9% 
10-19% 
20-29% 
30-39% 
40-49% 
50-59% 
60-69% 
70-79% 
80-89% 
90-100% 
I don't know 
 
32. If you had been a Government official deciding on the financing of the 15.000 euros corresponding to the costs 
of one year of full-time undergraduate study (maintenance and fees), would you have liked the most to have decided 
that... 
The Government pays for the entire 15.000 euros for every student 
The Government pays part of the 15.000 euros, either contributing to the maintenance costs or university costs of 
that year of studying 
The Government in general does not pay any of the 15.000 euros, but can provide financial assistance to students 
coming from the poorest families 
I did not have an opinion on those matters at the time 
Other (please specify) 
 
33. If you had been a government official deciding on the financing of the 15.000 euros corresponding to the costs of 
one year of full-time undergraduate study (i.e. maintenance and fees), which option would you have disliked the 
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most? 
The Government pays for the entire 15.000 euros for every student 
The Government pays part of the 15.000 euros, either contributing to the maintenance costs or university costs of 
that year of studying 
The Government in general does not pay any of the 15.000 euros, but can provide financial assistance for students 
from the poorest families 
I did not have an opinion on those matters at the time 
Other (please specify) 
Change of opinion on universities autonomy, quality assurance and qualifications 
framework 
In the same way as in the previous page, if you try to think of your opinions before your involvement in the 
Bologna Process, could you tell me which of the answers to each of the following questions would have been 
closest to your position at the time? 
Section 12: Universities' autonomy 
34. Before your involvement in the Bologna process, to which extent would you have agreed or disagreed with the 
statement that "universities lack autonomy to design undergraduate teaching programmes in this country"?  
Strongly agreed 
Tended to agree 
Neither agreed nor disagreed 
Tended to disagree 
Strongly disagreed 
I don't know 
 
35. If you had had to design a new degree undergraduate teaching programme for a university in your country at the 
time, which option would you have been the happiest with?  
I would have been happy to let the Government decide on the content of the programme 
I would have been happy to design the programme and then get the Government's approval on it 
I would have been happy to design the programme without any governmental interference 
I did not have an opinion on this matter at the time 
Other (please specify) 
35.a. Which option would you have been the most unhappy with? 
I would have been most unhappy to let the Government decide of the content of the programme 
I would have been most unhappy to design the programme and then get the Government's approval on it 
I would have been most unhappy to design the programme without any governmental interference 
I did not have an opinion on this matter at the time 
Other (please specify) 
 
Section 13: Qualifications framework 
36. Please indicate the level of agreement with the statement "qualifications frameworks across Europe are different" 
you would have had at the time by indicating a number from 1 to 100, with 100 meaning that you fully agreed. Please 
indicate "don't know" if you did not know about this issue at the time.  
 
37. How many years would you ideally have liked the first cycle (i.e. undergraduate degree) to take? 
Two years 
Three years 
Four years 
I did not have an opinion on this matter at the time 
Other (please specify) 
37.a. How many years would you ideally have liked the second cycle (i.e. masters degree) to take? 
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One year 
Two years 
I did not have an opinion on this matter at the time 
Other (please specify) 
 
38. Which of the following options would you have disliked the most for the length of the first cycle? 
Two years 
Three years 
Four years 
I did not have an opinion on this matter at the time 
Other (please specify) 
38.a. Which of the following options would you have disliked the most for the length of the second cycle? 
One year 
Two years 
I did not have an opinion on those matters at the time 
Other (please specify) 
 
39. At the time, did you think credits toward a degree should have been based on... 
The learning outcome? 
The number of hours worked? 
I did not have an opinion on these matters at the time 
 
Section 14 Quality assurance 
40. Please indicate to which extent you agreed with the statement that "quality assurance systems were very different 
across Europe" at the time by writing down a number from 1 to 100 (100 meaning that you fully agree). Please write 
"don't know" if you didn't know about that matter. 
 
41. If you had had to redesign a quality assurance system for your country at the time, which quality assurance system 
would you have liked the most? 
A quality assurance system mostly relying on European external peer review 
A quality assurance system mostly relying on national external peer review 
A quality assurance system mostly relying on internal peer review 
I did not have any opinion on this matter at the time 
Other (please specify) 
 
42. Which quality assurance system would you have disliked the most?  
A quality assurance system relying mostly on European peer review 
A quality assurance system relying mostly relying on national external peer review 
A quality assurance system relying mostly on internal evaluation 
I did not have any opinion on this matter at the time 
Other (please specify) 
 
Personal details and international experience 
Section 15 Personal details 
43. What is your gender? 
Male 
Female 
 
44. How old are you? 
Appendix 
  
 287 
15-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-54 
55-64 
65 and above 
 
45. What is your country of residence? 
 
46. What is your nationality? 
 
Section 16 International experience 
47. For how long a period, if any, have you studied abroad? 
I have not studied abroad 
Less than a year 
One year 
Two years 
Between three and five years 
More than five years 
 
48. For how long a period, if any, have you worked abroad (on a paid or unpaid basis)? 
I have not worked abroad 
Less than a year 
One year 
Two years 
Three to five years 
More than five years 
 
49. Is the Bologna process your only source of exposure to the European level? 
Yes 
No 
 
50. Please write down any other comments you may have in the following box 
 
51. If you are willing to participate in a short interview, please select yes and write down your name and e-mail 
address in the appropriate space. Thank you! 
Yes 
No 
51.a. Name 
51.a.i. E-mail address 
Thank you! 
You have now completed the survey. Thank you very much for taking the time to fill it in. 
If you have kindly accepted to be contacted for an interview, I will be in touch with you shortly.  
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Comparison between the original and final drafts of the Sorbonne declaration  
Par. First draft 11 May 1998 Final draft 21 May 1998 Par. 
 ‘A proposal for a joint declaration on harmonisation of the 
European higher education system  
Harmonisation of the architecture of the European higher 
education system 
 
 There was a time when students would freely circulate throughout 
Europe 
Suppressed  
1  Universities were born there, three quarters of a millennium ago.  
Our four countries boast some of the oldest, which are in these years 
celebrating important anniversaries, as the University of Paris is 
going today for its 800th. In the last thirty years, public demand for 
higher education has grown in huge proportions. However, despite 
several incentives, the majority of our students graduate without 
having had the benefit of a study period outside of national 
boundaries. The times of Erasmus seem in that respect long gone.  
Universities were born in Europe, some three quarters of a 
millennium ago. 
Our four countries boast some of the oldest, which are 
celebrating important anniversaries around now, as the 
University of Paris is doing today. 
In those times, students and academics would freely circulate 
and rapidly disseminate knowledge throughout the continent. 
Nowadays, too many of our students still graduate without 
having had the benefit of a study period outside of national 
boundaries. 
2  
2 Europe is not only that of the Euro, of the banks and the economy: 
it must be a Europe of knowledge as well. The intellectual, cultural, 
social and technical dimensions of our continent have to a large 
extent been shaped by its universities. We owe our students a higher 
education system in which they are given the best opportunities to 
seek and find their own area of excellency.  
The European progress has very recently moved some 
extremely important steps ahead. Relevant as they are, they 
should not make one forget that Europe is not only that of 
the Euro, of the banks and the economy: it must be a Europe 
of knowledge as well. We must strengthen and build upon 
the intellectual, cultural, social and technical dimensions of 
our continent. These have to a large extent been shaped by 
its universities, which continue to play a pivotal role for their 
development. 
 1  
 2 We must prepare them for the jobs of the future, with a spirit for 
enterprise, and open mind towards international experience, in a 
system that allows for progress of knowledge through commitment 
to research. 
We are heading for a period of major change in education 
and working conditions, to a diversification of courses of 
professional careers, with education and training throughout 
life becoming a clear obligation. We owe our students, and 
our society at large, a higher education system in which they 
are given the best opportunities to seek and find their own 
area of excellence.  
3 
  An open European area for higher learning carries a wealth 4  
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of positive perspectives, of course respecting our diversities, 
but requires on the other hand continuous efforts to remove 
barriers and to develop a framework for teaching and 
learning, which would enhance mobility and an ever closer 
cooperation.  
 3  The international recognition and attractive potential of our systems 
are directly related to their external and internal readability. We must 
explore ways to harmonise our respective curricula, so that our 
diplomas become both comparable and compatible: this will allow 
not only for student mobility, but will also transform the possibility 
for European citizens to use their degrees in order to get a job in 
other member countries into a reality.  
The international recognition and attractive potential of our 
systems are directly related to their external and internal 
readabilities. A system, in which two main cycles, 
undergraduate and graduate, should be recognised for 
international comparison and equivalence, seems to emerge.  
5 
 4 We are headed to a period of major change in working conditions, to 
a diversification of the courses of professional careers, with 
permanent education becoming a clear obligation. Following their 
first university diploma, students should be able to return to the 
academic world, in order to reach, through continued education, a 
higher level of qualification. The production of knowledge and the 
ways of teaching that new knowledge are changing fast; new 
relationships between states, firms and society and the march 
towards and intellectually and technologically more unified Europe 
challenge us to demonstrate our ability to evolve.  
  
 5  Most countries, not only with Europe, have become fully conscious 
of the need to foster such evolution.  
Most countries, not only within Europe, have become fully 
conscious of the need to foster such evolution. The 
conferences of European rectors, university presidents, and 
groups of experts and academics in our respective countries 
have engaged in widespread thinking along these lines.  
11 
5 A convention, recognising qualifications in higher education within 
Europe, was agreed on last year in Lisbon.  
The convention set a number of basic requirements and 
acknowledged that any country could engage in an even more 
favourable system.  
Standing by its conclusions, we can build on it and go further. 
European countries, and our four countries in particular, should 
A convention, recognising higher education qualifications in 
the academic field within Europe, was agreed on last year in 
Lisbon.  
The convention set a number of basic requirements and 
acknowledged that individual countries could engage in an 
even more constructivist scheme. Standing by these  
conclusions, one can build on them and go further. There is 
12  
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benefit from a simpler, more readable system of degrees. already much common ground for the mutual recognition of 
higher education degrees for professional purposes through 
the respective directives of the European Union.  
 6  The Conference of European rectors, university presidents, and 
groups of experts and academics in our respective countries have 
engaged in widespread thinking about this topic. All seem to 
converge to a system in which two main cycles, an undergraduate 
and a graduate one, should be clearly recognised for international 
comparison and equivalence. Much of the originality and flexibility in 
using this system will be based on the capitalization of credits (such 
as in the ECTS scheme) and semesters. This will allow for validation 
of these acquired credits for those who chose continued education 
and wish to be able to acquire true diplomas throughout life. There is 
no need to challenge other previously established diplomas, which 
may allow for a finer local scale of qualification at all levels.  
Much of the originality and flexibility in this system will be 
achieved through the use of credits (such as in the ECTS 
scheme) and semesters. This will allow for validation of these 
acquired credits for those who choose initial or continued 
education in different European universities and wish to be 
able to acquire degrees in due time throughout life. Indeed, 
students should be able to enter the academic world at any 
time in their professional life from diverse backgrounds.  
6 
7  Undergraduates would have access to a diversity of programs, with 
emphasis on a major and minor, on mastering two languages at least, 
on being introduced to the new information technologies. 
Undergraduates should have access to a diversity of 
programmes, including opportunities for multidisciplinary 
studies, development of a proficiency in languages and the 
ability to use new information technologies.  
7  
 
7 Recognition of the bachelor’s degree as an appropriate level of 
qualification is a major key for the success of this endeavour, in 
which we wish to make our higher education schemes clear to all.  
International recognition of the first cycle degree as an 
appropriate level of qualification is important for the success 
of this endeavour, in which we wish to make our higher 
education schemes clear to all.  
8 
 
7 In the graduate cycle, there would be a choice between a shorter 
master’s degree and a longer doctor’s degree, with possibilities to 
transfer from one to the other at various levels. In both graduate 
degrees, emphasis would be placed on research and autonomous 
work.  
In the graduate cycle there would be a choice between a 
shorter master’s degree and a longer doctor’s degree, with 
possibilities to transfer from one to the other. In both 
graduate degrees, appropriate emphasis would be placed on 
research and autonomous work.  
9  
7 In any graduate diploma, students would learn about innovation and 
research as a culture and as a praxis [sic]. During both cycles, 
students would be encouraged to spend one or two semesters in 
universities outside their own countries. 
At both undergraduate and graduate level, students would be 
encouraged to spend at least one semester in universities 
outside their own countries. At the same time, more teaching 
and research staff should be working in European countries 
other than their own. The fast growing support of the 
European Union for the mobility of students and teachers 
10  
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should be employed to the full.  
 8 We hereby commit ourselves to encouraging the definition of a 
common frame of reference, which can both improve external 
readability and facilitate student mobility as well as employability. 
Our governments have a significant role to play to this end, by 
defining ways in which acquired knowledge can be validated and 
respective diplomas from one country can be better recognized by 
the other. We expect this to promote further inter-university 
agreements, which can of course, at the individual level, be even 
more favourable. Progressive harmonisation of our degrees and 
cycles can be achieved through strengthening of already existing 
experience, joint diplomas, experimentation of volunteers, and 
dialogue with all concerned.  
We herby commit ourselves to encouraging a common frame 
of reference, aimed at improving external recognition and 
facilitating student mobility as well as employability.  
13 
  Our governments, nevertheless, continue to have a 
significant role to play to these ends, by encouraging ways in 
which acquired knowledge can be validated and respective 
degrees can be better recognised. We expect this to promote 
further inter-university agreements. Progressive 
harmonisation of the overall framework of our degrees and 
cycles can be achieved through strengthening of already 
existing experience, joint diplomas pilot initiatives, and 
dialogue with all concerned.  
12  
9  The 800th anniversary of the University of Paris, today here in the 
Sorbonne, offers us a solemn opportunity to engage in the common 
endeavour to create a European space of higher education, where 
national identities and common interests can interact and strengthen 
each other for the benefit of Europe, of its students, and more 
generally of its citizens. We call on other Member States of the 
Union and other European countries to join us in this objective and 
on all European Universities to effort to consolidate Europe’s stand 
in the world through continuously improved and updated education 
of its citizens.  
The anniversary of the University of Paris, today here in the 
Sorbonne, offers us a solemn opportunity to engage in the 
endeavour to create a European area of higher education, 
where national identities and common interests can interact 
and strengthen each other for the benefit of Europe, of its 
students, and more generally of its citizens.  
We call on other Member States of the Union and other 
European countries to join us in this objective and on all 
European universities to consolidate Europe’s standing in the 
world through continuously improved and updated education 
for its citizens. 
13 
Note: ‘par.’ in the first and fourth columns stands for ‘paragraphs’.  
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Comparison between the drafts of the Bologna declaration 
Par. Guy Haug proposal 26 March 
1999 
Italian proposal 
26 March 1999 
Amended declaration 
05 May 1999 
Final declaration 19 June 
1999 
 Declaration of ministers at the 
Bologna conference – a 
suggestion 
Scheme for the joint 
declaration of the Ministers for 
higher education convened in 
Bologna on the 19 June 1999 
 Joint declaration of the 
European ministers of education 
1 We, ministers in charge of higher 
education in the Member states of 
the European Union and other 
European countries, 
Unprecedented political 
awareness of importance for 
European construction 
(process) to extend itself, in 
particular to Europe of 
knowledge, is spreading: 
Europe of knowledge must be 
given more strength and 
substance to implement 
citizenship and for 
employability. 
The European process, thanks 
to the extraordinary 
achievements of the last few 
years, has become an 
increasingly more concrete and 
relevant reality for the Union 
and its citizens. Enlargement 
perspectives as well as 
deepening relations with other 
European countries, 
particularly those of the EES, 
attribute to that reality even 
wider dimensions. In the 
meanwhile we witness a 
growing awareness in large 
sectors of the political and 
academic world and of the 
public opinion of the necessity 
to bestow more complete and 
far-fetching contents to the 
European construction, in 
particular building upon 
strengthening its intellectual, 
cultural, social and technical 
The European process, thanks 
to the extraordinary 
achievements of the last few 
years, as become an increasingly 
concrete and relevant reality for 
the Union and its citizens. 
Enlargement prospects together 
with deepening relations with 
other European countries, 
provide even wider dimensions 
to that reality. Meanwhile, we are 
witnessing a growing awareness 
in large parts of the political and 
academic world and in public 
opinion of the need to establish 
a more complete and far-
reaching Europe, in particular 
building upon and strengthening 
its intellectual, cultural, social 
and scientific and technological 
dimensions. 
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dimensions. 
2 Building on the results achieved 
through the growing efforts 
undertaken in the last decade by 
governments, the European 
Union, universities and 
associations to foster exchanges, 
mobility and cooperation in 
higher education in Europe 
Much has happened since 
Sorbonne declaration, which in 
the above framework appealed 
on European countries to 
create European space of 
higher education 
The Europe of knowledge is 
now widely recognised as an 
irreplaceable factor for growth 
and as an indispensable 
component to consolidate and 
enrich the European 
citizenship, capable of 
providing the citizens with the 
necessary competences for 
facing the challenges of the 
new millennium together with 
the awareness of shared values 
and of belonging to a social 
and cultural common space. 
A Europe of knowledge is now 
widely recognised as an 
irreplaceable factor for social 
and human growth and as an 
indispensable component to 
consolidate and enrich the 
European citizenship, capable of 
giving its citizens the necessary 
competences to face the 
challenges of the new 
millennium, together with an 
awareness of shared values and 
belonging to a common social 
and cultural space. 
3 Furthering the initiative taken by 
ministers who signed the 
Declaration of the Sorbonne in 
May 1998 or subsequently 
adhered to it, 
Many have signed; (by June 
hopefully a majority will have 
signed) 
 The importance of education 
and educational co-operation in 
the development and 
strengthening of stable, peaceful 
and democratic societies is 
universally acknowledged as 
paramount, the more so in view 
of the situation in South East 
Europe. 
4 Paying full attention to the diversity 
of cultures, languages and 
educational systems and traditions 
in our countries and Europe in 
general, as well as to the 
autonomy of institutions of higher 
education as defined in each 
country, 
Reforms showed concrete 
adherence to Sorbonne 
principles 
The Sorbonne declaration of 
 The 25th of May 1998, 
underpinned by such 
considerations, stressed the 
Universities central role for 
developing the European 
cultural dimensions and singled 
out the creation of the 
The Sorbonne declaration of 25 
May 1998, which was 
underpinned by these 
considerations, stressed the 
Universities’ central role in 
developing European cultural 
dimensions. It emphasised the 
creation of the European area of 
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European area of higher 
education as a pivotal means to 
favour the mobility of the 
citizens, their employability 
and the Continent’s 
development. [par 3 in original 
version] 
higher education as a key way to 
promote citizens’ mobility and 
employability and the 
Continent’s overall development. 
5 Herewith declare our common 
determination to: 
Universities reacted very 
positively, accepted the 
challenge. 
Several European countries 
have accepted the invitation to 
engage themselves in the 
achievement of the objectives 
drawn by the declaration, 
signing it or expressing their 
adhesion in principle. The 
direction taken by several 
higher education reforms 
launched in the meantime in 
Europe has proven the 
Governments determination to 
action [sic] 
Several European countries have 
accepted the invitation to 
commit themselves to achieving 
the objectives set out in the 
declaration, by signing it or 
expressing their agreement in 
principle. The direction taken by 
several higher education reforms 
launched in the meantime in 
Europe has proved many 
Governments’ determination to 
act. 
6 Undertake a joint endeavour 
based on intergovernmental 
cooperation as well as (where 
applicable according to the treaties 
and the principle of subsidiarity) 
on activities with universities and 
the higher education community 
in general, 
There are reasons for 
satisfaction. Convergence 
needs nevertheless continuous 
impulse and we must keep up 
the pressure and make steps 
ahead. 
European universities on their 
side, have accepted the 
challenge and taken up a main 
role in the construction of the 
European area of higher 
education, also in the wake of 
the fundamental principles laid 
down in the Magna Charta 
Universitatum of 1988. This is 
of the highest importance, 
given that the Universities 
independence and autonomy 
ensure the higher education 
European higher education 
institutions, for their part, have 
accepted the challenge and taken 
up a main role in constructing 
the European area of higher 
education, also in the wake of 
the fundamental principles laid 
down in the Bologna Magna 
Charta Universitatum of 1988. 
This if of the highest 
importance, given that 
Universities’ independence and 
autonomy ensure that higher 
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and research systems 
continuous adaptation to the 
changing needs, the demands 
of society and the advances in 
scientific knowledge. 
education and research systems 
continuously adapt to changing 
needs, society’s demands and 
advances in scientific knowledge. 
7 aimed at the gradual 
creation of a European higher 
education space, which should be 
implemented in the years leading 
up to 2006 for the European 
Union and the European 
Economic Area, with a view to: 
Treaty of Amsterdam 
with provisions for enhanced 
cooperation provides 
important instrument. Will 
allow to resort (?) [sic]to 
Commission, that has played 
important role in promoting 
Europe of knowledge 
The course has been set 
in the right direction and with 
meaningful determination. The 
process of convergence of the 
systems of higher education 
requires nevertheless constant 
impulse in order to be fully 
accomplished. It is necessary 
to support it promoting 
concrete measures to achieve 
tangible steps ahead. 
Yesterday’s meeting has seen 
the participation of 
authoritative experts and 
scholars from all our countries 
and provides us with very 
useful suggestions on the 
initiatives to be taken. 
The course has been set in 
the right direction and with 
meaningful purpose. The 
achievement of greater 
compatibility and comparability 
of the systems of higher 
education nevertheless requires 
continual momentum in order to 
be fully accomplished. We need 
to support it through promoting 
concrete measures to achieve 
tangible forward steps. The 18th 
June meeting saw participation 
by authoritative experts and 
scholars from all our countries 
and provides us with very useful 
suggestions on the initiatives to 
be taken. 
8 1. eliminate remaining 
obstacles, in order to allow 
students, teachers and graduates 
to effectively exercise their 
recognised rights to free mobility 
and equal treatment, in areas 
concerning 
Academic day has 
offered very useful suggestions. 
We must look with 
special attention at the 
objective to increase the 
international competitiveness 
of the European system of 
higher education. The vitality 
and efficiency of any 
civilisation is measured in fact 
by the attraction that its 
cultural system exerts on other 
We must in particular look 
at the objective of increasing the 
international competitiveness of 
the European system of higher 
education. The vitality and 
efficiency of any civilisation can 
be measured by the appeal that 
its culture has for other 
countries. We need to ensure 
that the European higher 
Appendix 
  
 296 
countries. We need to ensure 
that the European system of 
higher education acquires in 
the world a degree of attraction 
equal to our extraordinary 
cultural and scientific 
traditions. 
education system acquires a 
world-wide degree of attraction 
equal to our extraordinary 
cultural and scientific traditions. 
9 -access of students in initial 
and lifelong higher education to 
study and training opportunities as 
well as to related social services 
such as accommodation, funding 
etc. 
We must also promote 
specificity of European system 
of higher education to make it 
more identifiable and 
competitive abroad. 
While reaffirming our 
full support to the principles 
laid down in the Sorbonne 
declaration, we engage in 
concerting our governing 
action for the attainment in the 
short term, and in any case 
within the first decade of the 
third millennium, of the 
following objectives that we 
deem of primary relevance in 
order to establish the 
European area of higher 
education and for the 
promotion of the European 
system of higher education in 
the world 
While affirming our 
support to the general principles 
laid down in the Sorbonne 
declaration, we engage in co-
ordinating our policies to reach 
in the short term, and in any case 
within the first decade of the 
third millennium, the following 
objectives, which we consider to 
be of primary relevance in order 
to establish the European area of 
higher education and to promote 
the European system of higher 
education world-wide 
9 Access of 
teachers/researchers and 
administrative staff in higher 
education to temporary or 
permanent employment without 
losing their rights to pension, 
social security, unemployment or 
other benefits; 
For this need to improve 
readability and comparability 
and introduce characterising 
elements in curricula; 
-adoption of a system of 
degrees easily readable and 
comparable in order to 
promote the European 
citizens’ employability and the 
international competitiveness 
of the European systems of 
higher education. 
Adoption of a system of 
easily readable and comparable 
degrees, also through the 
implementation of the Diploma 
supplement, in order to promote 
European citizens employability 
and the international 
competitiveness of the European 
higher education system. 
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9 2. Build up the necessary 
European dimensions of a higher 
education space, in terms of: 
While reaffirming full 
support to Sorbonne 
declaration principles we 
engage in convergent efforts to 
attain – at the earliest and 
anyhow within the first decade 
of year 2000 – following 
objectives of primary 
importance to implement 
European space of higher 
education and ‘European 
identity of higher education’. 
Adoption of a system 
based on two cycles, the first 
of three years at least, 
spendable on the European 
labour market and in the 
higher education system as an 
adequate level of qualification. 
Adoption of a system 
essentially based on two main 
cycles, undergraduate and 
graduate. Access to the second 
cycle shall require successful 
completion of first cycle studies, 
lasting a minimum of three 
years. The degree awarded after 
the first cycle shall also be 
relevant to the European labour 
market as an appropriate level of 
qualification. The second cycle 
should lead to the master and/or 
doctorate degree as in many 
European countries. 
9 -preparation of all students 
and graduates to the European 
dimensions of personal, civic and 
professional life in 
Promote specificity of 
European system of degrees 
easily readable and comparable 
to favour employability and 
competitiveness (single 
European higher education 
currency). 
Establishment of a 
system of credits – developing 
the ECTS – acquired also in 
non higher education contexts, 
as a proper means to favour 
the most wide and diffused 
student mobility. 
Establishment of a system 
of credits – such as in the ECTS 
system – as a proper means of 
promoting the most widespread 
student mobility. Credits should 
also be acquired in non-higher 
education contexts, including 
lifelong learning, provided that 
they are recognised by receiving 
universities concerned. 
9 [second page unavailable] -Adopt a system based 
on more cycles; the first of 
three years must be spendable 
on European labour market 
and in European higher 
education system as initial 
qualification level. 
Elimination of remaining 
obstacles to the effective 
exercise of the rights to free 
mobility and equal treatment 
with particular attention to : 
 
Promotion of mobility by 
overcoming obstacles to the 
effective exercise of free 
movement with particular 
attention to: 
9  -Establishment of credits -with regard to students, -for students, access to 
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– also earned in other contexts, 
but guaranteed by universities – 
as tool for student mobility. 
access to all services related to 
education 
 
study and training opportunities 
and to related services. 
9  [second page unavailable] -with regard to teachers, 
researchers and administrative 
staff, recognition and 
valorisation of periods spent in 
a European contest 
researching, teaching and 
training, without prejudice to 
their rights to pension and 
social security. 
 
For teachers, researchers 
and administrative staff, 
recognition and valorisation of 
periods spent in a European 
context researching, teaching 
and training, without prejudicing 
their statutory rights. 
9   -promotion of criteria 
and methodologies for quality 
assessment 
 
Promotion of European 
co-operation in quality assurance 
with a view to developing 
comparable criteria and 
methodologies 
9   -implementation of the 
necessary European dimension 
of the higher education space, 
particularly with regards to the 
curricular contents, inter-
institutional cooperation, 
mobility schemes and 
integrated programmes of 
study, training and research. 
Promotion of the 
necessary European dimensions 
in higher education, particularly 
with regards to curricular 
development, inter-institutional 
co-operation, mobility schemes 
and integrated programmes of 
study, training and research. 
10   We hereby commit to 
attain these objectives – each 
in the framework of our 
institutional competences and 
in full respect of the diversity 
of cultures, languages, national 
We hereby undertake to 
attain these objectives – within 
the framework of our 
institutional competences and 
taking full respect of the 
diversity of cultures, languages, 
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education systems and of 
University autonomy – for the 
consolidation of the European 
area of higher education. To 
that purpose we will pursue the 
ways of intergovernmental 
cooperation and those in the 
framework of the European 
Union (where applicable, on 
the basis of the subsidiarity 
principle and availing ourselves 
of the strengthened 
cooperation instrument) as 
well as of the other European 
institutions within competence 
of higher education. 
national education systems and 
of University autonomy – to 
consolidate the European area of 
higher education. To that end, 
we will pursue the ways of 
intergovernmental cooperation, 
together with those of non 
governmental European 
organisations with competence 
on higher education. We expect 
Universities again to respond 
promptly and positively and to 
contribute actively to the success 
of our endeavour. 
11   Convinced that the 
establishment of the European 
area of higher education 
requires constant support, 
supervision and adaptation to 
the continuously evolving 
needs, we decide to meet again 
within three years in order to 
assess the progress achieved 
and the new steps to be taken. 
Convinced that the 
establishment of the European 
area of higher education requires 
constant support, supervision 
and adaptation to the 
continuously evolving needs, we 
decide to meet again within two 
years in order to assess the 
progress achieved and the new 
steps to be taken. 
 
